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Abstract
In cyber security systems, various security protocols have been developed to provide trust-
worthy communications. However, designing security protocol is challenging and error-
prone, which is well illustrated by many security protocols attacks. Hence, it is necessary
to provide a verification framework where the security protocols can be formally checked.
In this thesis, we first analyze a vehicle charging protocol to show the strengths and weak-
nesses of existing methods. Then, we propose a verification framework, where the security
protocols can be intuitively specified and efficiently verified. Comparing with the exist-
ing methods, our verification method requires no abstraction during the verification and
works for an unbounded number of protocol sessions. Security protocols in real-world use
not only cryptography but also physical properties. Hence, we develop a generic analysis
method to the protocols that consider physical properties. We analyze a family of software-
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Trustworthy communications are needed in the cyber systems. In order to provide the
security, various security protocols are developed. However, designing security protocol
is challenging and error-prone, which is well illustrated by many attacks found in the
security protocols. Hence, it is necessary to provide a verification framework where the
security protocols can be formally checked.
In our first work, we analyze a complex vehicle charging protocol to show the strengths
and weaknesses of existing verification methods. Many interesting properties are analyzed
such as secrecy, authentication and privacy. The analysis shows that manual modeling
abstractions are generally needed to ensure the termination of the verification, making the
protocol specification less intuitive and more laborious. Additionally, false alarms can be
introduced when verification considers specific domain knowledge.
Then, in our second work, we propose a security protocol verification framework,
where the security protocols can be intuitively specified and efficiently verified. Compar-
ing with the existing methods, our verification method requires no abstraction during the
verification and works for an unbounded number of protocol sessions. Our research shows
that this framework can be applied to specific domains, e.g., the timed domain, easily.
The correctness of our verification algorithm has been formally proved. We implement
our method into a tool and use it to verify many timed and untimed security protocols
successfully.
Security protocols in real-world use not only cryptography primitives but also physical
ix
properties. Hence, we investigate a family of software-based attestation protocols that are
in this category so as to provide an analysis approach for them. These attestation protocols,
comparing with traditional hardware-based (e.g., TPM-based) attestation protocols, do not
require any hardware support in the attestation. Instead, their security are provided by the
computation limitation of the target devices. We analyze these protocols in three stages.
First, we propose a generic specification for them that captures most existing software-
based attestation protocols. Then, we formalize various security criteria that should be
satisfied by the generic scheme. Finally, we apply the security criteria back to the existing
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Security protocols usually are short programs that use cryptographic primitives to provide
secure communications in insecure networks, such as the Internet and the networks used
in the cyber-physical systems. They are widely used in our daily lives in, e.g., bank trans-
actions, mobile phones, wifi networks, e-votings. However, these security protocols (and
their manual proofs) are error-prone, which is well illustrated by the famous Needham-
Schroeder public-key protocol [93] where a security attack is found by Gavin Lowe 18
years after its publication [83]. Many new attacks are still being discovered continuously
to the manually proved protocols [4, 6, 35, 105, 100, 61]. As security protocols are de-
signed to provide security, their design flaws usually have serious consequences, which
can lead to the loss of money or even human lives. Even though correctness proofs for se-
curity protocols can be given manually [46], manual proving their correctness is extremely
hard when we consider (1) an active network attacker who controls the whole network, as
well as (2) infinitely many protocol sessions running in parallel at the same time. Hence,
an automatic verification framework for the security protocols that can generate machine
proofs automatically would be extremely useful.
However, developing a fully automatic approach to verify security protocols is chal-
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lenging. First, we need to provide a consistent specification method for describing the
security protocols and their security properties. Second, we need to develop a verifica-
tion algorithm that can either prove the correctness of the protocols or generate attack
instances. In order to prove the correctness of security protocols, we need to consider
an unbounded number of protocol sessions that are running at the same time during the
verification. Since verifying the security protocols in this scenario is undecidable in gen-
eral [41] (the termination of the verification cannot be ensured), we need to develop an
algorithm that can terminate on most of the practically used security protocols. Third, our
framework should be able to be applied to specific domains. For instance, as many se-
curity protocols consider time and they might be vulnerable under the timing attacks, our
framework should be capable of verifying timed security protocols.
1.1 Literature Review
Many symbolic verification logics are proposed to check security protocols using, e.g.,
Horn logic, strand space logic and multiset rewriting logic.
Horn Logic. Using Horn logic to verify security protocol was first proposed by Weiden-
bach [119]. Later in [29], Blanchet extended Weidenbach’s method with abstraction of
nonces, so that Horn logic can be used to specify and verify security protocols practically.
Their approach generally works as follows. First, they represent adversary capabilities
with Horn logic rules. For instance, the decryption capability of the adversary can be
represented by the rule encs(m, k), k → m, where encs is a symmetric encryption func-
tion, m is a message and k is a key. It means that if the adversary knows the encryption
encs(m, k) and the key k then he can get the plaintext m using the decryption function.
In this method, the security protocols can be formalized by the adversary’s capabilities so
as to facilitate efficient verification against various attacks. Then, a verification algorithm,
similar to the forward searching, is proposed to check the secrecy property of messages.
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Comparing with the traditional forward searching where a rule’s conclusion is reachable
when its premises are satisfied, this new searching algorithm treats the rule’s conclusion
as reachable when all of the premises in the rule are variables. For example, suppose we
have two rules such that m, k → encs(m, k) and encs(A, k)→ S, where m is a message,
k is a key, A and S are two constants. The verification algorithm takes encs(m, k) in the
first rule as reachable because its premises are variables. Then, the algorithm uses the con-
clusion from the first rule to fulfill the premise of the second one, generating a new rule
A, k → S. This new rule means that the constant S is reachable whenever the constant A
is reachable. The variable k can be ignored because the adversary can use any message
as k (it is an unrelated variable). In addition, in order to help the verification to terminate,
the algorithm proposed in [29] over-approximates the protocol execution by merging the
nonces when the protocol sessions have the same input sequence. Even though finding
attacks and proving correctness for security protocols are undecidable in general, the veri-
fication method proposed in [29] can be used to analyze real-world security protocols and
terminate quickly.
In [30], Blanchet proposed to extend the secrecy checking to verify two types of au-
thentication properties, i.e., non-injective agreement and injective agreement. In order to
clearly specify the authentication properties, Blanchet uses an init event to represent the
initialization of a protocol session and an accept event to stand for the acceptance of a
protocol session. Then, the non-injective agreement means that for every accept event
emitted, there exists a corresponding init event engaged before. The injective agreement
additionally requires that every init event can correspond to at most one accept event. By
following the secrecy checking algorithm, they can verify the non-injective agreement us-
ing a reachability checking with two phases. In the first phase, they need to ensure that
the accept event is reachable. Then, in the second phase, they need to ensure that that ac-
cept event can only be reached after the corresponding init event is engaged. Furthermore,
the injective agreement is satisfied if the following two conditions are satisfied. First, for
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every accept event engaged in the protocol, the corresponding init event must be engaged
before. Second, for every init event engaged in the protocol, at most one corresponding
accept event can be engaged later.
Strong secrecy [31] is an observational equivalence property, that can be verified using
Horn logic as well. It ensures that the adversary cannot observe any difference between
two protocol instantiations which differ in some secret values. In [31], they introduced a
predicate testunif to the Horn logic. testunif (p, p′) is true if and only if p 6= p′ and there
exists a substitution σ that σp = σp′ by substituting the secret value and the adversary can
get the terms for the substitution. Obviously, when testunif (p, p′) is true, the adversary
can send the terms to the protocol to distinguish the values used in the protocol sessions.
In addition to the strong secrecy, Blanchet et al. proposed a way to check selected equiv-
alence [32], which ensures observational equivalence when the changed secret value is
selected from a finite set. Selected equivalence should be preserved by protocols such as
the e-voting, where a voter’s vote should be unobservable by the adversary and the possible
vote (candidate) are selected from a finite set of values. In [31] and [32], the observational
equivalence can only be checked against two protocol instantiations of the same structure.
Cheval et al. [43] proposed to check observational equivalence for protocols with differ-
ent structures by imposing a fail case in verification. So given two structurally different
protocols, they are observational equivalent if they both fail or they satisfy the selected
equivalence.
Strand Space. In [118], Thayer et al. proposed strand space to check security protocol.
A strand represents a protocol interaction trace, consisting of a sequence of events such
as sending, receiving, encrypting and decrypting messages. Given a limited number of
strands, there exist a limited number of ways for them to interact with each other. The
state space of combining the strands is thus called strand space. Hence, by exhausting
the states in the strand space, either the protocol is proved as secure or an attack is found.
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Notice that the proving process is not automated in [118]. Later, Song [112] proposed a
method to automate the verification process using strand processes. They implement their
method into a tool named Athena. Model checking technique is adopted to formalize the
protocol execution and pruning theorems are employed to prunes the search space which
increase its verification efficiency. The weakness of this work is that they could only give
verification to security protocol with a bounded number of sessions.
Cremers followed Song’s work and developed a tool named Scyther [48]. Scyther can
verify security protocols with an unbounded number of sessions if a finite number of pat-
terns, the ways that the strands can compose together, can be found during the verification.
Even though Scyther does not give unbounded verification to all security protocols, it has
the advantage in formalizing various adversary models that could be stronger than Delov-
Yao model [56]. In the Delov-Yao model, the adversary has full control over the network,
but he cannot compromise the keys and messages used in the protocol. When forward
secrecy, weak forward secrecy, etc. are required, we need to verify the protocols against
the adversaries who can compromise keys and messages. By using the strand space, these
adversaries can be modeled in a straight forward manner. In [49, 24, 118, 50, 25, 26, 51],
Cremers et al. propose several extensions to Scyther that consider different attack models
in the verification.
Multiset Rewriting. Multiset rewriting was first proposed by Cervesato et al. [41] to
specify and verify security protocols using multiset rewriting rules. Multiset rewriting
considers the protocol execution as rewriting terms in the knowledge base. However, mul-
tiple rewriting rules can be applied at the same time. Schmidt et al. [104] uses multiset
rewriting to specify protocols and adversary capabilities. In addition, a guarded fragment
of first-order logic is adopted to specify security properties. Furthermore, equational the-
ories are employed to model the algebraic properties of cryptographic operators. Schmidt
et al. developed a tool named Tamarin [89] based on this method.
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Tamarin has the specification flexibility of Scyther where the sessions can be explicitly
specified in the model. Comparing with Scyther where different adversary model is built-
in and fixed, the adversary model in Tamarin can be specified by the users directly using
multiset writing rules. Even though Tamarin is strong in protocol specification capability,
modeling protocols with multiset rewriting rules directly is hard and error-prone for the
end-users. In general, multiset rewriting approach is a combination of the Horn logic
approach and the strand space approach. It divides the trace of the protocol execution
into small fragments so that protocols can be verified more efficiently than using strand
space. Additionally, it preserved the trace information so that interesting properties, e.g,
forward secrecy, can still be easily specified and verified. In [73], Kremer et al. proposed
to translate stateful applied pi-calculus to multiset rewriting rules and use Tamarin [89] as
its backend to verify stateful protocols.
1.2 The Objectives and Contributions
The research gaps for symbolic verification of security protocols are listed as follows.
• Several symbolic verification tools [29, 48, 89] based on different theoretical foun-
dations, e.g., Horn logic, strand space logic and multiset rewriting logic, are devel-
oped. They have been used to analyze many security protocols successfully. How-
ever, given a certain security protocol and a specific security property, it is unclear
which tool is better to use for the verification. It is also interesting to investigate
whether they have weaknesses in verifying certain types of protocols.
• Since the verification of security protocols is undecidable, many tools either need ab-
straction in the verification which gives false alarms, or can only handle a bounded
number of protocol sessions. In addition, when verifying security protocols in spe-
cific domains, some abstraction can lead to meaningless verification results. For
instance, in ProVerif [29], the nonces with the same name are merged even if they
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are generated in different sessions, when they have the same session interaction his-
tory. So, given an expired session key (a nonce) generated in the previous session,
it may can be used in a new session because the session key used in the new session
remains the same. Hence, when an expired session key (a nonce) is merged with an
unexpired session key generated in a new session, the expired session key can still
be used in the new session since they share the same value. When a verification tool
adopted this abstraction, a false alarm will be triggered saying that an expired ses-
sion key is accepted in the protocol. However, this attack cannot be conducted in the
real protocol because the nonces generated in different sessions should be different.
So we need to find a new verification method without the abstraction when time is
involved in the protocol verification.
• Given a symbolic verification framework, verifying security protocols used in prac-
tice is still challenging, as their designs consider the execution environment where
physical properties and hardware features play important roles.
In this thesis, we thus wants to study above research gaps and develop techniques to
bridge the gaps. The contributions of this thesis are listed as follows.
• In order to show the strengths and weaknesses of different verification approaches,
we analyze a motivating security protocol that considers many security properties
such as the secrecy, authentication and privacy. The analysis reveals many prob-
lems in existing tools. First, manual modeling abstractions are generally needed to
ensure the termination of the verification, making the protocol specification effort
less intuitive and more laborious. Second, false positives can be introduced when
verification considers specific domain knowledge. Third, the verification for an un-
bounded number of sessions cannot always terminate for medium or even small
sized protocols with existing tools.
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• Based on the case study, we propose a security verification framework that can be
flexibly extended to specific domains, for instance, the timed domain. The security
protocols can be specified by either timed logic rules or timed applied pi-calculus in
our framework. In order to verify the timed security protocols, we ensure that no
abstraction is made during the verification. The correctness of security protocols are
formally proved. We implement our method into a tool and use it to verify many
timed and untimed security protocols successfully.
• Security protocols in real-world tend to be more complex, which use their execu-
tion environment (i.e., hardware performance) to provide security. In order to de-
velop an analysis approach that works for protocols in this case, we investigate a
family of software-based attestation protocols that fall into this category. These at-
testation protocols, comparing with traditional hardware-based (e.g., TPM-based)
attestation protocols, do not require any hardware support in the attestation. Instead,
their attestation are based on the computation limitation of the target devices. We
analyze these protocols in three stages. First, we propose a generic specification
for software-based attestation protocols that captures most existing software-based
attestation protocols. Then, we formalize various security criteria that should be
satisfied by the generic scheme. Finally, we apply the security criteria back to the
existing software-based attestation protocols. Using this approach, we find several
security flaws successfully.
1.3 Publications
The work in Chapter 2 was published in the proceeding of the 19th international con-
ference on engineering of complex computer systems [76]. The work in Chapter 3 was
published in the proceeding of the 16th international conference on formal engineering
methods [77]. The work in Chapter 4 was originally published in the proceeding of the
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20th international symposium on formal methods [78], and its journal version is about
to be submitted to IEEE transactions on software engineering. Additionally, the work in
Chapter 5 was published in the proceeding of the 16th international conference on formal
engineering methods [75].
Overview. The goal of this thesis is to verify security protocols where both of cryp-
tography primitives and physical properties are used. I first present a case study on an
electric vehicle charging protocol (EVCP) to evaluate the existing tools. EVCP involves
many complex security properties, including secrecy, authentication and location privacy.
Hence, I used it as an example for verifying cryptography and physical properties together.
Then, I propose a symbolic verification method for timed protocols that are more related
to cryptography in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, I propose a generic analysis
method for software-based attestation protocols that are more related to physical proper-
ties. Then, future works are discussed in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Evaluation of Existing Tools: Symbolic Analysis of
an Electric Vehicle Charging Protocol
In this chapter, we describe our analysis of a recently proposed electric vehicle charing
protocol [80]. The protocol builds on complex cryptographic primitives such as commit-
ment [96], zero-knowledge proofs, BBS+ signature [16] and etc. Moreover, interesting
properties such as secrecy, authentication, anonymity, and location privacy are claimed in
this protocol. It thus presents a challenge for formal verification, as no single existing tool
for security protocol analysis can verify all the required properties. In our analysis, we
employ and combine the strength of two state-of-the-art symbolic verifiers, Tamarin and
ProVerif, to check all important properties of the protocol.
2.1 Introduction
Electric vehicles are promising and futuristic automobiles which use electric batteries for
clean energy. They dominate conventional vehicles from several aspects such as air pol-
lution reductions, less power emissions and lower oil dependencies. In order to support
the wide adoption of electric vehicles, Vehicle- to-Grid (V2G) is proposed. In V2G, it
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is possible and highly recommended to do charging when the demand is low, especially
after midnight, and to send the electricity back (recharging) to the system during the peak
time. Despite these advantages, one of the concerns is the potential privacy leakage along
with the charging route. Since energy storage devices cannot meet the requirement for
long-term driving, electric vehicles need to visit charging stations frequently for energy
supplying. As a consequence, the location privacy disclosed along with the charging and
recharging behaviors has drawn particular attentions.
Due to this specific application requirement, a privacy-preserving electric vehicle charg-
ing protocol (ECP) has been recently designed by Liu et al. [80]. In this protocol, vari-
ous complex cryptographic primitives are used and many security properties are claimed.
Firstly, the user could make commitment to some data and expose the key later to open
the commitment. It requires that the secrecy properties of the keys are related to the or-
der of events happened in the protocol. Specifically, the commitment scheme requires
that the private opening keys for the commitments should be unknown to the supplier
until the user exposes them explicitly in the protocol. Secondly, this protocol supports
the two-way transmission, which means the users are allowed to charge their vehicle at
the stations, as well as recharge the electricity back to the stations with their balance re-
funded. This is achieved using multiple generators in the commitment scheme which is
homomorphic, such that operations could be made on commitment to change the balance
without knowing the explicit value. In addition, the supplier is potentially dishonest in
this protocol. Injective agreement between the user and the supplier should always be
guaranteed, which ensures that the supplier could only charge the users just as he should.
Fourthly, the protocol is stateful in which manipulations over global mutable state are re-
quired. In this protocol, each user gets an account state after the registration. He needs to
use the information stored in the state to communicate with the supplier in the later ses-
sions and update them after each successful transaction.1 Lastly, privacy properties such as
1 As a result, some security protocol checkers could not terminate or even specify this protocol because of
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anonymity and location privacy should be preserved by the protocol against the supplier.
Anonymity makes sure that the supplier could not get any partial information about the
users when they charge and recharge at the stations. Meanwhile, location privacy ensures
that the supplier could not identify the station where users perform charing or recharging.
In this protocol, privacy properties are achieved by using the zero-knowledge proofs and
BBS+ signature [16] with commitment scheme.
Even though most of security protocol are designed carefully and manual proofs are
given along with their publication, the protocols as well as their proofs are still proven to
be error-prone [21, 64]. This can be well illustrated by the famous Needham-Schroeder
public-key protocol [94], in which a security flaw was found by Gavin Lowe 17 years af-
ter its publication [83]. Therefore, automatic verification is very helpful for ensuring the
correctness or finding attack on security protocols. In this chapter, we thoroughly perform
a formal analysis for the electric vehicle charging protocol [80]. As many symbolic tools,
such as Scyther [48], Tamarin [89], ProVerif [29], StateVerif [13], and Athena [113] have
been developed for automatic analysis of security protocols using different approaches,
selecting the right techniques and tools to verify a complex protocol such as [80] is non-
trivial. Due to the number of security and privacy properties claimed by the protocol, no
single protocol verifier could give a complete verification of the protocol at present. Thus,
we combine the verification capacities from Tamarin and ProVerif, to give a thorough ver-
ification of the protocol: Tamarin [89] can handle stateful protocols naturally and allows
us to check event order related secrecy and authentication properties, while ProVerif [29]
can check observational equivalence [32] so that we use it for checking privacy properties.
Our contributions. First, we present a study of a few state-of-the-art symbolic tools for
security protocol analysis and discuss their strength and weakness. We then propose to
combine the verification capacities of Tamarin and ProVerif to analyze the electric vehicle








FIGURE 2.1: Protocol Overview
charging protocol, in which secrecy, authentication and privacy properties all play impor-
tant roles. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to use Tamarin and ProVerif
for analyzing a single protocol in a compositional approach. Tamarin is used to check
event order related secrecy and authentication properties and ProVerif is used to check
privacy related properties. We formally define the properties claimed by the protocol and
give their verification results in Tamarin and ProVerif.
Structure of the chapter. In Section 2.2, we present the structural overview for this
protocol, the cryptographic primitives used in the protocol and the properties required
by this protocol. We then describe and compare four state-of-the-art security protocol
verifiers in details and address the reasons why we choose ProVerif and Tamarin as the
verification tools for this protocol in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, we will illustrate the
modeling in Tamarin along with the verification for secrecy and authentication properties.
In Section 2.5, we will show how we specify protocol in ProVerif as well as the anonymity
and privacy properties checked. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section 2.6
2.2 The Protocol
In this chapter, we perform formal verification for the properties claimed by an electronic
vehicle charging protocol [80]. This protocol is designed to protect the users’ privacy,
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e.g., anonymity and unlinkability, against the supplier even when they frequently charge
and recharge at the stations. It consists of four sub-routines such as registration, charging,
recharging and statement, whose overall structure2 is shown in Figure 2.1.
Registration. Firstly, the users need to register at the information center. They show their
identities to the supplier and pay a default deposit to open their accounts. The supplier
then give each user a token in return with his balance embedded inside.
Charging and Recharging. During the charging and recharging phases, the users provide
their token to the station in an anonymous way. After checking the token, the station will
update the token and send it back to the user. Since the station can record the information
he receives from the users, the charging and recharging transactions should be taken in a
partially blind way.
Statement. When the balance in the user’s account is running low, the users could go to the
information center again to disclose their identities and top-up money directly into their
accounts.
2.2.1 Cryptographic Primitives
To achieve the desired properties, various cryptographic primitives have been used in the
protocol, including commitment, zero knowledge proof, and BBS+ signature combined
with bilinear pairing.
Commitment. This protocol used the well known commitment scheme developed by Ped-
ersen [96], in which a secret opening value t is chosen randomly by the committer to com-
pute the commitment c over a tuple of public values (x0, x1, . . . , xn) asC(x0, x1, . . . , xn, t) =
gx00 g
x1




n+1. t is unknown to the public at first. When the committer wants to prove
that c is the commitment for (x0, x1, . . . , xn) he made, he could reveal the opening value t
2 The dash rectangles represent the anonymous charging and recharging operations taking place at the
stations.
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so that everyone can test if the following equation holds
C (x0, x1, . . . , xn, t)
?
= c.
It has been proven based on certain assumptions [92] that given a commitment c, no poly-
nomial algorithm exists to find the opening value t effectively with respect to 〈x0, x1, . . . , xn〉,
if 〈x0, x1, . . . , xn〉 and t are large random numbers. It has been proven that given a com-
mitment c, no polynomial algorithm exists to find the opening value t with respect to
(x0, x1, . . . , xn), which means only the committer could open the commitment c. Since
the commitment scheme is homomorphic, the multiplication of two commitments will
give a new commitment with its opening value that equals to the sum of the openings
from the formers. In this protocol, the commitment is constructed on the basis of four
independent generators in a cyclic group G denoted as g1, g2, g3, g4 ∈ G such that:





Zero-Knowledge Proof. As the protocol needs to preserve the privacy properties, the user
could not send the signatures, balances and etc. to the supplier directly. As a result, several
zero-knowledge proofs are used in this protocol. Zero knowledge proof schemes generally
could be represented by PK{(s0, . . . , sn) : f0 ∧ . . . ∧ fm} where PK is the proof given,
(s0, . . . , sn) are the private informations and f0 . . . fm are the targets the prover wants
to prove. As we treat the zero knowledge proofs as black boxes in the verification, we
modeled them as functions with two parts of information. One is the public information
pub and another is the private information pvt . The prover generates the proof based on
both of the public and private information denoted as prf (pub, pvt). To check the proof,
the verifier feeds the public information and the proof into the verification function in the
form of
verif (pub, prf (pub, pvt)) = true,
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which will return true only when they are correctly matched. Because the prover could
give the proof only if he knows the private information, the verifier could then be sure that
the prover has the private information he claimed.
BBS+ Signature with Bilinear Pairing. In this protocol, the BBS+ signature proposed
by Au et al. [16] is employed. It uses an additional generator g ∈ G. The BBS+ signature
allows the signer to produce signature in a partially blind way. Specifically, the signer
could compute a signature denoted as A(c, e, r) over a commitment c without knowing the
values encoded in c by
A(c, e, r) = (g ∗ c) 1e+r , (2.1)
where e is a fresh random number, r is the long-term private signing key of the signer,
and w = gr is the respective long-term public verification key. To verify the signature, a
bilinear pairing function eˆ is employed, satisfying that eˆ(ga, hb) = eˆ(g, h)ab. As a result,
everyone could verify the signature by testing
eˆ(A(c, e, r), w ∗ ge) ?= eˆ(g ∗ c, g). (2.2)
2.2.2 Protocol Overview
We give detailed descriptions for the four sub-routines of the protocol as follows.
Registration. The users need to create their accounts at the information center, before
they can charge their cars in the V2G system. At the information center, each user dis-
closes his identity I and pays a fixed deposit D to the supplier. Additionally, he freshly




3 along with a zero knowledge proof
p = PK1{(y′, s) : c0 = gy′0 gs3} to the supplier. After receiving I , c0 and p, the supplier















2 is 0, the
opening of the commitment encoded in A is the same as of c0. When the user gets A, y′′








the signature is verified successfully, the user stores the tuple (A, e, y′ + y′′, I,D, s) for
later operations.
Charging. Charging operations are conducted at the stations with users’ privacy pre-
served. Initially, the user has the tuple (A˜, e˜, y˜, I, B˜, s˜) stored in his device. Firstly, the








3 and sends it as









3 ∧ sˆ(A˜, wge˜) = eˆ(ggy˜0gI1gB˜2 gs˜3, g) ∧D ≥ B˜ − v ≥ 0}. After receiving c0,
s˜ and p, the supplier checks that s˜ has never been used and the proof is correct. If the
checking is passed, the supplier picks random numbers y′′ and e and computes the signa-






e+r where v is the amount of electricity charged. As can be seen,








3, so the balance is updated to
B˜ − v and the opening is unchanged. The supplier then sends A to the user with y′′ and e.
When the user receives the A, y′′ and e from the supplier, he verifies the correctness of A




2 and updates his internal state to (A, e, y
′ + y′′, I, B˜ − v, s).
Recharging. Recharging operation is the same as charging operation except that the up-
dated balance is increased rather than decreased. This could be achieved by multiplying a
commitment with a positive balance, which means that the supplier will compute the com-
mitment as c = c0 ∗ gy′′0 g+v2 to increase the balance by v. In addition, the zero knowledge
proof PK3 in Recharging phase is also the same as PK2 except that the balance checking
is rewritten into D ≥ B˜ + v ≥ 0.
Statement. When the user wants to increase the balance in his account, the user could
go to the information center and top-up money into his account so that the balance in this
account could be reset to the default deposit D. If the state stored in the user’s device
is (A˜, e˜, y˜, I, B˜, s˜), he needs to disclose his identity I and pay D − B˜ to the supplier.











3 ∧ sˆ(A˜, wge˜) = eˆ(ggy˜0gI1gB˜2 gs˜3, g)}. If s˜ has not been used before, the supplier checks









and e are freshly generated random numbers. Then, the supplier will send it with y′′ and e






2 , the user updates
the tuple in his device as (A, e, y′ + y′′, I,D, s) and completes the statement.
2.2.3 Assumptions
Complex cryptographic primitives are used in the protocol. Additionally, the protocol
requires redundancy checking, infinite set maintenance and algebra calculation. Modeling
these complex operations could easily lead to non-termination of the verification process.
Thus we make some assumptions below.
The cryptographic primitives are prefect. The adversary cannot guess the correct opening
value or forge another opening value to open the commitment. For zero-knowledge proofs,
we assume that they will not cause any information leakage for the secret values and they
can prove what they intended to prove. For BBS+ signature, signature could not be forged
without the signing key.
The supplier will not accept a same opening value twice. This assumption ensures that no
user could use the opening value and the signature issued from the supplier twice. The
reasons are as follows. The zero-knowledge proofs make sure that the opening value is
embedded in the commitment. Besides, the commitment scheme requires that no other
opening value could be forged. When the supplier receives a non-duplicated opening
value, if the verification is passed, the opening value and the signature should never be
used before.
Algebraic addition operation on random numbers never introduce duplicated values. In
the protocol, add function is used to compute the sum of two numbers, which is used in
cryptos such as BBS+ signature and commitment. In symbolic verification, we say two
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terms are equal when they are structurally equivalent. Since we only apply add function
to random numbers in the protocol, if algebraic operations on random numbers never in-
troduce duplicated values, two add results should be equal whenever they are structurally
equivalent, which ensures the correctness of the symbolic verification.
Balance bound checking in zero knowledge proofs are not considered. During the charging
and recharging, balance checking is implicitly checked in the zero knowledge proofs PK2
and PK3 . However, we omit the balance bound checking in PK2 and PK3 during the
verification, since < and ≤ conditions are not supported in ProVerif and Tamarin.
2.2.4 Primitives Modeling
According to the applications of the primitives and the structure of the protocol, we mod-
eled the primitives as follows:







3. We modeled them as resC(y, s) and chtC(y, I, B, s) in the tools. When the
supplier receives them, he computes the signature A accordingly in a consistent represen-
tation.
Zero Knowledge Proof. In this protocol, four zero knowledge proofs are used such as
PK1 , PK2 , PK3 and PK4 . Since the balance bound checking is omitted in PK2 and
PK3 , they become identical so we merged them into one zero knowledge proof of PK23 .
For PK1, the prover provides a proof knowledge regZK (c0, y′, s) with a verification func-
tion to check the correctness of c0
PK1 (resC (y′, s), regZK (resC (y′, s), y′, s)) = true.
In PK23 , the prover’s secrets are (A˜, e˜, y˜, I, B˜, y′, s) and the known information to the
supplier are (c0, s˜, r), so he provide a proof of chtZK (c0, A˜, e˜, y˜, I, B˜, y′, s) along with a
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verification function
PK23 (chtC (y′, I, B˜, s), s˜, r, chtZK (chtC (y′, I, B˜, s),
sysA(y˜, I, B˜, s˜, e˜, r), e˜, y˜, I, B˜, y′, s)) = true,
which checks if the c0 and A˜ are correctly formed with respect to (e˜, y˜, I, B˜, y′, s). For
statement sub-routine, the proof knowledge zk = stmZK (c0, A˜, e˜, y˜, y′, s). The verifier
check the zk with PK4 to ensure the c0 and A˜ are correct.
PK4 (resC (y′, s), s˜, I, B˜, r, stmZK (resC (y′, s),
sysA(y˜, I, B˜, s˜, e˜, r), e˜, y˜, y′, s)) = true.
BBS+ signature with bilinear pairing. We model the BBS+ signatures in a systematic
form as sysA(y, I, B, s, e, r) in which y is the addition of two nonces, I is the identity
of the user, B is the current balance in his account, s is the opening of the commitment
encoded in the signature, e is the random number chosen by the supplier and r is the private
signing key of the supplier. wge is modeled by compose(sysgr(r), e) = sysger(e, r)
and w = sysgr(r) is a public information. We defined an extract function to model the
behavior of (2.2) as
extract(sysA(y, I,D, s, e, r), sysger(e, r))
= syse(sysall(y, I,D, s))
in which the e and r is eliminated because of the bilinear function is used. Thus the user
could compute the value of syse(sysall(y, I,D, s)) directly.
2.3 Tools
Many symbolic tools, such as Scyther [48], Tamarin [89], ProVerif [29], StatVerif [13]
have been developed for automatic analysis of security protocols using several approaches.
They have different capabilities for analyzing different protocols with respect to different
properties.
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Scyther [48] is a tool based on the strand space [60] and the Athena [113] but extends them
with trace patterns to reduce the search space. Although unbounded verification could be
achieved by Scyther for some protocols, Scyther sometimes bounds the session number
to ensure termination of the verification. Additionally, stateful protocol verification and
privacy properties are not supported in Scyther.
Tamarin [89, 104] uses multiset rewriting [42] to specify the adversary’s capabilities to-
gether with a guarded fragment [11] of first-order logic for security properties and equa-
tional theories for algebraic properties. Due to the fact that multiset rewriting rules can
be directly specified in a model to represent the execution state of the protocol, Tamarin
becomes a powerful tool for verifying stateful protocols. Additionally, session indexes
can be specified in the query so that authentication properties and secrecy properties with
event ordering could be checked in Tamarin.
ProVerif [29] is developed actively since 2001, which uses Horn clauses to represent the
adversary’s capability and backward deduction to check for secrecy. Over approximation
on generated session nonces is deployed to limit the searching space but also leads to
false attacks. By combining the secrecy checking with inserting special events which
indicates the begin and end of the protocol execution [30], authentication checking is then
allowed in ProVerif. Blanchet et al. later extended ProVerif with observational equivalence
checking [32] and strong secrecy checking [31] so that privacy leakage can be found in
protocols.
StatVerif [13] later extends ProVerif with the global mutable state. It could handle proto-
col with explicit global state by converting the processes into a set of clauses upon which
ProVerif could verify. In the meanwhile, further abstractions are needed for verifying
protocol with infinite state spaces.
Comparison. The differences of these tools are summarized in Table 2.1. As the electric
charging protocol [80] analyzed in this chapter is a stateful protocol and it uses the commit-
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Property Scyther Tamarin ProVerif StatVerif
Secrecy UB/B UB UB UB
Authentication UB/B UB UB N.A.
Stateful Verification N.A. Infinite Weak Explicit
Explicit Event Index N.A. Supported N.A. N.A.
Strong Secrecy N.A. N.A. Supported N.A.
Observational Equivalence N.A. N.A. Supported N.A.
Table 2.1: Tool Comparison. (UB : Unbounded; B : Bounded; N.A. : Not Available.)
ment scheme which requires explicit event index ordering, Tamarin is the best candidate
for analyzing secrecy and authentication properties. On the other hand, strong secrecy and
observational equivalence are required for checking privacy properties in this protocol.
ProVerif is the only tool that supports these features. Thus, we integrate the verification
capacities from Tamarin and ProVerif to give a thorough verification of the protocol.
2.4 Analysis in Tamarin
2.4.1 Abstractions
We abstract the original protocol to ensure the termination of the verification process in
Tamarin. Since protocol abstraction can only introduce false alarms, if the protocol is
proven as secure after abstraction, its original version should be secure as well.
Fixing the balance for each sub-routines. During the verification in Tamarin, if the balance
is allowed to be increased and decreased in the protocol, verification procedure will try to
increase its value by infinite times without termination. Because the balance value is not
relevant to the secrecy and authentication properties considered in the verification, we
fixed the balance along the protocol execution. Since the balance is abstracted to a fixed
value, the charging and recharging behavior are then identical. So we merged them into
one operation denoted as cht in the model.
Setting the value y′′ to 0. In the protocol, y′′ is chosen randomly in every sub-routine by
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rule user_reg_0: 
    [ Fr(~yp)
    , Fr(~s) 
    , UserName($I) ]
    --[ UserInitEvent($I), UserGen($I, ~s)]-> 
    [ Out(resC(~yp, ~s))
    , Out(regZK(resC(~yp, ~s), ~yp, ~s))
    , UserReg($I, ~yp, ~s) ]
rule user_reg_1: 
    [ In(A)
    , !BalanceInit(D)
    , In(e)
    , !Pks(gr)
    , UserReg(I, yp, s) ]
    --[ Eq(extract(A, sysger(gr, e), syse(sysall(yp, I, D, s))), true) ]->
    [ User(A, e, yp, I, D, s) ]
rule server_reg:
    [ In(c)
    , In(zk)
    , !Sks(r)
    , UserName($I) 
    , !BalanceInit(D)
    , Fr(~e) ]
    --[ Eq(pk1(c, zk), true) ]-> 
    [ RegA(c, $I, D, ~e, r)
    , Out(~e) ]
rule user_cht_0:
    [ User(oA, oe, oy, I, oB, os)
    , Fr(~yp)
    , Fr(~s) ]
    --[ UserGen(I, ~s), UserReveal(I, os) ]-> 
    [ Out(chtC(~yp, I, oB, ~s))
    , Out(chtZK(chtC(~yp, I, oB, ~s), oA, oe, oy, I, oB, ~yp, ~s))
    , Out(os) 
    , UserCht(oA, oe, oy, I, oB, os, ~yp, ~s) ]
rule user_cht_1:
    [ UserCht(oA, oe, oy, I, B, os, yp, s)
    , In(A)
    , In(e) 
    , !Pks(gr) ]
    --[ UserChtEvent(I, os), Eq(extract(A, sysger(gr, e), syse(sysall(yp, I, B, s))), true) ]-> 
    [ User(A, e, yp, I, B, s) ]
rule server_cht:
    [ In(c)
    , In(zk)
    , In(os)
    , !Sks(r)
    , Fr(~e) ]
    --[ ServerChtEvent(os), Eq(pk23(c, zk, r, os), true) ]-> 
    [ ChtA(c, ~e, r) 
    , Out(~e) ]
FIGURE 2.2: Modeling in Tamarin
the supplier. When the supplier computes the signature, he adds y′′ to y′ which is encoded
in the commitment generated by the user. Since the add function is communicative, we
need to reflect the algebra property for add in the model. In the meanwhile, the multiset
rewriting rules can only apply to a whole message, so we have to rewrite all the mes-
sages where the add function may appear. As a result, the verification process could not
terminate because of the complexity introduced by the duplicated rules specified in the
model. In order to make the model terminable, we set the y′′ generated by the supplier to
0. Thus add(y′, y′′) is equivalent to y′ and modeling the behavior of the algebra function
add becomes unnecessary. In fact, y′′ is a public value as the supplier will send it out
in every session, so fixing its value will not affect the verification results for secrecy and
authentication checking.
2.4.2 Modeling
Multiset rewriting rules are specified in Tamarin to model the protocol execution. For
each sub-routine described in Section 2.2.2, we divide the user’s part into two phases. One
for sending out the commitment and zero-knowledge proofs, and the other for verifying
the signature and updating the internal state of the user. After the registration, every user
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maintains an internal state of User(A, e, y, I, B, s) in which A is the signature issued
from supplier, e and y are nonces, I is the identity of the user, B is the balance in the
user’s account and s is the opening for the user’s commitment encoded in A. Registration
and charging/recharging behaviors for both participants are shown in Figure 2.2. We use
user reg 0 and user reg 1 to represent the user actions during the registration, and use
server reg to specify the server’s registration behavior. User states are maintained for all
of the sub-routines. The two user actions in the registration phase are linked by the user
state UserReg. Charging/recharging and statement phases have similar structures. For
instance, in the charging phase, we use user crg 0 and user crg 1 to represent the user
actions during the charging, and use server crg to specify the server’s charging behavior.
As can be seen from the figure, a loop exists in the user charging/recharging phase, which
means that a user could do charging/recharging for infinite times. In Tamarin, pk1, pk23,
pk4 and signature checking are modeled according to Section 2.2.4. In order to check the
zero knowledge proofs and signatures, we defined an axiom on function Eq to test the
equivalence of two terms
Eq(x, y)⇒ x = y.
Thus Eq(pk1(c, zk), true) could be tested along the execution. The models are available
in [1].
2.4.3 Checking Secrecy and Authentication
Secrecy. One interesting secrecy property required by the electric charging protocol is
the conditional secrecy property for the opening value s of the commitment. As the user
explicitly sends the opening s out for verification, s will be known to the public. In the
meanwhile, s should be kept secret before the user intends to do so.
Definition 2.1. (Commitment secrecy). A nonce s satisfies commitment secrecy with re-
spect to the event open if and only if s is secret before event open is engaged.
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This property can be specified in Tamarin as follows:
∀I, s, i, j.generate(I, s)@i ∧ know(s)@j
=⇒ (∃r.open(I, s)@r ∧ r < j)
in which i, j and r are session ids, I is the identity of the user, and s is the value that
should satisfy commitment secrecy regarding to open event. The formula means whenever
the opening value s generated by I is known to the adversary, there exists an event open
explicitly engaged by I before it is known.
Authentication. As this protocol is a charging protocol, we need to make sure that the
correspondences between the users and the supplier are established correctly. We adopt
the definition of non-injective agreement and agreement from [85] and formalize them for
the protocol in Tamarin. In the protocol, because we deem the supplier as the adversary,
the users need to make sure that the other participant of the protocol is taking the role of
supplier. Thus, we formalize the non-injective agreement between the supplier and the
user as
∀I, s, i.UserCht(I, s)@i =⇒ (∃r.SupplierCht(s)@r)
which means whenever a user is taking his role for charging or recharging, the supplier is
also taking his role in the protocol. Additionally, we formalize the injective agreement as
∀I, s, i.UserCht(I, s)@i =⇒ (∃r.SupplierCht(s)@r
∧ (∀j.UserCht(I, s)@j ⇒ i = j)).
The injective agreement makes sure that for any operation taken by the supplier, there is
only one corresponding user.
Verification results. We have checked the above properties against different scenarios of
the protocol, the verification results are summarized in Table 2.2. All the experiments are
conducted under Mac OS X 10.9.1 with 2.3 GHz Intel Core i5 and 16G 1333MHz DDR3.
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Routine Property Result Time Step
Charging
and Recharging
Secrecy SAT 1.72s 54
Non-injective Auth SAT 7.14s 231
Injective Auth SAT 1092.87s 23895
Statement
Secrecy SAT 1.12s 20
Non-injective Auth SAT 1.56s 33
Injective Auth SAT 9.09s 251
Charging, Recharging
and Statement
Secrecy N.T. - -
Non-injective Auth N.T. - -
Injective Auth N.T. - -
Table 2.2: Verification results for Tamarin : SAT - Satisfied, N.T. - Non-terminating
After the registration is finished, any user could do charging/recharging for infinite times
with these three properties being preserved. In addition, these properties are also hold for
infinite times of statement operations after registration. However, if we check the prop-
erties with the charging/recharging and statement sub-routines combined, the verification
procedure does not terminate.
2.5 Analysis in ProVerif
2.5.1 Abstractions
During the protocol modeling in ProVerif, some abstractions are made to ensure the ter-
mination of the verification process.
Fixing the values of y′′ and e. In ProVerif, the value of a newly generated nonce depends
on two factors: the name of the nonce and the value of the messages received before
the generation point. In Section 2.2.2, we have shown that two nonces y′′ and e will be
generated by the supplier in every session after the supplier receives the commitment, the
zero-knowledge proof and an opening value s˜. Additionally, the nonces y˜′′ and e˜ generated
in the last session are encoded in the zero-knowledge proof, which then leads to the infinite
dependency traces of y′′ and e. Thus, the verification process cannot terminate. To break
the infinite dependency chain, we model y′′ and e as two globally shared nonces instead
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of generating them freshly in every session. Because fixing the value of y′′ and e will
not affect the users’ privacy, this abstraction will not introduce false positives into the
verification result.
Setting the value of y′′ to 0 for intractability and unlinkability checking. During intractabil-
ity and unlinkability analysis, the communicative law required by the function add will
lead to the non-termination of the verification. Since we could not remove the communica-
tive law which may lead to false negatives, we set y′′ = 0 so that add(y′, y′′) is equivalent
to y′. Then we could safely eliminate the usage of add with its functionality preserved. As
the users’ privacy will not be weaken by fixing y′′, this abstraction will not introduce any
false positives either.
2.5.2 Modeling
During the modeling in ProVerif, locations are modeled by public channels and the users’
state are passed by the process arguments to simulate the protocol execution. We have
modeled eight processes for four communication sub-routines between the users and the
supplier by following the protocol specification described in Section 2.2.2. Since the in-
finite iterations cannot be specified in ProVerif model, we explicitly call different phases
when the current routine is finished. For instance, when we check location privacy, we call
UserCrg by passing the user state as arguments to the process. (See the models in [1].)
2.5.3 Checking Privacy
Users’ privacy is the main purpose of designing this protocol, in which the supplier is
the potential adversary for breaking the users’ privacy. In this section, we give precise
definitions of anonymity and location privacy for the protocol, and we investigate other
properties for the protocol as well, including intractability, anonymity, strong anonymity
and unlinkability. We present the verification results for all of them. Privacy properties
are normally modeled by observational equivalence in the applied pi calculus, which is
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a widely accepted approach [53, 12, 57]. In the following discussions, we use ECP to
represent the well-formed representation [12] for the electric vehicle charging protocol
and use Reg, Crg, Rcg and Stm for registration, charging, recharging and statement sub-
routines respectively. Rtn{n1/p1, . . . , nm/pm} means that the routine Rtn parameterized
with p1, . . . , pm is instantiated by the values n1, . . . , nm. Since the protocol is stateful,
Reg.Crg.Crg is different from Reg.(Crg|Crg). Additionally, infinite iterations of the
process cannot be specified in ProVerif, so we only give proofs to finite execution iterations
with infinite replications and define ECPReg and ECPCrg as follows
ECPReg =!v(i).Reg{i/id},
ECPCrg =!v(i).Reg{i/id}.Crg{i/id}.
Similarly, we could define the well-formed protocol for recharging as ECPRcg .
Location privacy. Location privacy should be guaranteed for the users’ behaviors in the
stations, which could be specified as
Definition 2.2. (Location privacy). A user A’s charging behavior conducted at station X
satisfies location privacy if there exists a user B at station Y s.t.
C[(Reg{A/id}.Crg{A/id , X/l}
|Reg{B/id}.Crg{B/id , Y/l})]
∼ C[(Reg{A/id}.Crg{A/id , Y/l}
|Reg{B/id}.Crg{B/id , X/l})].
The stations could be modeled in ProVerif by different channels. Location privacy
could also be defined for recharging behaviors similarly. In addition, we also specify
intractability for users’ behaviors as
Definition 2.3. (Intractability). Two subsequent charging behaviors conducted by a user
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A at station X satisfies intractability if there exists a user B and a station Y s.t.
C[(Reg{A/id}.Crg{A/id , X/l}.Crg{A/id , X/l}
|Reg{B/id}.Crg{B/id , Y/l}.Crg{B/id , Y/l})]
∼ C[(Reg{A/id}.Crg{A/id , X/l}.Crg{A/id , Y/l}
|Reg{B/id}.Crg{B/id , Y/l}.Crg{B/id , X/l})]
which means the adversary cannot distinguish if a user performs charging at a same
station or different stations. Similarly, we can define intractability for recharging behav-
iors.
Anonymity and strong anonymity. Anonymity should be preserved when the user is
doing the charging operation and the recharging operation at stations. Anonymity for
charging is defined as follows.
Definition 2.4. (Anonymity). A well formed protocol ECPCrg satisfies anonymity property
for a user A’s charging behavior if there exists a user B s.t.
C[ECPCrg |(Reg{A/id}|Reg{B/id}).Crg{A/id}]
∼ C[ECPCrg |(Reg{A/id}|Reg{B/id}).Crg{B/id}]
A stronger notion for anonymity is proposed in [12] which ensures that the adversary
cannot tell whether a user A has participated a protocol run or not.
Definition 2.5. (Strong anonymity). A well formed protocol ECPCrg satisfies strong
anonymity property for a user A’s charging behavior if
C[ECPCrg |Reg{A/id}]
∼ C[ECPCrg |Reg{A/id}.Crg{A/id}]
Similarly, we could define (strong) anonymity for recharging behaviors.
Unlinkability. In protocol ECP , unlinkability is claimed for charging and recharging
operations at stations so that the no adversary, including the supplier, could tell that two
operations are initiated by the same user.
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Routine Property Result Time
Charging
Location Privacy SAT 131.64s
Intractability SAT 13.87s
Anonymity SAT 1391.20s
Strong Anonymity SAT 1717.25s
Unlinkability SAT 5.94s
Recharging
Location Privacy SAT 132.43s
Intractability SAT 14.96s
Anonymity SAT 1372.65s
Strong Anonymity SAT 1804.23s
Unlinkability SAT 6.63s
Table 2.3: Verification results for ProVerif : SAT - Satisfied
Definition 2.6. (Unlinkability). A well formed protocol ECPCrg satisfies unlinkability for
a user A’s charging behavior if there exists a user B s.t.
C[(Reg{A/id}.Crg{A/id}.Crg{A/id})|(Reg{B/id})]
∼ C[(Reg{A/id}.Crg{A/id})|(Reg{B/id}.Crg{B/id})]
Verification results. We have successfully verified location privacy, intractability, anonymity,
strong anonymity and unlinkability for users’ charging and recharging behaviors in ProVerif.
We do the experiments under Mac OS X 10.9.1 with 2.3 GHz Intel Core i5 and 16G
1333MHz DDR3. The verification results are summarized in Table 2.3.
2.6 Discussions
In this chapter, we presented the verification of an electric vehicle charging protocol pro-
posed by Liu et al. [80] using two most efficient tools. We have checked various security
and privacy properties for the protocol, such as secrecy and authentication in Tamarin, and
location privacy, intractability, anonymity and unlinkability in ProVerif. Moreover, we
have addressed the capabilities of Tamarin and ProVerif. We are the first to combine their
symbolic verification results for a single protocol.
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During the verification, we find that Horn logic used by ProVerif is generally more
efficient than the multiset rewriting logic adopted in Tamarin. Furthermore, because the
multiset rewriting is very powerful as a specification language, where the protocol commu-
nications and states can be explicitly specified, a single protocol could be modeled in many
different ways. Thus, it is hard for its users to choose the right modeling method, as some
of the modeling methods might result in non-termination of the verification. Even though
the applied pi-calculus with protocol states [73] has been developed to model the (stateful)
protocols in Tamarin, it still needs its users to manually write theorems based on the ma-
chine generated multiset rewriting rules, which makes the modeling even more laborious.
On the other hand, security protocols can be modeled by the Horn logic in ProVerif using
the applied pi-calculus. Moreover, Horn logic can be translated from the applied pi-calculus
automatically. Hence, we conclude that Horn logic is more user-friendly as a specification
language comparing with multiset rewriting logic.
However, in order to help the termination of the verification in ProVerif [29] using
Horn logic, Blanchet [29] introduces an abstraction that merges the nonces in different
sessions when the nonces have the same name and the sessions have the same trace. This
abstraction can generally lead to false alarms to the protocol verification [77, 78] when the
commitment schemes [96] or the timing constraints [35, 84, 54] are involved. For instance,
consider the following process, where s is a secret constant.
P = !νn.c(x).c(n).if x = n then c(s).0
P generates a nonce n, receives a value x from network and then outputs the nonce n to
the network. If x is equal to n, P then sends out the secret s. Since the nonce n is a random
number that is unknown to the public until it is revealed, the value x can never equal to
n. So the secrecy property of s should be preserved. However, according to [45], ProVerif
reports false alarms because of its abstraction of nonces. We thus propose a verification
framework, in Chapter 3, based on Horn logic, which requires no abstraction during the
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verification. Hence, our framework facilitates the verification of security protocols, in-
volving time and commitment scheme. By using the framework provided in Chapter 3, we




Timed Security Protocol Verification
Quantitative timing is often relevant to the security of systems, like web applications,
cyber-physical systems, etc. Verifying timed security protocols is however challenging as
both arbitrary attacking behaviors and quantitative timing may lead to undecidability. In
this chapter, we propose a service framework to support intuitive modeling of the timed
protocol, as well as automatic verification of an unbounded number of protocol sessions.
The partial soundness and completeness of our verification algorithms are formally proved.
The evaluation results show that our approach is efficient and effective in both finding
security flaws and giving proofs.
3.1 Introduction
Timed security protocols are used extensively. Many security applications [103, 38, 23]
use time to guarantee the freshness of messages received over the network. In these appli-
cations, messages are associated with timing constraints so that they can only be accepted
in a predefined time window. As a result, relaying and replaying messages are allowed
only in a timely fashion. It is known that security protocols and their manual proofs are
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error-prone, which has been evidenced by multiple flaws found in existing proved proto-
cols [105, 100, 61, 20, 19, 18]. It is therefore important to have automatic tools to formally
verify these protocols.
However, existing methods and tools for security protocol verification often abstract
timestamps away by replacing them with nonces. The main reason is that most of the de-
cidability results are given for untimed protocols [87, 101]. Thus, the state-of-the-art se-
curity protocol verifiers, e.g., ProVerif [29], Athena [113], Scyther [48] and Tamarin [89],
are not designed to specify and verify time sensitive cryptographic protocols. Abstracting
time away may lead to several problems. First, since the timestamps are abstracted as
nonces, the message freshness checking in the protocol cannot be correctly specified. As a
consequence, attacks found in the verification may be false alarms because they could be
impractical when the timestamps are checked. Second, omitting the timestamp checking
could also result in missing attacks. For instance, the timed authentication property en-
sures the satisfaction of the timing constraints in addition to the establishment of the event
correspondence. Without considering the timing constraints, even though the agreement
is verified under the untimed configuration correctly, the protocol may still be vulnera-
ble to timing attacks. Third, with light-weight encryption, which are often employed in
cyber-physical systems, it might be possible to decrypt secret messages in a brute-force
manner given sufficient time. In applications where long network latency is expected, it
is therefore essential to consider timing constraints explicitly and check the feasibility of
attacks.
Contributions. In this work, we provide a fully automatic approach to verify timed secu-
rity protocols with an unbounded number of sessions. Our contributions are fourfold. (1)
In order to precisely specify the capabilities of the adversary, we propose a service frame-
work in which the adversary’s capabilities are modeled as various services according to
the protocol specification and cryptographic primitives. Thus, when the protocol is vul-
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semi-automated Evans et al. [57]
automated bounded
Lowe [83]
Jakubowska et al. [63]
Corin et al. [45]
unbounded
Delzanno and Ganty [52]
Chapter 3 [75]
Chapter 4 [76]
FIGURE 3.1: Roadmap for Related Works
nerable, there should exist an attack trace consisting of the services in a certain sequence.
(2) An automatic algorithm is developed in this work to verify the timed authentication
properties with an unbounded number of sessions. Since security protocol verification is
undecidable in general [41], we cannot guarantee the termination of our algorithm. We
thus prove our algorithm as partially sound and complete in Section 3.3. (3) Having time
in security protocol verification adds another dimension of complexity. Thus we pro-
pose the finite symbolic representation for the timing constraints with approximation. We
prove that the protocol is guaranteed to be secure when it is full verified by our algorithm.
Additionally, when the protocol specification is in a specific form, we also prove that
our algorithm does not introduce false alarms. (4) A verifier named TAuth is developed
based on our method. We evaluate TAuth using several timed and untimed security proto-
cols [35, 40, 94, 72, 33, 103]. The experiment results show that our approach is efficient
and effective in both finding security flaws and giving proofs.
Related works. The roadmap of related works are shown in Figure 3.1. Evans et al. [59]
introduced a semi-automated way to analyze timed security protocols. They modeled
the protocols with CSP and checked them with PVS. In [86], Lowe proposed finite state
model checking to verify bounded timed authentication. In order to avoid the state space
explosion problem, protocol instances and time window are bounded in the verification.
Jakubowska et al. [65] and Corin et al. [47] used Timed Automata to specify the protocols
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and used Uppaal to give bounded verifications. Our method is different from theirs as
our verification algorithm is fully automatic and the verification result is given for an
unbounded number of sessions.
The work closest to ours was proposed by Delzanno and Ganty [54] which applies
MSR(L) to specify unbounded crypto protocols by combining first order multiset rewrit-
ing rules and linear constraints. According to [54], the protocol specification is modified
by explicitly encoding an additional timestamp, which represents the protocol initialization
time, into some messages. Thus the attack could be found by comparing that timestamp
with the original timestamps in the messages. However, it is not clearly illustrated in [54]
how their approach can be applied to timed security protocol verification in general. On
the other hand, our approach could be directly applied to crypto protocols without any
manual modification to the protocol specification.
We adopt the Horn logic which is similar to the one used in ProVerif [29], a very ef-
ficient security protocol verifier designed for untimed cryptographic protocol, and extend
it with timestamps and timing constraints. However, the extension for time is nontrivial.
In ProVerif, the fresh nonces are merged under the same execution trace, which is one of
major reasons for its efficiency. When time is involved in the protocol, the generation time
of the nonces in the protocol becomes important for the verification. Thus merging the
session nonces under the same execution trace often introduces false alarms into the ver-
ification results. In order to differentiate the nonces generated in the sessions, we encode
the session nonces into the events engaged in the protocol and use the events to distinguish
them. Additionally, our approach takes care of the infinite expansion of timing constraints,









Event(e) 〈m, t〉 (knowledge)
e(m1,m2, ...,mn) (event)
Constraint(B) C(t1, t2, ..., tn)
Service(S) [ G ] e1, e2, ..., en −[ B ]→ e
Query(Q) accept(. . .)←[ B ]− init1 (. . .), . . . , initn(. . .)
Table 3.1: Service Syntax Hierarchy
3.2 Protocol Specification Framework
We introduce the proposed protocol specification framework in this section. In the frame-
work, the security protocols and the cryptographic primitives are modeled as various ser-
vices accessible to the Adversary for conducting attacks. Generally, these services receive
inputs from the adversary and send the results back to the adversary as output over the
network. Timestamps are tagged to the messages to denote when they are known to the ad-
versary. We assume the adversary model presented in this framework is an active attacker
who can intercept all communications, compute new messages and send the messages he
obtained. For instance, he can use all the publicly available functions including encryp-
tions, decryptions, concatenations, etc. He can also ask legal protocol participants to take
part in the protocol when he needs. Thanks to the introduction of time, key expiration and
message compromise can also be specified by adding additional services.
3.2.1 Service Syntax
In our framework, services are represented by a set of Horn logic rules guarded by timing
constraints. We adopt the syntax shown in Table 3.1 to define the services. Messages
37
could be defined as functions, names, nonces, variables or timestamps. Functions can
be applied to a sequence of messages; names are globally shared constants; nonces are
freshly generated values in sessions; variables are memory spaces for holding messages;
and timestamps are values extracted from the global clock during the protocol execution.
A event can be a message tagged by a timestamp denoted as 〈m, t〉, which means that the
messagem is known to the adversary at time t. Otherwise, it is an user-defined event in the
form of e(m1, . . . ,mn) where e is the event name andm1, . . . ,mn are the event arguments.
The events are used for specifying authentication properties and distinguishing different
sessions. B is a set of closed timing constraints assigned on the timestamp pairs. Each
constraint is in the form of t − t′ ∼ d where t and t′ are timestamps, d is an integer
constant (∞ is omitted), and ∼ denotes either < or ≤. We denote the maximum value
of d in a timing constraint set B as max (B). For simplicity, when a timing constraint
t−t′ ∼ d ∈ B, we write d(B, t, t′) to denote the integer constant d, and c(B, t, t′) to denote
the comparator ∼1. G is a set of untimed conditions such as message inequivalence. A
service [ G ] e1, e2, ..., en −[ B ]→ e means that if the events e1, e2, ..., en, the conditions
G and the constraints B are satisfied, the adversary can invoke this service and obtain e as
the result.
3.2.2 Service Modeling
In the following, we show how to model the timed authentication protocols in our frame-
work. We illustrate the service modeling using a simple example called the Wide Mouthed
Frog (WMF) protocol [35] as described below.
A→ S :A, {tA, B, k}kA
S → B :{tS, A, k}kB
1 If a timing constraint is not specified exactly in this form, it should be possible to change the constraint
into this form. For instance, t− t′ > 3 can be changed into t′ − t < −3.
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In the protocol, A and B are two users Alice and Bob, and S is a trust server who shares
different secret keys with different users. The goal of this protocol is to share a fresh key
k from Alice to Bob. kA is the secret key shared between server and Alice, and kB is
the corresponding secret key for Bob. k is a fresh session key generated by Alice, which
should be different in different sessions. tA is a timestamp generated by Alice. Similarly,
tS is a timestamp generated by the server. In the protocol, we assume that the clock drift
for every participants is negligible, so that the message freshness checking is valid during
the execution.
When the server receives the request from Alice, it checks its freshness by comparing
the tA with the current clock reading tS . If tA and tS satisfy the pre-defined constraint
C1, the server then sends the second message to Bob. Upon receiving the message from
the server, Bob decrypts it and compares tS with his clock reading tB. If the timestamp
checking C2 is passed and the message is properly formed, Bob then believes that k is
a fresh key shared with Alice. In fact, there exists an attack [9] to the protocol which is
resulted from the symmetric structure of the exchanged messages.
A→ S : A, {tA, B, k}kA
S → I(B) : {tS, A, k}kB
I(B)→ S : B, {tS, A, k}kB
S → I(A) : {tS′ , B, k}kA
I(A)→ S : A, {tS′ , B, k}kA
S → B : {tS′′ , A, k}kB
In the attack trace, the adversary I personates Bob, hijacks the second message and sends
it back to the server within the timing constraint C1. Then, the server would treat it as
a valid request from Bob and update the tS to its current clock reading. By doing this
repeatedly, the timestamp in the request can be extended to an arbitrary large value. As a
result, when Bob receives a message that passes the timestamp checking, the request from
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Alice may not be timely any more. Hereafter, we assume that the server and Bob check the
freshness of the received messages with following timing constraints: C1 = tS − tA ≤ 2
and C2 = tB − tS ≤ 2. Notice that in general, the constraints should be set according to
the protocol specification, network latency, etc.
Crypto Services. Cryptographic primitives are usually specified as services without net-
work latency. Generally, we have two types of crypto services, which are constructors and
destructors. Constructors are used to generate new messages such as concatenation and
encryption, whereas destructors are used to extract messages from the constructed mes-
sages. For instance, the constructor and the destructor for symmetric encryption can be
modeled as follows.
〈m, t1〉, 〈k, t2〉 −[ t1 ≤ t ∧ t2 ≤ t ]→ 〈encs(m, k), t〉 (3.1)
〈encs(m, k), t1〉, 〈k, t2〉 −[ t1 ≤ t ∧ t2 ≤ t ]→ 〈m, t〉 (3.2)
The service (3.1) means that if the adversary has a messagem and a key k, this service can
generate the symmetric encryption form by k, and the timing t of receiving the encryption
should be later than the timing t1 and t2 when m and k are known to the adversary. The
symmetric decryption service is similarly defined in service 3.2.
For some cryptographic primitives, additional constraints can be added for special pur-
poses. For instance, RSA encryption may consume non-negligible time to compute. If the
encryption time has a lower bound d, we could use the following constructor to model the
additional requirement on time.
〈m, t1〉, 〈pk, t2〉 −[ t− t1 > d, t− t2 > d ]→ 〈RSA(m, pk), t〉
Protocol Services. Protocol services are used to specify the execution of the protocol.
These services are directly derived from the protocol specification. Specifically, for the
WMF protocol, the server S answers queries from all its users. After receiving a request
from a user I , S extracts the message content and checks the timestamp. If the timestamp
is generated within 2 time units, S sends out the encryption of an updated timestamp tS ,
the initiator’s name and the session key k under the responder’s shared key. The service
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provided by the server can be specified with
〈encs((tI , R, k), key(I)), t〉, 〈I, t′〉 −[ 0 ≤ tS − tI ≤ 2 ∧ t ≤ tS ∧ t′ ≤ tS ]→
〈encs((tS, I, k), key(R)), tS〉 (3.3)
in which key(U) represents the secret key shared between the server and the user U . Since
the keys are only shared with the user and the server, We do not treat the key constructor
as a public service. Besides, the names of the two participants should be known to the
adversary, so we have services for publishing their names.
−[ ]→ 〈A[], t〉 (3.4)
−[ ]→ 〈B[], t〉 (3.5)
Event Services. In order to ensure the authenticity between participants, we introduce
two special events init and accept. The init event is explicitly engaged by the initiator
when a new protocol session starts, while the accept event is engaged by the protocol
when the timed authentication is established successfully. According to [85], the timed
authentication is correct if and only if every accept event is emitted with its corresponding
init event engaged before, and the timing constraints should always be satisfied. For the
WMF protocol, Alice engages an event init when she wants to start a session with R.
init(A[], R, [k], tA), 〈R, t〉 −[ t ≤ tA ]→ 〈encs((tA, R, [k]), key(A[])), tA〉 (3.6)
When the user Bob gets the message from the server, he decrypts it with his shared key
key(B[]) and checks its freshness. If the timestamp checking is passed and the initiator is
I , he then believes that he has established a timely authenticated connection under session
key k with I and engages an accept event as follows.
〈encs((tS, I, k), key(B[])), t〉 −[ tB − tS ≤ 2 ]→ accept(I, B[], k, tB) (3.7)
Additional Services. Introducing time allows to model systems which are not possible
previously. For instance, some applications require that the passwords are used only if
they are unexpired. One possible scenario is that the token token(s , pw , tk) can only be
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opened within the lifetime [tk, tk + d] of the password pw.










∧ tk ≤ t ]→ 〈s , t〉
If the adversary can obtain both of the token and the password within [tk, tk+d], the secret
s can be extracted from the token. Another possible service that could be accessible to the
adversary is the brute force attack on the encrypted messages, which allows the adversary
to extract the encrypted data without knowing the key. Suppose the least time of cracking
the crypto is d, the attacking behavior can be modeled with
〈Crypto(m, k), t〉 −[ t′ − t > d ]→ 〈m, t′〉.
For some ciphers like RC4 which is used by WEP, key compromise on a busy network
can be conducted after a short time. Given an application scenario where such attack is
possible and the attacking time has a lower bound d, we can model it as follows.
〈RC4 (m, k), t〉 −[ t′ − t > d ]→ 〈k, t′〉
Remarks. Even though the services specified in our framework can directly extract the
message from the encryption without the key and so on, a given protocol can still guarantee
correctness as long as proper timing checking is in place, e.g., authentication should be
established before the adversary has the time to finish the brute-force attack.
3.2.3 Security Properties
In this work, we focus on verifying that the authentication between the two participants
is timely, which means every accept event is preceded by a corresponding init event sat-
isfying the timing constraints. Thus we formalize the timed authentication property by
extending the definition in [85] as follows.
Definition 3.1. Timed Authentication. In a timed security protocol, timed authentication
holds for an accept event e with a set of init events H agreed on arguments encoded in
the events and the timing constraints B, if and only if for every occurrence of e, all of
the corresponding init events in H should be engaged before, and their timestamps should
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always satisfy the timing constraints B. We denote the timed authentication query as
e ←[ B ]− H . In order to ensure general timed authentication, the arguments encoded in
events should only be different variables and timestamps.
We remark that the timed authentication defined above is non-injective. Because the
legitimate run of WMF protocols requires that the authentication should be established
within 4 time units, its query is modeled as follows.
accept(I, R, k, t)←[ t− t′ ≤ 4 ]− init(I, R, k, t′) (3.8)
In Section 3.3, we present a verification algorithm to check the authentication. Since
the verification for security protocol is generally undecidable [41], our algorithm cannot
guarantee termination. Hence, we claim our attack searching algorithm as partial sound
and partial complete under the condition of termination (partial correctness).
3.3 Verification Algorithm
Given the specification formalized in Section 3.2, our verification algorithm is divided
into two phases. The attack searching service basis is constructed in the first phase so
that attacks can be found in a straight forward method in the second phase. Specifically,
every service consists of several inputs, one output and some timing constraints. When a
service’s input can be provided by another service’s output, we could compose these two
services together to form a composite service. In the first phase, our algorithm composes
the services repeatedly until a fixed-point is reached. When such a fixed-point exists, we
call it the guided service basis. However, the above process may not terminate because of
two reasons. The first reason is the infinite knowledge deduction. For example, given two
services m −[]→ h(m) and h(m) −[]→ h(h(m)), we can compose them to obtain a new
service m −[]→ h(h(m)), which could be composed to the second service again. In this
way, infinitely many composite services can be generated. The second reason is the infinite
expansion of timing constraints. For instance, assume we have S0 = 〈enc(t′, k), t1〉 −[
t′′ − t′ ≤ 2 ∧ t1 ≤ t′′ ]→ 〈enc(t′′, k), t′′〉 and S1 = init(t, [k]) −[ t′ − t ≤ 2 ∧ t ≤ t′ ]→
〈enc(t′, [k]), t′〉 in the service basis. When we compose S1 to S0, their composition S2 =
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init(t, [k]) −[ t′′ − t ≤ 4 ∧ t ≤ t′′ ]→ 〈enc(t′′, [k]), t′′〉 has a larger range than S1. Besides,
we could compose S2 to S0 again to obtain an even larger range, so the service composition
never ends. Since verification for untimed security protocol is undecidable, we, same as
state-of-the-art tools like ProVerif, cannot handle the first scenario. We thus focus on
solving the second scenario by approximating the timing constraints into a finite set. The
fixed-point is then called the approximated service basis. When the over-approximation is
applied, false alarms may be introduced into the verification result so that, generally, only
partial completeness is preserved by our attack searching algorithm. Finally, we present
our attack searching algorithm in the end of this section.
3.3.1 Service Basis Construction
In the first phase, our goal is to construct a set of services that allows us to find security
attacks in the second phase. In order to construct such a service basis, new services are
generated by composing existing services. In this way, the new composite services can
also be treated as services directly accessible to the adversary and the algorithm continues
until the fixed-point is reached, i.e., no new service can be generated. We use the most
general unifier to unify the input and the output.
Definition 3.2. Most General Unifier. If σ is a substitution for both messages m1 and m2
so that σm1 = σm2, we say m1 and m2 are unifiable and σ is an unifier for m1 and m2. If
m1 and m2 are unifiable, the most general unifier for m1 and m2 is an unifier σ such that
for all unifiers σ′ of m1 and m2 there exists a substitution σ′′ such that σ′ = σ′′σ.
Since the adversary in our framework has the capability to generate new names and
new timestamps, when a service input is a variable or a timestamp that is unrelated to
other events in a service, the adversary should be able to generate a random event and use
it to fulfill that input. In this way, that input can be removed in the composite service.
Hence, we define service composition as follows. For simplicity, we define a singleton as
a event of the form 〈x, t〉 where x is a variable or a timestamp.
Definition 3.3. Service Composition. Let S = [ G ] H −[ B ]→ e and S ′ = [ G′ ] H ′ −[
B′ ]→ e′ be two services. Assume there exists e0 ∈ H ′ such that e and e0 are unifiable,
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their most general unifier is σ and σB∩σB′ 6= ∅∧σG∩σG′ 6= ∅. The service composition
of S with S ′ on a event e0 is defined as
S ◦e0 S′ = clear(σ([ G ∩G′ ] H ∪ (H ′ − {e0}))) −[ sim(σB ∩ σB′) ]→ σe′
where the function clear merges duplicated events from the inputs and removes any sin-
gleton 〈x, t〉 where x does not appear in other events of the rule, and the function sim
removes timestamps that are no longer used in the composite service.
When new composite services are added into the service basis, redundancies should
be eliminated from the service basis. As the timing constraints can be viewed as a set of
clock valuations which satisfy the constraints, they thus can be naturally applied with set
operations, e.g., B ⊆ B′, B ∩B′, etc.
Definition 3.4. Service Implication. Let S = [ G ] H −[ B ]→ e and S ′ = [ G′ ] H ′ −[
B′ ]→ e′ be two services. S implies S ′ denoted as S ⇒ S ′ if and only if ∃σ, σe = e′∧G′ ⇒
σG ∧ σH ⊆ H ′ ∧B′ ⊆ σB.
When services are composed in an unlimited way, infinitely many composite services
could be generated. For instance, composing the symmetric encryption service (3.1) to
itself on the event 〈m, k〉 leads to a new service encrypting the message twice, that is
〈m, t〉, 〈k1, t1〉, 〈k2, t2〉 −[ . . . ]→ 〈encs(encs(m, k1), k2), t′〉, which can be composed to
the encryption service again. In order to avoid these service compositions, we adopt a
similar strategy proposed in [29] such that the unified event in the service composition
should not be singletons. Moreover, the events in our system cannot be unified2, thus we
defineV as a set of events that should not be unified, consisting of all events and singletons.
We denote β(α,Rinit) as the fixed-point, where Rinit is the initial service set and α
is a service approximation function adopted during the construction. In order to compute
β(α,Rinit), we first define Rv based on the following rules, where inputs(S) represents
the inputs of service S.
1. ∀S ∈ Rinit,∃S ′ ∈ Rv, S ′ ⇒ S;
2 init events only appear in the inputs and accept events only appear in the output.
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2. ∀S, S ′ ∈ Rv, S 6⇒ S ′;
3. ∀S, S ′ ∈ Rv, if ∀ein ∈ inputs(S), ein ∈ V and ∃f 6∈ V, S ◦e S ′ is defined, ∃S ′′ ∈
Rv, S ′′ ⇒ α(S ◦e S ′).
The first rule means that every initial service is implied by a service in Rv. The second
rule means that no duplicated service exists in Rv. The third rule means that for any two
services in Rv, if the first service’s inputs are in V and their composition exists, their
approximated composition is also implied by a service in Rv. These three rules means Rv
is the minimal closure of the initial service set Rinit. Based on Rv, we have
β(α,Rinit) = {S | S ∈ Rv ∧ ∀ein ∈ inputs(S) : ein ∈ V}.
In the latter part of this section, α will be instantiated with no-approximation and over-
approximation.
For any service, it is derivable from a service basis R if and only if there is a derivation
tree that represents how the service is composed.
Definition 3.5. Derivation Tree. Let R be a set of closed services and S be a closed
service, where a closed service is a service with its output initiated by its inputs. Let S be
a service in the form of [ G ] e1, . . . , en −[ B ]→ e. S can be derived from R if and only if
there exists a finite derivation tree defined as
1. edges in the tree are labeled by events;
2. nodes are labeled by the services in R;
3. if a node labeled by S has incoming edges of es1, . . . , e
s
n, an outgoing edge of e
s, sat-
isfying the untimed conditionGs and the timed conditionBs, then S ⇒ [Gs ] es1, . . . , esn −[
Bs ]→ es;
4. the outgoing edge of the root is the event e;
5. the incoming edges of the leaves are e1, . . . , en.
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Additionally, (1) G is the intersection of all the untimed conditions in the derivation tree;
(2) if all the timing constraints in the derivation tree form B, then the timing constraints
for S is sim(B), where sim removes timestamps that are no longer used. We name this
tree as the derivation tree for S on R.
Guided Service Basis. When no approximation is used in the service basis construction,
the fixed-point is called guided service basis denoted as Rguided = β(αguided,Rinit) where,
for any service S, αguided(S) = S. In such a case, we prove that a service can be derived
from the guided service basis whenever it can also be derived from the initial service set,
and vice versa.
Theorem 3.6. For any service S in the form of [ G ] H −[ B ]→ e where ∀ein ∈ H : ein ∈
V, S is derivable from Rinit if and only if S is derivable from Rguided.
Before proving the above theorem, we prove a lemma first.
Lemma 3.7. If So ◦e S ′o is defined, St ⇒ So and S ′t ⇒ S ′o, then either there exists e′ such
that St ◦e′ S ′t is defined and St ◦e′ S ′t ⇒ So ◦e S ′o, or S ′t ⇒ So ◦e S ′o.
Proof. Let So = [ Go ] Ho −[ Bo ]→ eo, S ′o = [ G′o ] H ′o −[ B′o ]→ e′o, St = [ Gt ] Ht −[
Bt ]→ et, S ′t = [ G′t ] H ′t −[ B′t ]→ e′t. There should exist a substitution σ such that
σet = eo, σHt ⊆ Ho, σe′t = e′o, σH ′t ⊆ H ′o,Go ⇒ σGt,G′o ⇒ σG′t, σBt ⊇ Bo, σB′t ⊇ B′o.
Assume So ◦e S ′o = clear(σ′([ Go ∧ G′o ] Ho ∪ (H ′o − e))) −[ sim(σ′Bo ∩ σ′B′o) ]→ σ′e′o.
We discuss the two cases as follows.
First case. Suppose ∃e′ ∈ H ′t such that σe′ = e. Since So ◦e S ′o is defined. e and eo are
unifiable. Let σ′ be the most general unifier, σ′σe′ = σ′σet, then e′ and et are unifiable,
therefore St ◦e′ S ′t is defined. Let σt be the most general unifier, then ∃σ′t such that σ′σ =
σ′tσt. We have St ◦e′ S ′t = clear(σt(Ht ∪ (H ′t − e′))) −[ sim(σtBt ∩ σtB′t) ]→ σte′t. Since
σ′tσt(Ht∩(H ′t−e′)) = σ′σ(Ht∪(H ′t−e′)) ⊆ σ′(Ho∪(H ′o−e)), σ′tσte′t = σ′σe′t = σ′e′o and
σ′tsim(σtBt∩σtB′t) = sim(σ′tσtBt∩σ′tσtB′t) = sim(σ′σBt∩σ′σB′t) ⊇ sim(σ′Bo∩σ′B′o),
and σ′t(σtGt ∧ σtG′t) = σ′tσtGt ∧ σ′tσtG′t = σ′σGt ∩ σ′σG′t ⇐ σ′Go ∩ σ′G′o, we have












FIGURE 3.2: Two Nodes in Derivation Tree
Second case. Since ∀e′ ∈ H ′t such that σe′ 6= e, we have σH ′t ⊆ H ′o − e. Thus
σ′σH ′t ⊆ σ′(Ho∪(H ′o−f)), σ′σB′t ⊇ σ′B′o ⊇ σ′Bo∩σ′B′o σ′σG′t ⇐ σ′G′o ⇐ σ′Go∩σ′G′o,
and σ′σe′t = σ
′e′o. Therefore S
′
t ⇒ So ◦e S ′o.
Based on Lemma 3.7, we prove Theorem 3.6 as follows.
Proof. (only if) Assume S is derivable from Rinit, then there exists a derivation tree Ti for
S on Rinit. Since a service S is removed from the basis only if it is implied by another
service S ′, we have ∀S ∈ Rinit,∃S ′ ∈ Rv, S ′ ⇒ S.
As a result, we should be able to replace all the labels of nodes in Ti with services in
Rv and get a new derivation tree Tv. Because some of the services are filtered out from
Rv to Rguided when their input events do not all belong to V, we further need to prove
that the nodes in Tv can be composed together until a derivation tree Tguided is formed so
that all the nodes in Tguided are labeled by services in Rguided. To continue our proof, we
assume that there exists two nodes n and n′ in Tv and they are linked by an edge e as
shown in Figure 3.2. We should have S, S ′ ∈ Rv such that S ⇒ [ G ] H −[ B ]→ e,
S ′ ⇒ [ G′ ] H ′ −[ B′ ]→ e′ and e ∈ H ′. If Se = [ G ∩G′ ] (H −[ B ]→ e) ◦e (H ′ −[ B′ ]→
e′) is defined, according to Lemma 3.7, we could replace the two nodes with only one
node in two different cases. In the first case, because Rv is the fixed-point of the service
composition, there should exist S ′′ ∈ Rv such that S ′′ ⇒ Se. In the second case, we can
remove the node n and link its incoming links directly to the n′, so that the new node n′
is still implied by S ′. We could continuously replace the nodes in the derivation tree until
no node can be further processed and we denote the new tree as Tguided. For every node in
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Tguided, we prove the services labeled to the nodes are in Rguided as follows.
• For the leaves of the tree, their incoming edges are labeled by the events in V. So
the leaves are labeled by services in Rguided.
• For an inner node n′ of the tree with all its children’s service inputs in V. Because n′
cannot composed by its children, the inputs of the service labeled to n′ should also
be events in V. So the services labeled to all the inner nodes are in Rguided.
As a consequence, all the nodes in Tguided are labeled by services in Rguided, so S is deriv-
able from Rguided.
(if) For every service in Rv, it should be composed from existing services, which is in
turn composed from the initial service set. Thus all the services in Rv should be derivable
from Rinit. In the meanwhile, Rguided does not introduce extra services except for existing
services in Rv, so ∀S ∈ Rguided, S is derivable from Rinit.
Approximated Service Basis. New timestamps are often introduced in the service com-
position. When no longer used timestamps are removed from the composite service, the
timing constraints can be deemed as extended for unification. On the other hand, given
two services with the same inputs and output but they have different timing constraints,
they may be indifferent if all of the different constraints have exceeded a ceiling. For in-
stance, if the password has a fixed lifetime, its usefulness for the adversary remains the
same when the password has already expired. Since these services can be deemed as the
same, we remove their exceeded timing constraints to generalize their expressiveness. In
this work, heuristically, we assume that every service is very likely to be used by the ad-
versary for at least once in the attack trace and the timing constraints in the query also
play important role in the reachability checking, so we set the ceiling as 1 +
∑
max (B)
in which B comes from the initial service set and the query. For instance, in the WMF
protocol, the max (B) is 2 for both of the service (3.3) and (3.7), 0 for other initial ser-
vices, and 4 for the query, so we have the ceiling set as 9. We refer to the set of services
with the ceiling U as approximated service basis Rapprox = β(αUapprox,Rinit). The service
approximation function αUapprox is defined as follows.
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Definition 3.8. Service approximation with ceiling U . Let S = [ G ] H −[ B ]→ e. We
define the service approximation with ceiling U as αUapprox(S) = [ G ] H −[ B′ ]→ e. For
any two timestamps t, t′ in the service S, if d(B, t, t′) ≤ U , then d(B′, t, t′) = d(B, t, t′)
and c(B′, t, t′) = c(B, t, t′); else if d(B, t, t′) > U , then d(B′, t, t′) is∞ and c(B′, t, t′) is
<.
Since the timing constraints are enlarged after the approximation, false alarms may be
introduced into verification result. However, according to the experiment results shown in
Section 3.4, the false alarms could be prevented when the ceiling is properly configured.
when the ceiling is properly configured. On the other hand, whenever a timed protocol is
verified as correct under the approximation, it is guaranteed to be attack-free, which is the
same as ProVerif.
Theorem 3.9. Let U be the ceiling. For any service S in the form of [ G ] H −[ B ]→ e
where ∀ein ∈ H : ein ∈ V, if S is derivable from Rinit, S is also derivable from Rapprox.
Proof. The proof for this theorem is almost the same as the only if proof for Theo-
rem 3.6. Since service approximation only expands the timing constraints, given an initial
service set Rinit and a ceiling U , we should have that ∀S ∈ β(αguided,Rinit), ∃S ′ ∈
β(αUapprox,Rinit), S ′ ⇒ S. Because the only if for Theorem 3.6 is already proved, we
should also have that S is derivable from Rapprox whenever S is derivable from Rinit.
3.3.2 Query Searching
When the query is violated by a service in the service basis, we call it a contradiction to
the query. A service is a contradiction to the query if and only if its output event can be
unified to the query’s output, while it does not require all the predicate events in the query
or it has a larger timing range than the query constraints. Thus, the contradiction is defined
as follows.
Definition 3.10. Contradiction. A service S = [ G ] H −[ B ]→ e is a contradiction to the
query Q = e′ ←[ B′ ]− H ′ if and only if G 6= false ∧ B 6= ∅, e and e′ are unifiable with
the most general unifier σ and ∀σ′, σ′σH ′ 6⊆ σH ∨ σB 6⊆ σ′σB′.
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If we rewrite the query Q into a service of Sq = H ′ −[ B′ ]→ e′, S is a contradiction
to Q if and only if e′ and e are unifiable with the most general unifier σ and we have
σSq 6⇒ σS. According to Definition 3.1, events in the query only contain variables and
timestamps that are different. Thus the accept event in Sq can be unified with any other
accept event. The contradiction checking could then be simplified to check whether S
outputs an accept event and satisfies Sq 6⇒ S. Given the service basis R, we thus search
the attacks as follows.
Rc = {S|S ∈ R, the output of S is an accept event ∧ Sq 6⇒ S}
Rc consists of the contradiction instances. We prove its partial correctness as follows.
Theorem 3.11. Partial Soundness. Assume R is Rguided. Let Q be a query of e′ ←[
B′ ]− H ′ and Sq = H ′ −[ B′ ]→ e′. There exists S derivable from Rinit such that S is a
contradiction to Q if there exists S ′ ∈ R such that the output of S ′ is an accept event and
Sq 6⇒ S ′.
Proof. [R = Rguided] Since S ′ ∈ R of which the output is an accept event and Sq 6⇒ S ′,
according to the Definition 3.10, S ′ is a contradiction to the query Q. On the other hand,
according to Theorem 3.6, since S ′ ∈ R, S ′ is derivable from Rinit.
Theorem 3.12. Partial Completeness. Assume R is either Rguided or Rapprox. Let Q be a
query of e′ ←[ B′ ]− H ′ and Sq = H ′ −[ B′ ]→ e′. There exists S derivable from Rinit
such that S is a contradiction to Q only if there exists S ′ ∈ R such that the output of S ′ is
an accept event and Sq 6⇒ S ′.
Proof. [R = Rguided or Rapprox] If S derivable from Rinit is a contradiction to the Q,
according to Theorem 3.6 (Theorem 3.9 resp.), there is a derivation tree T with its nodes
labeled by services in Rguided (Rapprox resp.) for S. Suppose the root of T is labeled by
Sr ∈ Rguided (Sr ∈ Rapprox resp.), the output of Sr is an accept event, and the inputs of
Sr are events in V. Because nodes in the derivation tree cannot be connected by events,
the inputs corresponding to the edges connecting the children of root are singletons. If
Sq ⇒ Sr, Sr implies the node and all of the input events in Sr is also in S, we have
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Sq ⇒ S, which conflicts the precondition Sq 6⇒ S. Thus Sq 6⇒ Sr. As Sr is in R such that
the output of Sr is an accept event, the theorem is then proved.
Partial Soundness for Approximated Service Basis under Restriction. The partial
soundness is not guaranteed for our verification algorithm when approximated service
basis is used. However, when the initial services are specified in some restricted form,
even though the approximated service basis is over-approximated, the partial soundness of
our query searching algorithm can be proved as well. One possible restriction is that for
any two timestamps t and t′ in every initial service with B, d(B′, t, t′) is required to be
no less than 0. If the ceiling is set to be larger than max (Bq) + 1 where Bq is the timing
constraints of the query, we prove the partial soundness of our verification algorithm as
follows. First, we prove that, under this restriction, for any service S in the approximated
service basis, we have a corresponding service S ′ in the guided service basis such that
S = αUapprox(S
′). Second, when the contradiction instance set Re is not empty for the
approximated service basis, we prove the existence of a corresponding attack instance in
the guided service basis. According to the Theorem 3.6, the attack found in the guided
service basis is guaranteed to be valid. So the protocol indeed has an attack and the partial
soundness for the approximated service basis under the restriction is then proved.
Lemma 3.13. Given an initial service set Rinit and a ceiling U . Every service in Rinit sat-
isfies the restriction that for any two timestamps t and t′ in the service with B, d(B′, t, t′)
is no less than 0. We have ∀S ∈ β(αUapprox,Rinit), ∃S ′ ∈ β(αguided,Rinit) such that
S = αUapprox(S
′).
Proof. First, we need to prove the equation αUapprox(α
U
approx(S)◦eαUapprox(S ′)) = αUapprox(S◦e
S ′) is hold when S and S ′ satisfy the restriction. Assume B is the timing constraint set for





′ respectively. Given d = d(B, t, t′),
d′ = d(B′, t′, t′′), da = d(Ba, t, t′) and d′a = d(B
′
a, t, t
′), we discuss different cases for d
and d′ as follows.
• If d > U ∧ d′ > U , we have da =∞∧ d′a =∞, so d+ d′ > U ∧ da + d′a > U .
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• If d > U ∧ 0 ≤ d′ ≤ U , we have da =∞∧ d′a = d′, so d+ d′ > U ∧ da + d′a > U .
• If 0 ≤ d ≤ U ∧ d′ > U , we have da = d ∧ d′a =∞, so d+ d′ > U ∧ da + d′a > U .
• If 0 ≤ d ≤ U ∧ 0 ≤ d′ ≤ U , we have da = d ∧ d′a = d′, so d+ d′ = da + d′a.
Thus we have the timing constraints in αUapprox(α
U
approx(S) ◦e αUapprox(S ′)) are the same
as those in αUapprox(S ◦e S ′). Since the service approximation does not change the ser-
vices inputs and output, the equation is thus valid. Given an approximated service in
β(αUapprox,Rinit), there should exist a derivation tree labeled by services in Rinit and the
node is replaces by approximated services when two directly connected nodes are com-
posed, according to the proof of Theorem 3.6. By repeatedly using the above equation
during the node composition, we could delay the service approximation to a tree labeled
by services in β(αguided,Rinit). Because the service approximation does not modify the
service inputs and output, there should also be only one node in the tree. Hence we have
∀S ∈ β(αUapprox,Rinit), ∃S ′ ∈ β(αguided,Rinit) such that S = αUapprox(S ′).
Theorem 3.14. Partial Soundness under Restriction. Assume R is Rapprox. Every service
in Rinit satisfies the restriction that for any two timestamps t and t′ in the service with
B, d(B′, t, t′) is no less than 0. If the ceiling U is set to be larger than max (Bq) + 1
where Bq is the timing constraints of the query, R = β(αUapprox,Rinit). Let Q be a query of
e′ ←[ B′ ]− H ′ and Sq = H ′ −[ B′ ]→ e′. There exists S derivable from Rinit such that S
is a contradiction to Q if there exists S ′ ∈ R such that the output of S ′ is an accept event
and Sq 6⇒ S ′.
Proof. [R = Rapprox] According to Lemma 3.13, there should exist a service Sg in
β(αguided,Rinit) such that S ′ = αUapprox(Sg). Since the ceiling U is set to be larger than
max (Bq)+1, we have Sq 6⇒ Sg as well. Because of Theorem 3.11, we have Sg is derivable
from Rinit such that Sg is a contradiction to Q. The theorem is thus proved.
Whether this restriction is applicable to the experiments evaluated is indicated in Sec-
tion 3.4.
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Remarks. Given a protocol with a valid attack, there should exist a derivation tree for
that attack. Since we do not bound the number of events presented in a derivation tree (a
composite service), we effectively deal with an unbounded number of sessions. The reason
why our algorithm could work (i.e., terminate with correct result) is mainly because of two
reasons. First, different from the explicit attack searching, we do not actively instantiate
the variables in the services. So it becomes possible to represent the infinite adversary
behaviors with a finite number of services. Second, we made a reasonable assumption in
this work such that different nonces have different values. If the same nonce is generated
in two sessions, those two sessions should be the same. Thus we merge them during
the verification. As a consequence, even though we do not abstract the nonces used in
the protocol as ProVerif does, this assumption could help us to find inconsistency in the
service and remove the invalid ones from the service basis.
3.4 Evaluations
The flexibility and expressiveness of our service framework make it suitable for specifying
and verifying timed security protocols, for instance, timed authentication protocols and
distance bound protocols, etc. We have implemented our verifier TAuth in C++ with about
8K LoC. All the experiments shown in this section are conducted under Mac OS X 10.9.1
with 2.3 GHz Intel Core i5 and 16G 1333MHz DDR3. The TAuth verifier and the models
shown in this section are available in [2].
We summarize some implementation choices in TAuth below. First, the timing con-
straints in the service are represented by Difference Bound Matrices (DBMs) [28]. Since
timestamps are unified and new timestamps are introduced in the service composition, we
use unique identifiers to distinguish the timestamps generated in the system so that dif-
ferent timestamps have different identifiers among services. Second, events in a service
are merged when the encoded fresh nonces are evaluated to a same value. The reason
is that the value of nonces generated in the session should be random, so different fresh
nonces should have different values. For instance, if the session key k is initiated in the
init event, init(A[], R1, [k]) and init(I, R2, [k]) should be merged and the substitution




]R Result Time ]R Result Restriction Time
Wide Mouthed Frog [35] 26 Attack [84] 3ms 26 Attack SAT 4ms
Wide Mouthed Frog c [54] 19 Secure 3ms 19 Secure SAT 3ms
Wide Mouthed Frog Lowe [84] - - - 32 Secure SAT 8ms
CCITT X.509(1) [40] 35 Attack [6] 4ms 35 Attack SAT 3ms
CCITT X.509(1c) [6] 45 Secure 7ms 45 Secure SAT 7ms
CCITT X.509(3) [40] 111 Attack [35] 52ms 111 Attack SAT 51ms
CCITT X.509(3) BAN [35] 106 Secure 74ms 106 Secure SAT 70ms
NS PK [94] 50 Attack [82] 6ms 50 Attack SAT 6ms
NS PK Lowe [82] 51 Secure 8ms 51 Secure SAT 9ms
NS PK Lowe Na Compromise [55] 51 Secure 8ms 51 Secure SAT 8ms
NS PK Lowe Nb Compromise [55] 42 Attack [55] 3ms 42 Attack SAT 3ms
NS PK Lowe NC Time [55] 48 Secure 10ms 48 Secure UNSAT 10ms
SKEME [72] 77 Secure 73m 77 Secure SAT 74ms
Auth Range [33, 38] 17 Secure 2ms 17 Secure UNSAT 1ms
Ultrasound Dist Bound [103] 35 Attack [105] 2ms 35 Attack UNSAT 2ms
Table 3.2: Verification results for timed authentication protocols
service is invalid. Third, we check the query contradiction on the fly when new services
are composed. Whenever we find a contradiction, we stop the verification process and
report the security flaw. This optimization can potentially give the early termination to the
verification process when the protocol has security flaws.
Several different types of security protocols are analyzed in our experiments. In the
experiments, all the protocols are proved or dis-proved in a short time as summarized in
Table 3.2. For some protocols, the restriction mentioned in the Section 3.3.2 is applicable,
so that the attack is guaranteed to be correct whenever it can be found, which is indicated
in the table. Notice that, even though some protocols do not satisfy the restriction, all the
attacks found in the experiments are valid. First, untimed protocols such as Needham-
Schroeder series and SKEME are analyzed with TAuth. We use these protocols to show
that TAuth can work with untimed protocols. Additionally, timed protocols like CCITT
series are also checked by TAuth. However, the attacks found in these protocols are un-
timed. Furthermore, timed authentication protocols like the WMF series and the NS PK
Lowe NC Time are correctly analyzed as well. We use these protocols to demonstrate
that our approach can work with timed protocols and find timed attacks. Specifically, in
the NS PK Lowe Nb Compromise version, the nonces generated by the responder in the
protocol could be compromised [55], so the adversary could perform attacks to the proto-
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Protocol Result TAuth ProVerif Scyther
NS PK Attack 6ms 6ms 200ms
NS PK Lowe Secure 8ms 5ms 177ms
NS PK Lowe Na Compromise Secure 8ms 5ms 170ms
NS PK Lowe Nb Compromise Attack 3ms 5ms 31ms
Table 3.3: Comparison with other untimed protocol verifiers.
col. Denning and Sacco [55] proposed a way to fix these security flaws by checking the
timestamps. In the NS PK Lowe NC Time version, we assume that extra time is needed
for the nonce compromise, so that freshness checking for the messages could ensure the
authentication is attack-free. Notice that the service approximation only works for WMF
Lowe version [84] in our experiment, that is a version of WMF fixed by Gavin Lowe, be-
cause it is the only protocol that cannot be early terminated by the on-the-fly algorithm (it
is attack-free) and its timing constraints involve infinite expansion.
Moreover, we successfully analyze two distance bounding protocols, that are Auth
Range [33, 38] and Ultrasound Dist Bound [103]. In the Auth Range protocol, the prover
wants to convince the verifier that he is within a pre-agreed distance with the verifier. For
instance, in a keyless entry system frequently adopted by cars, the prover is the remote
key and verifier is the car. In the Auth Range protocol, it is assumed that the prover is
honest and nothing can travel faster than light, so they could securely use the travel time
of radio signals to measure the distance. In the Ultrasound Dist Bound protocol which has
the same application scenario as the Auth Range protocol, the verifier uses radio signals
to send requests while the prover uses ultrasound to return the answers. Since ultrasound
travels much slower than radio and other processing time is negligible, the travel time
of ultrasound dominates the whole protocol execution time. However, this protocol does
not require the prover to be honest, so the prover can send his answer by either radio or
ultrasound to others. When the adversary has a cooperator near the verifier, he can send
the answer to the cooperator by radio and ask the cooperator to forward the answer by
ultrasound to the verifier. As a consequence, the verifier can be convinced that the prover
is within the distance even though the prover is not.
Finally, we compare our tool TAuth with other successful untimed protocol verifiers,
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i.e., ProVerif [29] and Scyther [48]. The Needham Schroeder public key authentication
protocols except for its timed variant are chosen for the comparison as timestamps are ab-
sent in these protocols. The comparison results are summarized in the Table 3.3. It can be
seen that TAuth is almost as fast as ProVerif. TAuth is slightly slower mainly due to over-
head on handling timing constraints. Thanks to the on-the-fly algorithm, TAuth is faster
than ProVerif in finding the attack for the Lowe Nb Compromise version. Furthermore,
TAuth is much faster than Scyther. Notice that Scyther could only verify the Lowe version
and Lowe Na Compromise version with a bounded number of sessions while TAuth proves
for infinitely many sessions.
3.5 Discussions
We present a service framework which can automatically verify the timed authentication
protocols with an unbounded number of sessions. The partial correctness of our approach
have been formally proved in this work. The experiment results for four different types of
scenarios show that our framework is efficient and effective to verify a large range of timed
security protocols. Even though we only check timed authentication properties for security
protocols in this work, our framework could be easily extended to secrecy checking with
timing constraints.
For future works, a throughout study on the termination of the algorithm would be very
interesting. Since the problem of verifying security protocols is undecidable in general, we
cannot guarantee the termination of our algorithm, but identifying the terminable scenario
for practical security protocol could help the general adoption of our techniques. Our
approach is inspired by the method used in ProVerif [29]. As is discussed in Section 3.3,
TAuth is as terminable as ProVerif when the service approximation is used. However, the
over-approximation also introduces false alarms. In order to remove the false alarms, as
is discussed in Section 3.3, we can apply some restriction to the specification so that the
found attacks are guaranteed to be valid. However, the restriction mentioned previously
is quite restrictive because network latency, brute force attack, etc. cannot be specified
under that restriction. Hence, how to restrict the specification in a practical way is another
interesting future work direction.
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Chapter 4
Parameterized Timed Security Protocol Verification
Quantitative timing is often explicitly used in systems for better security, e.g., the cre-
dentials for automatic website logon often has limited lifetime. Verifying timing relevant
security protocols in these systems is very challenging as timing adds another dimension
of complexity compared with the untimed protocol verification. In Chapter 3, we proposed
an approach to check the correctness of the timed authentication in security protocols with
fixed timing constraints. However, a more difficult question persists, i.e., given a par-
ticular protocol design, whether the protocol has security flaws in its design or it can be
configured secure with proper parameter values? In this chapter, we answer this question
by proposing a parameterized verification framework, where the quantitative parameters
in the protocols can be intuitively specified as well as automatically analyzed. Given a
security protocol, our verification algorithm either produces the secure constraints of the
parameters, or constructs an attack that works for any parameter values. The correctness
of our algorithm is formally proved. We implement our method into a tool called PTAuth
and evaluate it with several security protocols. Using PTAuth, we have successfully found
a timing attack in Kerberos V which is unreported before.
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4.1 Introduction
Time could be a powerful tool in designing security protocols. For instance, distance
bounding protocols rely heavily on time; session keys with limited lifetime are extensively
used in practice to achieve better security. However, designing timed security protocols is
more challenging than designing untimed ones because timing adds a range of attacking
surface, e.g., the adversary might be able to extend the session key without proper autho-
rization. Hence, it is important to have a formal verification framework to analyze the
timed security protocols. In our work [77] illustrated in Chapter 3, we developed a verifi-
cation algorithm to analyze whether a given protocol with fixed timing constraints is secure
or not. In this work, we answer a more difficult question, i.e., given a security protocol
with configurable parameters in the timing constraints, are there configuration methods
which could guarantee security and what are they? Having an approach to answer the
question is useful in a number of ways. Firstly, it can analyze, at once, all instances of
the security protocols with different parameter values. Secondly, it allows the protocol
designer to gain precise knowledge on the secure configuration of the parameters so as to
choose the best values (e.g., in terms of minimizing the protocol execution time).
In general, parameterized timing constraints are necessary in various scenarios. First
of all, they can be used to capture the general design of the protocols. For instance, since
the lifetime of credentials are often related to the runtime information like network la-
tency, it is best to keep them parameterized so that we can systematically find out their
secure relations. Furthermore, parameterized timing constraints are necessary to model
the properties of some special cryptographic primitives. For example, weak cryptographic
functions, which are breakable by consuming extra time, may be used in the sensor net-
works for higher computing performance and lower power consumption. Since breaking
different weak functions requires different attack time, in order to guarantee the correct-
ness of the protocols in these sensor networks, we need to parameterize the attack time and
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compute the secure configuration accordingly. Moreover, agencies often give suggestions
on key crypto-period for cryptographic key management [22], so parameterized timing
constraints can be used to model long term protocols.
Nevertheless, this is a highly non-trivial task. The challenges for designing timed
protocol and providing proper parameter configuration are illustrated as follows. First,
in the setting of timed authentication over the Internet, given the network is completely
exposed to the adversary, we need to formally prove that the critical information cannot
be leaked and the protocol works as intended under arbitrary attacking behaviors from
the network. Second, timestamps are continuous values extracted from clocks to ensure
the validity of messages and credentials. Analyzing the continuous timing constraints
adds another dimension of complexity. Third, a protocol design might contain multiple
timing parameters, e.g., the network latency and the session key lifetime, which could
affect security of the system. Manually reasoning the least constrained and yet correct
configuration for the parameters in complex protocols is extremely hard and error-prone.
As a consequence, automatic analysis technique is needed for proving the correctness of
the protocol and computing the parameter configurations.
Contributions. Our contributions in this work are summarized as follows. (1) We propose
timed logic rules to specify parameterized timed protocols in Section 4.3 by extending our
previous work [77] with parameterized timing constraint, secrecy query, etc. Additionally,
we propose timed applied pi-calculus to model the timed protocols in Section 4.4 and de-
fine its semantics based on the timed logic rules in Section 4.5. We thus facilitate intuitive
specification method for timed security protocols with timing parameters. (2) Based on the
timed logic rules, security protocols can be verified efficiently for an unbounded number
of protocol sessions in our framework as shown in Section 4.6. Generally, in this work,
we specify the adversary’s capabilities in the security protocols as a set of Horn logic rules
with parameterized timing constraints. Then, we compose these rules repeatedly until a
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fixed-point is reached, so that we can check the desired security properties against them
and compute the largest parameter configurations. The parameter configuration is repre-
sented by succinct constraints of the parameters. When the protocol could be secure with
the right parameter values, our approach outputs a set of constraints on the parameters
that are necessary for security. Otherwise, an attack is generated, which would work for
any parameter configuration. We formally prove the correctness of our algorithm. (3) We
implement our method as a tool named PTAuth. In order to handle the parameters in the
timing constraints, we utilize the Parma Polyhedra Library (PPL) [17] in our tool to rep-
resent the relations between timestamps and parameters. We evaluate our approach with
several security protocols in Section 4.7. During the experiment, we found a timing attack
in the official document of Kerberos V [95] that has never been reported before.
4.2 Running Example: Wide Mouthed Frog
We use the same Wide Mouthed Frog (WMF) [35] protocol shown in Chapter 3 as a
running example to illustrate how our approach works. WMF is designed for exchanging
timely fresh session keys, ensuring that the key is generated by the protocol initiator within
a short time when the protocol responder accepts it.
Syntax Hierarchy. Before describing the WMF protocol, we first introduce the syntax to
represent the messages as shown in Table 4.1. Messages could be defined as functions,
names, nonces, variables or timestamps. Functions can be applied to a sequence of mes-
sages; names are globally shared constants; nonces are freshly generated random values
in sessions; variables are memory spaces for holding messages; and timestamps are clock
readings extracted during the protocol execution. In addition, we introduce parameters to
parameterize the timing constraints. The constraint function C(X) applies succinct con-
straints to X, where X is a set of timestamps and parameters. Each succinct constraint can
be written in a general form of l(t1 , . . . , tn , §p1, . . . , §pm) ∼ 0, where ∼∈ {<,≤} and
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Type Expression






Constraint(B) C(t1, t2, . . . , tn (timing relation)
, §p1, §p2, . . . , §pm)
Configuration(L) C(§p1, §p2, . . . , §pm) (parameter config)







Rule(R) [ G ] e1, . . . , en −[ B ]→ e (rule)
Table 4.1: Syntax Hierarchy Structure
l is a linear function. In the following, the symmetric encryption function is denoted as
encs(m, k), wherem is the plaintext and k is the encryption key. Furthermore, all the mes-
sages transmitted in WMF is encrypted by the shared key represented as sk(u), which is
only known between the user u and the server. For simplicity, the concatenation function
tuplen(m1,m2, . . . ,mn) is written as 〈m1,m2, . . . ,mn〉.
Events are constructed by attaching predicates to the message sequences. In our frame-
work, we have seven different predicates:
• init([d],m, t) means that a session with id [d] has been initiated using the arguments
in m at time t.
• other participants can engage join(m, t) to show their participation in the protocol
using the arguments in m at time t.
• similarly, the responder engages accept([d],m, t) to indicate the protocol acceptance
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under the arguments of m at time t in a session with id [d];
• the knowledge event know(m, t) means that the adversary knows the message m at
the time t ;
• the nonce generation event new([n], loc[],m) stands for the generation of nonce [n]
at the location loc[] where m records a message tuple that can be identified by the
nonce [n];
• the uniqueness event unique(u, loc[],m) means that the message u is a unique value
appeared at the location loc[], wherem records a message tuple that can be identified
by 〈u, loc[]〉;
• the event leak(m) is introduced to check the leakage of the secret message m that
violates the secrecy property, as shown in the example later.
Comparing with the nonce generation event where the nonce [n] should always be unique
regardless of the location, the uniqueness checking of u is location dependent. For the
same location, only one unique event can have u; while for two different locations, two
different unique events can be claimed for the same u.
Generally, the timed logic rules represent the capabilities of the adversary, written
as [ G ] e1, e2, . . . , en −[ B ]→ e, where G is a set of untimed guards, {e1, e2, . . . , en}
is a set of premise events, B is a set of timing constraints and e is a conclusion event.
It means that if the untimed guard condition G, the premise events {e1, e2, . . . , en} and
the timing constraints B can be satisfied, the conclusion event is ready to occur. For
simplicity, when G is empty, we omit the untimed guard condition in the rule. Notice
some arguments of every event shown in Table 4.1 are marked with a special symbol ?.
For every event, the ? marked arguments forms the key of the event. When the events in
the same rule have an identical key, they should be merged. For instance, given two know
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events know(m1, t1) and know(m2, t2) in a rule’s premises, if m1 = m2, we merge them
by applying a substitution {t2 7→ t1} to the whole rule.
Wide Mouthed Frog. The WMF protocol is a key exchange protocol consisting of three
participants, i.e., the initiator Alice, the responder Bob and the server. It has the following
steps.
(1) Alice engages : new([k], alice gen[], 〈A[], B[], tA〉)
, init([k], 〈A[], B[], [k]〉, tA)
Alice → Server : 〈A[], encs(〈tA, B[], [k]〉, sk(A[]))〉
(2) Server checks : tS − tA ≤ §pa
Server engages : join(〈A[], B[], [k]〉, tS )
Server → Bob : encs(〈tS , A[], [k]〉, sk(B[]))
(3) Bob checks : tB − tS ≤ §pa
Bob engages : new([b], bob gen[], 〈A[], B[], [k], tS , tB〉)
, accept([b], 〈A[], B[], [k]〉, tB)
First, Alice generates a fresh key [k] at time tA with the new event and engages an initA
event to initiate the key exchange protocol with Bob. Second, Alice sends the fresh key
with the current time tA and Bob’s name to the server. Third, after receiving the request
from Alice, the server checks the freshness of the timestamp tA and accepts Alice’s request
by engaging an initS event. Fourth, the server sends a new message to Bob, informing him
that the server receives a request from Alice at time tS to communicate with him using the
key [k]. Fifth, Bob checks the timestamp and accepts the request from Alice if it is timely.
The transmitted messages are encrypted under the users’ shared keys.
Parameters. Whether or not WMF works relies on two crucial time parameters. The first
parameter is the real network latency §pd of the network, and the second one is the message
delay §pa allowed in the message freshness checking. §pd is initially configured as §pd > 0
because the network latency should be positive. However, the exact value of §pd depends
on the network itself and thus cannot be fixed in the protocol design. Parameter §pa on the
other hand might be related to §pd’s value, which should be answered by the verification.
That is to say, the values of the parameters are better modeled as unknown parameters
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and we must be able to analyze the protocol without the concrete values of them. By
introducing these two parameters, we want to make sure that the WMF protocol exchanges
the secret session key successfully, and the correspondence between the request from Alice
and the acceptance from Bob is timely. Hence, ideally a tool would automatically show us
the secure configuration of §pd and §pa. Because WMF has two message transmissions,
we need to check whether tB − tA ≤ 2 ∗ §pa is always satisfied.
4.3 Specifying Protocols using Timed Logic Rules
In this section, we introduce how to model the parameterized timed security protocols.
Generally, protocols as well as their underlying cryptography foundation are represented
by a set of Horn logic rule variants [29] as shown in Table 4.1. They, denoted as Rinit ,
represent the capabilities of the adversary in the protocol.
Adversary Model. We assume that an active attacker exists in the network, extending
from the Dolev-Yao model [56]. The attacker can intercept all communications, compute
new messages, generate new nonces and send any message he obtained. For computation,
he can use all the publicly available functions, e.g., encryption, decryption, concatenation.
He can also ask the genuine protocol participants to take part in the protocol based on
his needs. Comparing our attack model with the Dolev-Yao model, attacking the weak
cryptographic functions and compromising legitimate protocol participant are allowed by
consuming extra time, as shown later in this section.
Rule Construction. Based on the adversary model described above, the interactions avail-
able to the adversary in the protocol can be represented by Horn logic rule variants guarded
by timed checking conditions. Generally, every rule consists of a set of untimed guard
conditions, several premise events, some timing constraints and one conclusion event as
shown in Table 4.1. When the guard conditions, the premise events and the timing con-
straints in a rule are fulfilled, its conclusion event becomes available to the adversary. We
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remove the brackets if the rule has no guard condition. For instance, since the symmetric
encryption and decryption functions are publicly available in WMF, these capabilities of
the adversary can be represented by the following two rules.
know(m, t1 ), know(k, t2 ) −[ t1 , t2 ≤ t ]→ know(encs(m, k), t) (4.1)
know(encs(m, k), t1 ), know(k, t2 ) −[ t1 , t2 ≤ t ]→ know(m, t) (4.2)
The rule (4.1) means that given a message m and a key k, the adversary can compute its
encryption encs(m, k), and the encryption can only be known after the message and the
key are obtained. Similarly, the rule (4.2) shows the decryption capability of the adversary.
Furthermore, the adversary can register new accounts at the server, except for the ex-
isting ones of Alice and Bob. So, we have the following rule.
[c 6= A[] ∧ c 6= B[]] know(c, t1 ) −[ t1 ≤ t ]→ know(sk(c), t) (4.3)
For rules related to the protocol itself, they can be extracted from the protocol read-
ily. For instance, the adversary can actively ask Alice to initiate the first step of the
WMF protocol, so the messages in the second step can be intercepted from the network,
which is shown by the rule (4.4). As Alice can initiate this protocol with any user at any
time based on the adversary’s needs, the constant B[] is replaced with a variable R and
know(〈R, tA〉, t) is added to the premises of the rule, comparing with protocol description
in Section 4.2.
know(R,t), new([k], alice gen[], 〈A[], R, tA〉), initA([k], 〈A[], R, [k]〉, tA)
−[ t ≤ tA ]→ know(〈A[], encs(〈tA, R, [k]〉, sk(A[]))〉, tA) (4.4)
Similarly, based on the server’s behavior in the second step of WMF, we can construct
the rule (4.5) shown below. Since the server provides its service to all of its users, Alice
and Bob’s names are replaced by variables. The network latency and the message delay
are captured by the parameterized constraints.
know(〈I, encs(〈tI , R, k〉, sk(I))〉, t), join(〈I, R, k〉, tS )
−[ tS − t ≥ §pd ∧ tS − tI ≤ §pa ]→ know(encs(〈tS , I, k〉, sk(R)), tS ) (4.5)
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Finally, Bob accepts the protocol when he receives the message from the server, indi-
cating that the initiator is Alice and the request is fresh.
know(encs(〈tS , A[], k〉, sk(B[])), t), new([b], bob gen[], 〈A[], B[], k, tS , tB〉)
−[ tB − t ≥ §pd ∧ tB − tS ≤ §pa ]→ accept([b], 〈A[], B[], k〉, tB) (4.6)
Additional Attack Rule. In addition to the attacker capabilities in the Dolev-Yao model,
the attacker can compromise cryptographic primitives and legitimate protocol participants.
For instance, we can model the brute-force attack on a weak encryption function. Given
the name of the encryption function as Crypto and the least time of cracking Crypto as
§d, the attacking behavior can be modeled by the following rule.
know(Crypto(m, k), t1) −[ t− t1 > §d ]→ know(m, t)
Additionally, for some ciphers, key compromise can be conducted under certain condi-
tions. For example, for RC4 used by WEP, when a large number of ciphertexts are trans-
mitted in the network, the encryption key can be compromised, which could be measured
with time. Given an application scenario where such attack is possible and the attacking
time has a lower bound §d, we can model it as follows.
know(RC4 (m, k), t1)〉 −[ t− t1 > §d ]→ know(k, t)
Authentication Query. Similar to our previous work [77], verifying the timely authenti-
cation is allowed in our framework. The timely authentication not only asks for the proper
correspondence between the init and accept events but also requires the satisfaction of the
timing constraints, formalized as follows. Extended from our previous work [78], given
a timed security protocol, the timed non-injective authentication is satisfied if and only if
for every acceptance of the protocol responder, the protocol initiator indeed initiates the
protocol and the protocol partners indeed join in the protocol, agreeing on the protocol
arguments and timing requirements. We formally define the non-injective timed authenti-
cation as follows.
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Definition 4.1. Non-injective Timed Authentication. In a timed protocol, non-injective
timed authentication
Qn = accept ←[ B ]− init , join1, . . . , joinn
holds if and only if for every occurrence of the event accept , all of the corresponding
events {init , join1, . . . , joinn} are engaged before, and their timestamps should always
satisfy the timing constraints B. In order to ensure the general timed authentication, the
arguments encoded in the query events should only be variables and timestamps.
The injective timed authentication additionally requires an injective correspondence
between the protocol initialization and acceptance in addition to satisfaction of the non-
injective timed authentication. Hence, the injective timed authentication, which ensures
the infeasibility of the replay attack, is strictly stronger than the non-injective one.
Definition 4.2. Injective Timed Authentication. The injective timed authentication, de-
noted as
Qi = accept ←[ B ]→ init , join1 , . . . , joinn ,
is satisfied by a timed protocol, if and only if (1) the non-injective timed authentication
Qn = accept ←[ B ]− init , join1 , . . . , joinn ,
is satisfied and (2) for any init event of Qi occurred in the protocol, at most one accept
event with an unique id can occur, agreeing on the arguments in the events and the timing
constraints in B.
For simplicity, given a non-injective query Qn = accept ←[ B ]− H and its injective
version Qi = accept ←[ B ]→ H , we have inj (Qn) = Qi and non inj (Qi) = Qn.
Similarly, given these two respective query sets Qn and Qi, we have inj (Qn) = Qi and
non inj (Qi) = Qn.
In WMF, the authentication should be accepted by the responder R only if the request
is made by the initiator I within 2 ∗ §pa. Thus, we have the following non-injective au-
thentication query
QWMFn = accept([b], 〈I, R, k〉, kR)←[kR − kS ≤ §pa, kS − kI ≤ §pa ]−
init([k], 〈I, R, k〉, tI ), join(〈I, R, k〉, tS ) (4.7)
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and the corresponding injective authentication query inj (QWMFn ).
Secrecy Query. In this work, we extend the verification algorithm developed in our pre-
vious work [77] with secrecy checking that can be relevant to timing. Secrecy checking
is introduced with additional rules that lead to the leak events, representing the leakage of
the secret information.
Definition 4.3. Secrecy. In a security protocol, secrecy holds for a message m if the
event leak(m) is unreachable when “new 1, new 2, . . . , newn, know(m, t) −[]→ leak(m)”
is added to Rinit , where new 1, new 2, . . . , newn are the nonce generation events for all of
nonces in m. Notice that different nonce generation events should have different locations
so that they can be correctly identified in the protocol.
For instance, according to the WMF protocol, a secret session key [k] is sent over the
network. In order to check the secrecy property of [k], we add the following rule to Rinit
and then check the reachability of the leak event.
new([k], alice gen[], 〈A[], B[], tA〉), know([k], t) −[]→ leak([k]) (4.8)
It means that if the session key [k] generated by Alice for Bob can be known to the adver-
sary, the secrecy property of the session key is invalid in WMF.
4.4 Specifying Protocols using Timed Applied pi-calculus
In order to model the timed security protocols naturally, a high-level specification lan-
guage should be provided. Hence, we develop timed applied pi-calculus to specify timed
security protocols, which extends the applied pi-calculus [5] with time related operations
and measurements. We use the Wide Mouthed Frog protocol [35] as a running example to
demonstrate our modeling method.
Comparing with the syntax of the applied pi-calculus, generating, checking and using
timestamps are allowed in the timed applied pi-calculus. The syntax of the timed applied pi-
calculus is shown in Table 4.2, which consists of five expression categories, i.e., messages,
parameters, timing constraints, parameter configurations and processes.
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Type Expression
Message(m) f(m1,m2, ...,mn) (function)
A,B,C (name)
n (nonce)
x, y, z (variable)
t (timestamp)
Parameter(p) p (parameter)
Constraint(B) C(t1, t2, . . . , tn, p1, p2, . . . , pm) (timing constraint)
Configuration(L) C(p1, p2, . . . , pm) (parameter relation)





if m1 = m2 then P [else Q] (untimed condition)
if B then P [else Q] (timed condition)
wait until µt : B then P (timing delay)
let m = f(. . .) then P [else Q] (function application)
c(m).P (channel input)
c(m).P (channel output)





Table 4.2: Syntax of Timed Applied pi-calculus
Generally, messages represent the data transmitted during the process execution. They
can be hierarchal constructed by functions, names, nonces, variables and timestamps.
Functions can be applied to a sequence of messages; names are globally shared constants;
nonces are freshly generated random values in the processes; variables are memory spaces
for holding messages; and timestamps are clock readings extracted during the process ex-
ecution. Additionally, parameters stands for the timing settings that are generally agreed
or globally exist in the protocol. By comparing them with the timestamps in the protocol,
we can regulate the protocol execution trace.
Functions are defined as f(m1,m2, . . . ,mn)⇒ m@D, where f is the function name,
m1,m2, . . . ,mn are the input messages, m is the output message and D is the consumable
timing range. For simplicity, we add some syntactic sugar as follows. (1) When D =
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[0,∞) which is the largest timing range of functions, we omit ‘@ D’ in the function
definition. (2) When m is exactly the same as f(m1,m2, . . . ,mn), we similarly omit ‘⇒
m’ for short. For instance, the symmetric encryption function encs is originally defined
as encs(m, k) ⇒ encs(m, k) @ [0,∞). It means that a symmetric encryption encs(m, k)
can be generated from a message m and a key k using the function encs with no negative
time. After the simplification, we can write its definition as encs(m, k). Similarly, the
symmetric decryption function decs can be defined as decs(encs(m, k), k) ⇒ m with the
same meaning of m and k. For illustration purpose, some frequently used functions are
defined in Table 4.3.
The constraint set B = C(t1, t2, . . . , tn, p1, p2, . . . , pm) represents a set of linear con-
straints over the timestamps and parameters, which can be used as checking condition and
timing assumption in the protocol. For instance, given a parameter pa as the maximum
lifetime of messages in the protocol, the message receiver may check the message fresh-
ness with a timing constraint t′ − t ≤ pa, when the message, generated by the sender at t,
is received at t′. Meanwhile, given another parameter pd as the minimum network delay,
we may have t′ − t ≥ pd as a general constraint on the message transmission. Another
constraint set L = C(p1, p2, . . . , pm) stands for the global linear relations over the timing
parameters. For example, the parameter relation pd ≤ pa should be generally satisfied
because no message can be delivered otherwise. Before the verification, L will be con-
figured to an initial relation. Later during the verification, whenever an attack is found, L
will be updated with new constraints so as to remove the attack and preserve the security
properties.
As shown in Table 4.2, processes are defined as follows. ‘0’ is a null process that
does nothing. ‘P |Q’ is a parallel composition of processes P and Q. The replication ‘!P ’
stands for an infinite parallel composition of process P , which captures an unbounded
number of protocol sessions running in parallel. The name restriction ‘νn.P ’ represents
that a fresh nonce n is generated and bound to the process P . The time restriction ‘µt.P ’
similarly means that a timestamp t is read from the user’s clock and bound to the process
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Scheme Definition
Symmetric encs(m, k) (encryption)
Encryption decs(encs(m, k), k)⇒ m (decryption)
Asymmetric pk(skey) (generate public key)
Encryption enca(m, pkey) (encryption)
deca(encs(m, pk(skey)), skey)⇒ m (decryption)
Signature sign(m, skey) (generate signature)
check(sign(m, skey), pk(skey))⇒ true (check signature)
Hash hash(m) (generate hash value)
Tuple tuplen(m1, . . . ,mn) (generate tuple)
∀i ∈ {1 . . . n} : (extract tuple)
geti(tuplen(m1 , . . . ,mn))⇒ mi
Table 4.3: Cryptographic Function Definitions
P . The checking condition c in the expression ‘if c then P [else Q]’1 has two forms:
(1) the untimed condition m1 = m2 is a symbolic equivalence checking between two
messages; (2) the timed condition C(t1, t2, . . . , tn, p1, p2, . . . , pm) is a numeric constraint
over timestamps and parameters. When the condition c is valid, the process P is executed;
otherwise, Q is executed. The timing delay expression ‘wait until µt : B then P ’ means
that P is executed until the current clock reading satisfies the timing condition B. The
function application expression ‘let m = f(m1, . . . ,mn) then P else Q’ means if the
function f is applicable to a sequence of messages m1, . . . ,mn, its result is bound to the
message m in the process P ; otherwise, the process Q is executed. The channel input
expression ‘c(m).P ’ means that a message, bound to the name m, is received from the
channel c before executing P . The channel output expression ‘c(m).P ’ describes that
the message m is sent to the channel c before executing the process P . The uniqueness
checking expression ‘check m as unique .P ’ ensures that the value of m has never been
used before, comparing with other replications of this process. The uniqueness checking
is particularly useful to prevent replay attacks in practice.
Additionally, four events are introduced in the process calculus to specify the security
claims that can be made in the protocol.
• The protocol participant can engage a secrecy(m) event to indicate that the message
1 The expression in the brackets ‘[E]’ means that E can be omitted.
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m should be kept as a secret to the adversary.
• Right before the initiator finishes its role in starting the protocol, which is usually
indicated by sending the last message, he emits an event init(m)@t, which means
that a session has been initiated using the arguments in m at time t.
• When the responder finishes the protocol successfully, he engages an event accept(m)@t
to indicate the protocol acceptance under the arguments in m at time t.
• When other participants join the protocol run, they can engage an event join(m)@t
to show their participation in the protocol using the arguments in m at time t.
Overall, we use the secrecy event to declare the secrecy property and use the init , join
and accept events to check the authentication properties claimed by the protocol. As these
events are closely related to the security properties, we explain them with the property
definitions.
Notations. Several widely accepted notations for cryptographic protocol analysis are used
in this chapter as follows. A variable m is bound to a process P when m is constructed
by the function application expression ‘let m = f(m1, . . .) then P else Q’ or the channel
input expression ‘c(m).P ’ as shown in Table 4.2. When a variable m appears in a process
P while it is not bound to P , it is a free variable in P . A process is closed when it does
not have any free variable. σ = {x1 7→ m1, . . . , xn 7→ mn} stands for the substitution that
replaces the variables x1, . . . , xn with the messages m1, . . . ,mn respectively. Given two
messages m and m′, when there exists a substitution σ such that σm = m′, we say that m
can be unified to m′, denoted as m  m′; when no such substitution exists, we say that
m cannot be unified to m′, denoted as m 6 m′. Given two messages m1 and m2, if there
exists a substitution σ such that σe1 = σe2, we say e1 and e2 are unifiable and σ is an unifier
for e1 and e2. If e1 and e2 are unifiable, the most general unifier for e1 and e2 is an unifier
σ such that for all unifiers σ′ of e1 and e2 there exists a substitution σ′′ such that σ′ = σ′′σ.
The most general unifier for e1 and e2 is denoted as mgu(m1,m2). For simplicity, the
concatenation function tuplen(m1,m2, . . . ,mn) is written as 〈m1,m2, . . . ,mn〉 (or simply
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m1,m2, . . . ,mn when no ambiguity is introduced). Given a tuple x = 〈x1, . . . , xi〉 and a
message y, their concatenation can be written as x · y = 〈x1, . . . , xi, y〉.
In the following, we again use the Wide Mouthed Frog (WMF) [35] protocol as an
example to illustrate our specification language. For review purpose, WMF is designed to
establish a timely fresh session key k from an initiator A to a responderB through a server
S. In WMF, whenever a message is received, the receiver checks the message freshness
before accepting it. To make a flexible specification, we thus use a parameter to represent
the maximum message lifetime as pa, ensuring that the message is received within pa. Ad-
ditionally, we consider another parameter pd, which stands for the minimal network delay,
during the verification. Since pd is a timing parameter related to the network environment,
it is not directly used in the protocol execution. Instead, it is a default and compulsory de-
lay that applies to all of the network transmissions, so we add this delay to every channel
inputs. In addition, we assume that the network latency is always positive, which makes
the initial parameter configuration as L0 = {pd > 0}. Notice that a positive network delay
is not compulsory in the protocol specification. However, setting the minimal network
latency as pd ≥ 0 sometimes introduces a misleading result: the protocol can be verified
as correct when pd strictly equals to 0. Since the network latency pd cannot be ensured as
0 in practice, the security protocol is thus proved as insecure instead. Because this final
step of manual deduction is undesirable, we can remove it by simply requiring a positive
network latency in the first place.
The Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol. The WMF protocol is a key exchange protocol that
involves three participants, e.g., an initiator Alice, a responder Bob and a server S. Alice
and Bob register their usernames as A and B at the server respectively. The generated key
of a user u are written as key(u). WMF then can be informally described as the following
three steps.
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(1) A generates a random session key k
A→ S : 〈A, encs(〈ta, B, k〉, key(A))〉
(2) S receives the request from A at ts
S checks : ts − ta ≤ pa
S → B : encs(〈ts, A, k〉, key(B))
(3) B receives the message from S at tb
B checks : tb − ts ≤ pa
B accepts the session key k
First, A generates a fresh key k at time ta and initiates the WMF protocol with B by
sending the message 〈A, encs(〈ta, B, k〉, key(A))〉 to the server. Second, after receiving
the request from A, the server checks the freshness of the timestamp ta and accepts her
request by forwarding a new message encs(〈ts, A, k〉, key(B)) to B, informing him that
the server receives a request from A at time ts to communicate with him using the key k.
Third, B checks the message from the server as well and accepts the request from A if it
is timely. All of the transmitted messages are encrypted under the users’ long-term keys
pre-registered at the server.
In order to verify WMF in a hostile environment, we assume that (1) the adversary can
decide the protocol responder for A, (2) S provides its session key exchange service to all
of its registered users and (3) the adversary can register as any user at the server, except
for A and B. In WMF, because we are only interested in the protocol acceptance between
the legitimate users, we ask B to only accept the requests from A. Additionally, a public
channel c controlled by the adversary is used in this protocol for network communications.
Before the protocol starts, all of its participants need to register a secret long-term key
at the server. We assume that A and B have already registered at the server using their
names. Hence, the server can generate new keys for any other users (possibly personated
by the adversary), which can be shown as the process Pr below.
Pr = c(u).if u 6= A ∧ u 6= B then c(key(u)).0
In WMF, A takes a role of the initiator as specified by Pa below. She first starts the
protocol by receiving an responder’s name r from c, assuming that r is provided by the
adversary. Then, A generates a session key k and claims k should be unknown to the
adversary. Meanwhile, A emits an init event, saying that A initializes the WMF proto-
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col at time ta, using the protocol arguments ma. Notice that ma is not clearly specified
here, because we have not formally introduced the authentication property yet. The vari-
able ma is instantiated later in this section according to different types of authentication
properties. Finally, the message 〈A, encs(〈ta, r, k〉, sk(A))〉 is sent from A to S. Since the
initialization time ta, the responder’s namer r and the session key k are encrypted with A’s
long-term key, which is only known to A and the server, the adversary cannot obtain them
directly.
Pa = c(r).νk.secrecy(k).µta.init(ma)@ta
.c(〈A, encs(〈ta, r, k〉, sk(A))〉).0
As specified by the process Ps, after the server receives a user’s request y, it records the
current time as ts. It gets the initiator’s name i from the unencrypted part of the request
and use the key key(i) to decrypt the encrypted part of the request. If the decryption
function applies successfully, it stores the initialization time, the responder’s name and the
session key into ti, r and k respectively. When the freshness checking ts − ti ≤ pa is
passed, the server then believes its participation in the current protocol run and engage a
join event at time ts. Similar to ma in the init event, we specify the argument ms with the
authentication properties. Later, a new message encrypted by the responder’s key, written
as encs(〈ts, i, k〉, key(r)), is sent to the responder over the public channel.
Ps = c(y).µts.let i = get1 (y) then
let x = get2 (y) then let m = decs(x , key(i)) then
let ti = get1 (m) then let r = get2 (m) then
let k = get3 (m) then if ts − ti ≤ pa then
join(ms)@ts.c(encs(〈ts, i, k〉, key(r))).0
Additionally, as shown in the process Pb, whenB receives the request from the initiator
through the server, B records his current time as tb and tries to decrypt request as a tuple
of the server’s processing time ts, the initiator’s id i and the session key k. If i = A and
the freshness checking tb − ts ≤ pa is valid, B then believes that the request is sent from
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A within 2 ∗ pa (as the message freshness checking stacks) and engages the accept event
at time tb.
Pb = c(x).µtb.let m = decs(x , sk(B)) then
let ts = get1 (m) then let i = get2 (m) then
let k = get3 (m) then if i = A then
if tb − ts ≤ pa then accept(mb)@tb.0
Finally, we have a process Pp that broadcasts all of the public available names, e.g.,
Alice and Bob’s names.
Pp = c(A).c(B).0
The overall process P is an infinite parallel composition of the five processes described
above.
P = (!Pr)|(!Pa)|(!Ps)|(!Pb)|(!Pp)
In this work, we discuss two types of security properties, i.e., authentication and se-
crecy. In order to clearly illustrate them, we introduce the formal adversary model adopted
in this work first.
Adversary Model. We assume that an active attacker exists in the network, whose ca-
pability is defined based on and extended from the Dolev-Yao model [56]. The attacker
can intercept all communications, compute new messages, generate new nonces and send
any message he obtained. For computation, he can use all the publicly available functions,
e.g., encryption, decryption, concatenation. He can also ask the genuine protocol partici-
pants to take part in the protocol based on his needs. Comparing our attack model with the
Dolev-Yao model, attacking weak cryptographic functions and compromising legitimate
protocol participants are allowed additionally. Notice that the adversary cannot emit the
accept , init and secrecy events, because they can be only engaged by legitimate protocol
users for checking properties. A formal definition of the adversary model in timed applied
pi-calculus is as follows.
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Definition 4.4. Adversary Process. The adversary process is defined as a closed timed
applied pi-calculus process S which does not emit the init , join accept and secrecy events.
Meanwhile, S can use all of the public functions.
Timed Authentication. Typically, in the protocol, we have an initiator who starts the
protocol and a responder who accepts the protocol. For instance, in WMF, Alice is the
initiator and Bob is the responder. Additionally, other entities, who are called partners,
can be involved during the protocol execution, such as the server in WMF. Given all of
the protocol participants, the protocol authentication generally aims at establishing some
common knowledge among them when the protocol successfully ends.
Since different participants take different roles in the protocol, we introduce the fol-
lowing three events for the initiator, the responder and the partners respectively. In these
events, the argument m stands for the arguments used in the current protocol session.
• The protocol initiator emits init event when he has initialized the protocol.
• The protocol responder emits accept event when he has finished the protocol.
• The protocol partner emits join event when his has participated in the protocol.
When any event is engaged, it means that the corresponding protocol participant believes
his participation in a protocol run. Hence, the above events should be engaged immediately
after the protocol participants successfully process all of the received messages according
to their roles, as his knowledge of the protocol execution state cannot be increased after
this point.
Based on the init , join and accept events, the protocol authentication then can be for-
mally specified as the event correspondence. Extending from [77, 78], we discuss the non-
injective and injective timed authentication properties in this work. Additionally, when
different arguments are checked in event correspondence, they can be further categorized
into agreement or synchronization properties.
Extended from our previous work [78], given a timed security protocol, the timed
non-injective authentication is satisfied if and only if for every acceptance of the protocol
responder, the protocol initiator indeed initiates the protocol and the protocol partners
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indeed join in the protocol, agreeing on the protocol arguments and timing requirements.
We formally define the non-injective timed authentication as follows.
Definition 4.5. Non-injective Timed Authentication. The non-injective timed authentica-
tion, denoted as
Qn = accept ←[ B ]− init , join1 , . . . , joinn ,
is satisfied by a closed process P , if and only if for any adversary process S, for every
occurrence of an accept event in P |S, the corresponding init events and join events in
Qn have occurred before in P |S, agreeing on the arguments in these events and the timing
constraints in B.
The injective timed authentication additionally requires an injective correspondence
between the protocol initialization and acceptance in addition to satisfaction of the non-
injective timed authentication. Hence, the injective timed authentication, which ensures
the infeasibility of the replay attack, is strictly stronger than the non-injective one.
Definition 4.6. Injective Timed Authentication. The injective timed authentication, de-
noted as
Qi = accept ←[ B ]→ init , join1 , . . . , joinn ,
is satisfied by a closed process P , if and only if (1) the non-injective timed authentication
Qn = accept ←[ B ]− init , join1 , . . . , joinn ,
is satisfied by P and (2) for any adversary process S, corresponding to one init event ofQi
occurred in P |S, at most one accept event can occur in P |S, agreeing on the arguments
in the events and the timing constraints in B.
(1) Timed Agreement Properties. When the message m encoded in the authentication
events stands for the common knowledge established by the protocol among the par-
ticipants, we call these timed authentication properties as timed agreement properties.
The non-injective and injective timed agreement properties generally ensure the common
knowledge establishment among the protocol participants under the timing restrictions.
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Example 4.7. In WMF, when B accepts the protocol, the common knowledge established
among A, S and B should be the initiator’s name, the responder’s name and the session
key. Hence, we specify the message m is different processes of WMF as follows.
ma = 〈A, r, k〉 in Pa
ms = 〈i, r, k〉 in Ps
mb = 〈i, B, k〉 in Pb
The non-injective timed agreement then should be written as
Qna = accept(〈i, r, k〉)@ti
←[ ts−ti ≤ §pa ∧ tr − ts ≤ §pa ]−
init(〈i, r, k〉)@ts, join(〈i, r, k〉)@tr (4.9)
where the responder accepts at time tr, the server joins at time ts and the initiator initial-
izes at time ti. Similarly, we have the injective timed agreement Qia = inj (Qna).
(2) Timed Synchronization Properties. However, the above timed agreement properties do
not necessarily guarantee the faithful message exchanges between protocol participants,
so the messages received by the receiver may not be the same message sent by the sender
in the protocol. Based on the synchronization defined in [52], when the message m en-
coded in the authentication events reflects the network input and output correspondence,
we name these timed authentication properties after timed synchronization properties. The
synchronization properties generally ensure that the messages exchanged in the protocol
are untampered, so the message received by the receiver is the message sent from the
sender for every network transmission.
Example 4.8. In WMF, we first specify the arguments of the authentication events as fol-
lows to reflect the network communications.
ma = 〈r, 〈A, encs(〈ta, r, k〉, sk(A))〉〉 in Pa
ms = 〈y, encs(〈ts, i, k〉, key(r))〉 in Ps
mb = 〈x〉 in Pb
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Then, we specify the input and output correspondence in the non-injective timed synchro-
nization property, written as follows.
Qns = accept(〈s2b〉)@ti
←[ ts−ti ≤ §pa ∧ tr − ts ≤ §pa ]−
init(〈r, a2s〉)@ts, join(〈a2s, s2b〉)@tr
where the responder accepts at time tr, the server joins at time ts and the initiator initial-
izes at time ti. Notice that ‘a2s’ is the message sent from A to S and ‘s2b’ is the message
sent from S to B. Similarly, we have the injective timed synchronization Qis = inj (Qns).
Secrecy. When a protocol participant believes that a message m cannot be known to the
adversary, he emits the event secrecy(m) to claim for its secrecy.
Definition 4.9. Secrecy Property. The secrecy property, denoted as Qs = secrecy(m) is
satisfied by a closed process P , if and only if for any adversary process S, the message
cannot be sent to the public channel c in P |S.
4.5 Timed Applied pi-calculus Semantics
The high-level timed applied pi-calculus must facilitate efficient verification, e.g., with a
concise and compact low-level semantics. We thus propose its semantics based on the
Horn logic rules illustrated in Section 4.3. In this way, the timed security protocol thus
can be naturally specified as well as efficiently verified. In this section, we define the
semantics of the timed applied pi-calculus illustrated previously based on the timed logic
rules introduced in Section 4.2.
(1) Semantics of Functions. Since functions can be generally defined (before simplifica-
tion) as
f(m1,m2, . . . ,mn) = m@D,
their semantic rules can be accordingly written as
know(m1, t1), know(m2, t2), . . . , know(mn, tn)
−[ ∀i ∈ {1 . . . n} : t − ti ∈ D ∧ t ′ ≥ t ]→ know(m, t ′).
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(2) Semantics of Processes. For processes, defining the semantics is more complex be-
cause we need to keep track of various protocol execution contexts. Thus, we introduce
several semantic states. Generally, the semantically equivalent timed logic rules of a pro-
cess P , can be denoted as bP cTNUMGHBσX .
• T is a set of timestamps that are generated before executing P . We use it to order
the timing of different behaviors. For instance, when a message is sent at time t in
P , ∀t′ ∈ T : t′ ≤ t should be satisfied.
• N is a set of nonces generated before P . They can identify the current process until
it terminates or sub-processes are forked.
• U is a set of value and location pairs that records the uniqueness checking happened
before P . Whenever the uniqueness of u is checked at the location l, the pair 〈u, l〉
will be added to U .
• M is a tuple of messages that is determined by the current process’s id. M consists
of the process inputs, the generated timestamps and nonces. Their order in M fol-
lows the operation order in the process. The process outputs are not included in M
because they can be determined by M as the process is deterministic.
• G is a set of untimed guard conditions that leads to the current process location.
Given two messages m and m′, two types of untimed guard conditions can be added
to G, i.e., m 6= m′ and m 6 m′.
• B is a set of timing conditions that leads to the current process location, consisting
of linear constraints over timestamps and parameters.
• σ is a naming substitution set that is applicable to P .
• X is a pair set of semi-completed timed logic rules and substitutions. Specifically,
these rules do not have the new events for nonces in N and the unique events for
unique pairs in U , which can identify the current process. This is because the current
process has not been finished yet. So we record the substitutions when the logic
82
rules are generated, and generate the completed rules when the process terminates
or forks.
Given an initial process P0, the Horn logic rules thus can be represented as bP0c∅∅∅〈〉∅∅∅∅∅.
In order to simplify the presentation of the translation, given a ruleR = [G ]H −[ B ]→ e,
we write R +p H ′ = [ G ] H ∪H ′ −[ B ]→ e.
First, we discuss three types of expressions that either terminate the current process
or fork sub-processes, so that the nonces in N and the unique pairs in U cannot identify
the current process after the expression. They are the null process ‘0’, the process parallel
‘P |Q’ and the process replication ‘!P ’. Given the null process in b0cTNUMGHBσX ,
the behavior tuple M of the current process is finally complete, so we can add the new
events and the unique events into the rules in X . The parallel composition process ‘P |Q’
can be considered as three processes: P andQ are executed without being identified by the
nonces inN and the pairs inU , and the current process terminates with the session ids from
N . The infinite process replication ‘!P ’ can be similarly described as an infinite process
parallel P | . . . |P . Upon constructing the new event for a nonce [n] in N , we introduce a
function loc([n]) to provide an unique name depending on the generation location of [n].
In practice, the function loc can be implemented as {l = l + 1; return l; } where l is a
global variable initialized as 0.
Given H ′ = {new([n],loc([n]),M) | [n] ∈ N ∧M 6= 〈〉}
∪ {update(u, l [],M) | 〈u, l []〉 ∈ U ∧M 6= 〈〉}
b0cTNUMGHBσX = {σ′(R +p H ′) | 〈R, σ′〉 ∈ X}
bP |QcTNUMGHBσX = b0cTNUMGHBσX
∪ bP cT (∅)(∅)MG(H ∪H ′)Bσ(∅)
∪ bQcT (∅)(∅)MG(H ∪H ′)Bσ(∅)
b!P cTNUMGHBσX = b0cTNUMGHBσX
∪ bP cT (∅)(∅)MG(H ∪H ′)Bσ(∅)
Second, for the nonce and timestamp generation expressions, we add the nonces and
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the timestamps into the nonce set N and the timestamp set T respectively. Furthermore,
for the timestamp generation, we also add timing constraints to describe that the newly
generated timestamp is larger or equal to the previously generated ones.
bνn.P cTNUMGHBσX
= bP cT (N ∪ {[n]})U(M · [n])GHBσX
bµt.P cTNUMGHBσX
= bP c(T ∪ {t})NU(M · t)GH(B ∩ {t ′ ≤ t | t ′ ∈ T})σX
Third, four conditional expressions exist in timed applied pi-calculus. The inequiva-
lence condition between messages should be included in G, while the timing constraints
should be added toB. The timing delay expression requires that the current timing satisfies
some timing constraint.
bif m1 = m2 then P else QcTNUMGHBσX
= bP cTNUMGHB(mgu(m,m′) · σ)X ∪ bP cTNUM(G ∧m1 6= m2)HBσX
bif B0 then P else QcTNUMGHBσX
= bP cTNUMGH(B ∩B0)σX ∪ (∪{bQcTNUMGH(B ∩ ¬c)σX | ∀c ∈ B0})
bwait until µt : Bt then P cTNUMGHBσX
= bP c(T ∪ {t})NU(M · t)GH(B ∩ {t ′ ≤ t | t ′ ∈ T} ∩Bt)σX
Given function f defined as f(m′1, . . . ,m
′
n)⇒ m′@D
and σ′ = mgu(〈m1, . . . ,mn〉, 〈m′1, . . . ,m′n〉), we have
blet m = f(m1, . . . ,mn) then P else QcTNUMGHBσX
= bµt1.wait until µt2 : t2 − t1 ∈ D then P cTNUMGHB({m 7→ m′} · σ′ · σ)X
∪ bQcTNUM(G ∧ 〈m′1, . . . ,m′n〉 6 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉)HBσX
Fourth, network communications can happen in the timed applied pi-calculus. For
network input, we record the timing when it is received and add a premise event as a
requirement to know that message. For every network output, we store an incomplete
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rules with the current substitution into X , considering that the output can be sent to the
network and known to the adversary as a result when all the premise events, untimed
guards and timing constraints are satisfied.
Given t as a new timestamp, we have
bc(m).P cTNUMGHBσX
= bP c(T ∪ {t})NU(M ·m)G(H ∪ {know(m, t)})(B ∪ {t ′ ≤ t | t ′ ∈ T})σX
bc(m).P cTNUMGHBσX
= bP cTNUMGHBσ(X ∪ {〈[G] H −[ B ∩ {t − t ′ ≥ §pd | t ′ ∈ T} ]→ know(m, t), σ〉})
Fifth, we can check the uniqueness of values in the process, which could be particularly
useful to prevent replay attacks, ensuring the injective timed authentication. In practice,
the uniqueness checking is usually implemented by maintaining a database and comparing
the new values with the existing ones. Notice that we reuse the function loc(m) to calculate
the checking location.
bcheck m as unique.P cTNUMGHBσX
= bP cTN(U · 〈m, loc(m)〉)MGHBσX
Sixth, three types of authentication events can be engaged in the process. The join
event is similar to the join expression in the calculus. However, for the init and accept
events, although their meanings are preserved in the timed logic rules, in order to check
the injective authentication property, we add an additional argument to them to represent
the session id. In fact, any nonce generated in the current session that is stored in N can
be used as the session id. When N is an empty set, we active generate a nonce before en-
gaging these two events. Both of the init and join events are added into the rule premises,
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while the accept event acts as the rule conclusion.
binit(m)@t.P cTNUMGHBσX
= if @[d] ∈ N then bνn.init(m)@t.P cTNUMGHBσX
else bP cTNUMG(H ∪ {init([d],m, t)})(B ∪ {t ≥ t ′|∀t ′ ∈ T})σX
bjoin(m)@t.P cTNUMGHBσX
= bP cTNUMG(H ∪ {join(m, t)})(B ∩ {t ≥ t ′|∀t ′ ∈ T})σX
baccept(m)@t.P cTNUMGHBσX
= if @[d] ∈ N then bνn.accept(m)@t.P cTNUMGHBσX
else bP cTNUMGHBσ(X ∪ {〈[G] H −[ (B ∩ {t ≥ t ′|∀t ′ ∈ T}) ]→ accept([d],m, t), σ〉})
Seventh, the last expression in the timed applied pi-calculus is the secrecy claim. How-
ever, the secrecy property is checked as an absence of information leakage as shown in
Section 4.6, so we use the event leak(m) as an contradiction event against secrecy(m).
bsecrecy(m).P cTNUMGHBσX
= bP cTNUMGHBσ(X ∪ {〈[G] H ∪ {know(m, t)} −[ B ]→ leak(m), σ〉})
4.6 Verification Algorithm
Given a rule R = [ G ] H −[ B ]→ e, a set of rules R and a parameter configuration L, we
use α(R,L) = [G ]H −[ B∩L ]→ e and α(R, L) = {α(R)|R ∈ R} to represent the rules
under the configuration L. Since the initial rules Rinit can be extracted from the protocol
as shown in Section 4.3, the satisfaction of an authentication query Q then depends on
whether the adversary can actively guide the protocol to reach the accept event based on
α(Rinit , L) without engaging the corresponding init events in Q or satisfying the timing
constraints. Similarly, the verification of the secrecy query needs to check that the leak
event is unreachable based on α(Rinit , L). In this section, we focus on computing the
largest parameter configuration that ensures the correctness of the desired authentication
and secrecy properties.
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Given any parameter configuration L, in order to determine whether a query Q is sat-
isfied by α(Rinit , L), we can adapt the verification algorithm in [77]. However, there
might be infinitely many possible parameter configurations. Thus, in this work, we de-
velop an approach to handle the parameters symbolically. Specifically, the verification
is divided into two sequential phases: the rule basis construction phase and the query
searching phase. In the rule base construction phase, we generate new rules by composing
two rules (through unifying the conclusion of the first rule and the premise of the second
rule). Our verification algorithm uses this method repeatedly to generate new rules until a
fixed-point is reached. This fixed-point is called the rule basis if it exists. Subsequently,
in the query searching phase, the query is checked against the rule basis to find counter
examples. Generally, we need to check the event correspondence as well as the parame-
terized timing constraints, the verification either proves the correctness of the protocol by
providing the secure configuration of the parameters (represented as succinct constraints),
or reports attacks because no parameter configuration can be found. Since the verifica-
tion for security protocol is generally undecidable [41], our algorithm cannot guarantee
termination. However, as shown in Section 4.7, our algorithm can terminate on most of
the evaluated security protocols. Additionally, limiting the number of protocol sessions is
allowed in our framework which would guarantee the termination of our algorithm.
Rule Basis Construction. Before constructing the rule basis, we need to review some
basic concepts introduced in Chapter 3 first:
• If σ is a substitution for both events e1 and e2 such that σe1 = σe2, we say e1 and
e2 are unifiable and σ is an unifier for e1 and e2. If e1 and e2 are unifiable, the most
general unifier for e1 and e2 is an unifier σ such that for all unifiers σ′ of e1 and e2
there exists a substitution σ′′ such that σ′ = σ′′σ.
• Given two rules R = [ G ] H −[ B ]→ e and R′ = [ G′ ] H ′ −[ B′ ]→ e′, if e and
e0 ∈ H ′ can be unified with the most general unifier σ such that σG ∧ σG′ can be
valid, their composition is denoted as R ◦e0 R′ = σ([ G ∧G′ ] H ∪ (H ′ − {e0})) −[
σ(B ∩B′) ]→ σe′.
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• Additionally, given the above two rules R and R′, we define R implies R′ denoted
as R⇒ R′ when ∃σ, σe = e′ ∧G′ ⇒ σG ∧ σH ⊆ H ′ ∧B′ ⊆ σB.
We construct the rule basis β(Rinit) based on the initial rules Rinit. Firstly, we de-
fine Rv as follows, representing the minimal closure of the initial rules Rinit. (1) ∀R ∈
Rinit,∃R′ ∈ Rv, R′ ⇒ R, which means that every initial rule is implied by a rule in
Rv. (2) ∀R,R′ ∈ Rv, R 6⇒ R′, which means that no duplicated rule exists in Rv. (3)
∀R,R′ ∈ Rv and R = [G] H −[ B ]→ e, if ∀e′ ∈ H, e′ ∈ V and ∃e0 6∈ V, S ◦e0 S ′ is
defined, then ∃S ′′ ∈ Rv, S ′′ ⇒ R ◦e0 R′, where V is a set of events that can be provided by
the adversary. In this work, V consists of the init events, the join events, the new events,
the unique events and the know(x, t) event where x is a variable or a timestamp. The third
rule means that for any two rules in Rv, if all premises of one rule are trivially satisfiable
and their composition exists, their composition is implied by a rule in Rv. Based on Rv,
we can calculate the rule basis as follows.
β(Rinit) = {R | R = [G] H −[ B ]→ e ∈ Rv ∧ ∀e′ ∈ H : e′ ∈ V}
Theorem 4.10 means that the rules in α(Rinit, L) is equivalent to those in α(β(Rinit), L).
Since the premises of the rules in α(β(Rinit), L) are trivially satisfiable according to the
function β, the attack searching based on α(β(Rinit), L) would be much easier.
Theorem 4.10. For any rule R in the form of [G] H −[ B ]→ e where ∀e′ ∈ H : e′ ∈ V,
R is derivable from α(Rinit, L) if and only if R is derivable from α(β(Rinit), L).
Proof. Given a derivation tree T of R, we define Γ(T, L) as a derivation tree where every
node’s label R′ is replaced with α(R′, L). According to Theorem 3.6, R = [ G ] H −[
B ]→ e is derivable from Rinit if and only if R is derivable from β(Rinit). It means that
we can construct a derivation tree T of R based on Rinit if and only if we can construct a
derivation tree T ′ of R based on β(Rinit). After applying the configuration L to all of the
labels of T , we have the following two conditions.
• If B ∩ L 6= ∅, Γ(T, L) becomes a derivation tree of α(R,L) based on α(Rinit, L),
and Γ(T ′, L) becomes a derivation tree of α(R,L) based on α(β(Rinit), L).
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• If B ∩ L = ∅, α(R,L) becomes invalid, so both of Γ(T, L) and Γ(T ′, L) do not
exist.
Hence, α(R,L) is derivable from α(Rinit, L) if and only if α(R,L) is derivable from
α(β(Rinit), L). The theorem is then proved.
Query Searching. A rule is a contradiction rule to the non-injective authentication query
if and only if its conclusion event is an accept event, while it does not require all the init
and join events as premises or it has looser timing constraints comparing with those in the
query. Otherwise, it is an obedience rule to the non-injective agreement query.
Definition 4.11. Non-injective Authentication Contradiction and Obedience. A ruleR =
[ G ] H −[ B ]→ e is a contradiction to the non-injective authentication query Qn =
accept ←[ B′ ]− H ′ denoted as Qn 0 R if and only if G 6= false ∧ B 6= ∅, e and accept
are unifiable with the most general unifier σ such that ∀e′ ∈ H, e′ ∈ V and ∀σ′, (σ′σH ′ 6⊆
σH) ∨ (σB 6⊆ σ′σB′). On the other hand, it is an obedience to Qn denoted as Qn ` R if
and only if G 6= false ∧B 6= ∅, e and accept are unifiable with the most general unifier σ
such that ∀e′ ∈ H, e′ ∈ V and ∃σ′, (σ′σH ′ ⊆ σH) ∧ (σB ⊆ σ′σB′).
Furthermore, the injective authentication query is violated if and only if (1) there exists
a contradiction to the non-injective version of the query, or (2) given two obedience rules
to the non-injective version of the query, when the corresponding init events have identical
session ids, the accept events in these two rules are not necessarily the same.
Definition 4.12. Injective Authentication Contradiction. Given a pair of (not necessarily
different) rules R and R′ , it is a contradiction to the injective authentication query Qi =
accept ←[ B′ ]→ init , J ′ denoted asQi 0 〈R,R′〉 if and only if (1)R andR′ are obedience
rules to non inj (Qi); (2) when the corresponding init events in R and R′ have the same
session id, the accept events of R and R′ do not necessarily have the same session id.
Finally, a rule is a contradiction to the secrecy query when the leak event is reachable.
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Algorithm 1 Parameter Configuration Computation
1: Input: β(Rinit) - the rule basis
2: Input: L0 - the initial configuration
3: Input: Qn - the non-injective authentication queries
4: Input: Qi - the injective authentication queries
5: Input: Qi - the secrecy queries
6: Output: L - a set of parameter configurations
7: L = {L0};
8: for Q ∈ Qn∪Qs∪non inj (Qi), L ∈ L, R = [ G ] H −[ B ]→ e ∈ α(β(Rinit), L) do
9: if Q 0 R then
10: L = L− {L};
11: for L′ : B ∩ L′ = ∅ ∨Q ` α(R,L′) do




16: for Q ∈ Qi, L ∈ L, R = [ G ] H −[ B ]→ e and R′ = [ G′ ] H ′ −[ B′ ]→ e′ ∈
α(β(Rinit), L) do
17: if non inj (Q) ` R ∧ non inj (Q) ` R′ ∧Q 0 〈R,R′〉 then
18: L = L− {L};
19: for L′ : B ∩ L′ = ∅ ∨B′ ∩ L′ = ∅ do




24: for L ∈ L, Q ∈ Qn ∪ non inj (Qi) do
25: if @R ∈ α(β(Rinit), L), Q ` R then




Definition 4.13. Secrecy Contradiction. A rule R = [ G ] H −[ B ]→ e is a contradiction
to the secrecy query denoted as Qs 0 R if and only if G 6= false ∧ B 6= ∅, e = leak(m)
and ∀e′ ∈ H : e′ ∈ V.
During the verification, our goal is to ensure that (1) no contradiction exists for all
queries while (2) at least one obedience rule exists for every non-injective authentication
query. Hence, given the non-injective authentication queries Qn, the injective authenti-
cation queries Qi and the secrecy queries Qs, our goal is to compute the largest L that
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satisfies the following conditions.
(1) ∀Q ∈ Qn ∪Qs ∪ non inj (Qi),
@R ∈ α(β(Rinit), L) : Q 0 R
(2) ∀Q ∈ Qi,@R,R′ ∈ α(β(Rinit), L),
non inj (Q) ` R,R′ : Q 0 〈R,R′〉
(3) ∀Q ∈ Qn ∪ non inj (Qi),
∃R ∈ α(β(Rinit), L) : Q ` R
Algorithm 1 illustrates the computing process of the largest L. From line 8 to line 15,
we compute the parameter configurations that remove the contradictions for Qn and Qs.
From line 16 to line 23, when we find a pair of rules that is a contradiction to an injective
authentication query, we remove one of them by updating the global configurations. From
line 24 to line 28, we ensure that every non-injective authentication query has at least one
obedience rule.
In order to prove the correctness of our algorithm, we need to show that for any con-
figuration L, a contradiction exists in α(β(Rinit), L) if and only if it exists in α(Rinit, L).
Theorem 4.14. Partial Correctness. Let Rinit be the initial rule set. When Q is a secrecy
query or a non-injective authentication query, there exists R derivable from α(Rinit, L)
such that Q 0 R if and only if there exists R′ ∈ α(β(Rinit), L) such that Q 0 R′. When
Q is an injective authentication query, there exists R1 and R2 derivable from α(Rinit, L)
such that Q 0 〈R1, R2〉 if and only if there exists R′1, R′2 ∈ α(β(Rinit), L) such that
Q 0 〈R′1, R′2〉.
Proof. Partial Soundness. Given any rule in α(β(Rinit), L), according to Theorem 4.10,
they are derivable from α(Rinit, L). Hence, any contradiction found in α(β(Rinit), L) is
a contradiction derivable from the initial rules α(Rinit, L). Partial Completeness. (1)
When Q is a secrecy query or a non-injective authentication query, suppose we have a
rule R derivable from α(Rinit, L) such that Q 0 R. According to Theorem 4.10, R is
also derivable from α(β(Rinit), L). So there exists a derivation tree of R whose nodes
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are labeled by rules in α(β(Rinit), L). We prove that the rule Rt = [ Gt ] Ht −[ Bt ]→
et labeled on the tree’s root is also a contradiction as follows. Notice that R is a rule
composed by Rt with other rules, so Gt 6= false and B 6= ∅.
• If Q is a secrecy query, Rt has a leak event as conclusion because Q 0 R. Addition-
ally, since Rt ∈ α(β(Rinit), L), ∀e′t ∈ Ht, e′t ∈ V. Thus, Q 0 Rt.
• If Q = accept ←[ Bq ]− Hq is a non-injective authentication query, et should be an
accept event. So, Rt should satisfy either Q ` Rt or Q 0 Rt. If Q ` Rt, as all of
the arguments in accept are variables, there exists a substitution σ of et and accept
satisfying σaccept = et, and ∃σ′, (σ′σHq ⊆ σHt) ∧ (σBt ⊆ σ′σBq) Meanwhile,
incoming edges of the tree root cannot be init events and new events, so these events
should also persist in R0. Hence, Q ` R0. This violates our precondition that
Q 0 R0. We then have Q 0 Rt.
(2) WhenQ is an injective authentication query, suppose we have a rule pair 〈R,R′〉 deriv-
able from α(Rinit, L) such that Q 0 〈R,R′〉, in the following we prove that there exists
a pair of rules 〈Rβ, R′β〉 in α(β(Rinit), L) such that Q 0 〈Rβ, R′β〉. According to Theo-
rem 4.10, R and R′ are also derivable from α(β(Rinit), L). So there exists two derivation
trees for R and R′ respectively whose nodes are labeled by rules in α(β(Rinit), L). Sup-
pose the root nodes of these two trees are labeled by Rt and R′t respectively. We already
proved that Rt and R′t are obedience rules to non inj (Q) as above. Given σ is the sub-
stitution when the init events are merged in R and R′, it should also work when the init
events are merged in Rt and R′t. Because σ cannot merge the accept events in R and R
′, it
cannot merge the accept events Rt and R′t as well. Hence, we have Q 0 〈Rt, R′t〉
Checking WMF. After checking the specification of WMF using the above-mentioned
algorithm, PTAuth claims an attack. The two key rules in β(Rinit) are shown below. The
rule (4.10) represents the execution trace that the server transmits the key once from Alice
to Bob. It is obedient to the query (4.7). However, the rule (4.11) is a contradiction to
the query (4.7), because it has a weaker timing range (tB ≤ tA + 4 ∗ §pa) than that in the
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query (tB ≤ tA + 2 ∗ §pa). This rule stands for the execution trace that the adversary sends
the message from the server back to server twice and then forwards it to Alice. According
to the rule (4.5), the timestamp in the message can be updated in this method. Hence,
Bob would not notice that the message is actually delayed when he receives it. In order to
remove the contradiction, we need to configure the parameters as either §pa < §pd or §pa ≤
0. However, applying any one of these constraints to the initial configuration 0 < §pd leads
to the removal of the rule (4.10), the only obedience rule in α(β(Rinit), L). Hence, PTAuth
claims that an attack is found, which means that no parameter configuration would make
the protocol work.
new([k], alice gen[], 〈A[], B[], tA〉), init([k], 〈A[], B[], [k]〉, tA)
,new([b], bob gen[], 〈A[], B[], [k], tS, tB〉), join(〈A[], B[], [k]〉, tS)
−[ t ≤ tA, tB ≤ tS + §pa ≤ tA + 2 ∗ §pa, tA + 2 ∗ §pd ≤ tS + §pd ≤ tB, ]→
accept([b], 〈A[], B[], [k]〉, tB) (4.10)
new([k], alice gen[], 〈A[], B[], tA〉), init([k], 〈A[], B[], [k]〉, tA)
,new([b], bob gen[], 〈A[], B[], [k], tS3, tB〉), join(〈A[], B[], [k]〉, tS1)
, join(〈B[], A[], [k]〉, tS2), join(〈A[], B[], [k]〉, tS3)
−[ t ≤ tA, tB ≤ tS3 + §pa ≤ tS2 + 2 ∗ §pa ≤ tS1 + 3 ∗ §pa ≤ tA + 4 ∗ §pa,
tA + 4 ∗ §pd ≤ tS1 + 3 ∗ §pd ≤ tS2 + 2 ∗ §pd ≤ tS3 + §pd ≤ tB ]→
accept([b], 〈A[], B[], [k]〉, tB) (4.11)
Corrected WMF for Non-injective Timed Agreement. The WMF protocol can be fixed
by inserting two different constants m1 and m2 into the messages sent to and received
from the server respectively, which breaks their symmetric structure. Using this method,
the server can distinguish the messages that it sent out previously, and refuse to process
them again. Our algorithm proves the non-injective timed agreement of this modified
WMF protocol and produces the timing constraints 0 < §pd ≤ §pa with the following
obedience rule. However, the injective timed agreement of WMF is still unsatisfied.
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Corrected WMF for Injective Timed Agreement. In fact, there exist two methods to
modify the WMF protocol so that the injective timed agreement can be satisfied.
• In practice, Bob can maintain a database which stores the previously used session
keys. When a new request is received, Bob checks the new session key against the
old ones to make sure its uniqueness. Hence, any session key generated by Alice can
at most correspond to one acceptance by Bob. By using the unique event, we can
check the uniqueness of values in our calculus.
• According to Lowe’s method [82], we can ensure the injective authentication prop-
erty by adding another round of communications between the protocol initiator and
the protocol responder. Before Bob engages the accept event in the process Pb, Bob
can generate a fresh nonce [n] and send it back to Alice under the newly agreed
encryption key [k]. When Alice receives the nonce [n], she send [n] + 1 back to
Bob. Since Alice will only reply once, Bob then can ensure that his acceptance
corresponds to at most one protocol initialization from Alice.
Our tool can prove the injective timed agreement property for these two corrected versions
of WMF.
4.7 Evaluations
Based on our verification framework, we have implemented a tool named PTAuth. We
encode PPL [17] in our tool to analyze the satisfaction of timing constraints. Meanwhile,
in order to improve the performance, we implement an on-the-fly verification algorithm
that updates the parameter configuration whenever a rule is generated. Hence, the veri-
fication process can terminate early if an attack can be found. We use PTAuth to check
many security protocols as shown in Table 4.4. All the experiments shown in this section
are conducted under Mac OS X 10.10.1 with 2.3 GHz Intel Core i5 and 16G 1333MHz
DDR3. In the experiments, we have checked several timed protocols i.e., the WMF proto-
cols [35, 54], the Kerberos protocols [95], the distance bounding protocolse [33, 38, 103]
and the CCITT protocols [40, 6, 35]. Additionally, we analyze the untimed protocols like
the Needham-Schroeder series [94, 82] and SKEME [72]. As can be seen, most of the
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Protocol Parameterized Bounded ]R Result Time
Wide Mouthed Frog [35] Yes No 40 Attack [84] 39ms
Wide Mouthed Frog (c) [54] Yes No 35 Secure 13ms
Kerberos V [95] Yes No 19370 Attack 23m5s
Kerberos V (c) Yes Yes 438664 Secure 2h41m
Auth Range [33, 38] Yes No 21 Secure 10ms
Ultrasound Dist Bound [103] Yes No 50 Attack [105] 18ms
CCITT X.509 (1) [40] No No 45 Attack [6] 14ms
CCITT X.509 (1c) [6] No No 62 Secure 37ms
CCITT X.509 (3) [40] No No 127 Attack [35] 84ms
CCITT X.509 (3) BAN [35] No No 148 Secure 131ms
NS PK [94] No No 68 Attack [82] 30ms
NS PK Lowe [82] No No 61 Secure 28ms
SKEME [72] No No 127 Secure 466ms
Table 4.4: Experiment Results
protocols can be verified or falsified by PTAuth quickly for an unbounded number of pro-
tocol sessions. Notice that the secure configuration is given based on the satisfaction of
all of the queries, so we do not show the results for different queries separately in the ta-
ble. The justification for the bounded verification of the corrected version of Kerberos V
is presented later in this section. The PTAuth tool and the models shown in this section
are available in [2]. Particularly, we have successfully found a new attack in Kerberos
V [95] using PTAuth. In the following, we present the detailed findings in Kerberos V.
Since Kerberos V is the latest version, we denote it as Kerberos for short unless otherwise
indicated.
Kerberos Overview. Kerberos is a widely used security protocol for accessing services.
For instance, Microsoft Window uses Kerberos as its default authentication method; many
UNIX and UNIX-like operating systems include software for Kerberos authentication.
Kerberos has a salient property such that its user can obtain accesses to a network service
within a period of time using a single request. In general, this is achieved by granting
an access ticket to the user, so that the user can subsequently use this ticket to authen-
ticate himself to the server. Kerberos is complex because multiple ticket operations are
supported simultaneously and many fields are optional, which are heavily relying on time.
So, configuring Kerberos is hard and error-prone.
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Kerberos consists of five types of entities: User, Client, Kerberos Authentication Server
(KAS), Ticket Granting Server (TGS) and Application Server (AP). KAS and TGS to-
gether are also known as Key Distribution Centre (KDC). Specifically, Users usually are
humans, and Clients represent their identities in the Kerberos network. KAS is the place
where a User can initiate a logon session to the Kerberos network with a pre-registered
Client. In return, KAS provides the User with (1) a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) and (2)
an encrypted session key as the authorization proof to access TGS. After TGS checks the
authorization from KAS, TGS issues two similar credentials (1) a Service Ticket (ST) and
(2) a new encrypted session key to the User as authorization proof to access AP. Then, the
User can finally use them to retrieve the Service from AP. Additionally, both of the TGT
and the ST can be postdated, validated and renewed by KDC when these operations are
permitted in the Kerberos network.
Specification Highlights. Generally, by following the method described in Section 4.3,
the specification for Kerberos itself can be extracted easily. In order to verify Kerberos
comprehensively, we model several keys and timestamps (which could be optional) by
following precisely its official document RFC 4120 [95].
• The user and the server are allowed to specify sub-session keys in the messages.
When a sub-session key is specified, the message receiver must use it to transmit the
next message rather than using the default session-key.
• Optional timestamps are allowed in the user requests and the tickets. In the follow-
ing, fq , tq and rq denote the start-time, the end-time and the maximum renewable
end-time requested by the users. Similarly, sp, ep and rp denote the start-time, the
end-time and the maximum renewable end-time agreed by the servers. sp, ep and rp
are encoded in the tickets, corresponding to fq , tq and rq respectively. An additional
timestamp ap is encoded in the ticket to represent the initial authentication time of
the ticket. Furthermore, cq represents the current-time when the request is made by
the user, and cp stands for the current-time when the ticket is issued by the server. In
Kerberos, fq , rq , sp and rp are optional. So the servers need to check their presence
and construct replies accordingly.
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In this work, two parameters are considered in Kerberos, i.e., the maximum lifetime
§l and the maximum renewable lifetime §r of the tickets. Based on these parameters, the
servers can only issue tickets whose lifetime and renewable lifetime are shorter than §l
and §r respectively. Furthermore, five operations are modeled for the Kerberos servers
as follows. (1) Postdated tickets can be generated for future usage. They are marked as
invalid initially and they must be validated later. (2) Postdated tickets must be validated
before usage. (3) Renewable tickets can be renewed before they expire. (4) Initial tickets
are generated at KAS using user’s client. (5) Sub-tickets are generated at TGS using
existing tickets. Notice that the end-time ep of the sub-ticket should be no larger than the
end-time of the existing ticket. The complete model of Kerberos is available at [2].
Queries. In order to specify the queries, we define three events as follows. Since the
injective authentication is not required, we remove the session id encoded in the events for
simplicity.
• When an initial ticket is generated at KAS, an initauth(〈k, C, S〉, t) event is en-
gaged, where k is the fresh session key, C is the client’s name, S is the target
server’s name, and t is the beginning of the ticket’s lifetime.
• Whenever an new ticket is generated at KAS or TGS, an initgen(〈k, C, S〉, t) event
is engaged. Its arguments have the same meaning as those in initauth .
• Whenever an ticket is accepted by the server, an accept(〈k, C, S〉, t) event is en-
gaged, where k is the agreed session key, C is the client’s name, S is the current
server’s name, and t is the acceptance time.
In Kerberos, we need to ensure the correctness of two timed authentications. First, when-
ever a server accepts a ticket, the ticket should be indeed generated within §l time units
using the same session key. Second, whenever a server accepts a ticket, the initial ticket
should be indeed generated within §r time units.
accept(〈k, C, S〉, t)←[ t − t ′ ≤ §l ]− initgen(〈k, C, S〉, t ′) (4.12)
accept(〈k, C, S〉, t)←[ t − t ′ ≤ §r ]− initauth(〈k′, C, S ′〉, t ′) (4.13)
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Ticket (TGT)
• ap1 = 0
• ep1 = 3
• rp1 = 5
with Authentication Event
• initauth(〈[k1], A[], TGS[]〉, 0)
• initgen(〈[k1], A[], TGS[]〉, 0)
Ticket (ST)
• ap2 = 0
• ep2 = 3
• rp2 = 7
with Authentication Event
• accept(〈[k1], A[], TGS[]〉, 2)
• initgen(〈[k2], A[], AP []〉, 2)
Ticket (ST)
• ap3 = 0
• ep3 = 6
• rp3 = 7
with Authentication Event
• accept(〈[k2], A[], AP []〉, 3)
• initgen(〈[k3], A[], AP []〉, 3)
Service
with Authentication Event
• accept(〈[k3], A[], AP []〉, 6)
KDC
• §l = 3
• §r = 5
Sub-ticket Request for AP
• cp1 = 2
• eq1 = 3
• rq1 = 7
Renew Request
• cp2 = 3
• eq2 = 6
Service Request
• cp3 = 6
FIGURE 4.1: Attack Found in Kerberos V
Verification Results. For the termination of the verification, we need to initially con-
figure the parameters as §r < n ∗ §l, where n can be any integer larger than 1. The
requirement for this constraint is justified as follows. Algorithm 1 updates parameter
configuration at line 15 to eliminate the contradiction rules. Suppose we have a rule
initauth(〈k, C, S〉, t ′) −[ t − t ′ ≤ c ∗ §l ]→ accept(〈k, C, S〉, t) in the rule basis, where
c > 1. This rule is a contradiction to the query (4.13) because §r is not necessarily larger
than c ∗ §l. However, Algorithm 1 can add a new constraint c ∗ §l ≤ §r to the existing
configuration and then continue searching. Since we have infinitely many such rules in
β(Rinit) with different values of c, the verification cannot terminate. Hence, in this work,
we set the initial configuration as §r < 2 ∗ §l to avoid the non-termination. Notice that this
initial configuration does not prevent us from finding attacks because it does not limit the
number of sequential operations allowed in the Kerberos protocol.
After analyzing Kerberos using PTAuth, we have successfully found a security flaw in
its specification document RFC 4120 [95]. (When the network latency is not considered,
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PTAuth directly reports the attack; when the network latency is considered, PTAuth claims
that the protocol is correct only if l ≤ 2 ∗ §pd, which is clearly undesired.) The attack
trace is depicted in Figure 4.1. Suppose the Kerberos is configured with §l = 3 and
§r = 52, and a user Alice has already obtained a renewable ticket at time 0. Then, she
can request for a sub-ticket of AP at time 2 that is renewable until time 7, satisfying rq1
− cp1 ≤ §r. Notice the new sub-ticket’s end-time ep2 cannot be larger than the end-
time ep1 of the existing ticket. Later, she renews the new sub-ticket before it expires and
gets a ticket valid until time 6. Finally, she requests the service at time 6 and engages an
event accept(〈[k3], A[], AP []〉, 6). However, this accept event does not correspond to any
initauth event satisfying Query (4.13), which leads to an attack. In fact, Alice can use this
method to request sub-ticket for AP repeatedly so that she can have access to the service
forever. Obviously, the server who made the authentication initially does not intend to
do so. Fortunately, after checking the source code of Kerberos, we find that this flaw is
prevented in its implementations [90, 74]. An additional checking condition3 has been
inserted to regulate that the renewable lifetime in the sub-ticket should be smaller than the
renewable lifetime in the existing ticket. We later confirmed with Kerberos team that this
is an error in its specification document, which could have led to a security issue but has
not done so in its current implementation.
Corrected Version. After adding the timing constraints on renewable lifetime between
the base-ticket and the sub-ticket, the verification cannot terminate. This is caused by an
infinite dependency trace formed by tickets, as we do not limit its length. Hence, we bound
the number of tickets that can be generated during the verification, which in turn bounds
the number of initgen events in the rule. In this work, we bound the ticket number to five.
This is justified as we have five different methods to generate tickets in Kerberos: the
servers can postdate, validate, renew tickets, generate initial tickets and issue sub-tickets.
After bounding the ticket number that can be generated, our tool proves the correctness of
Kerberos and produces the configuration 0 ≤ §l ≤ §r < 2 ∗ §l.
2 §l and §r are represented by symbols during the verification.
3 For krb5-1.13 from MIT, the checking is located in the file src/kdc/kdc util.c at line 1740 - 1741. We also
checked other implementations, like heimdal-1.5.2.
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4.8 Related Works
As mentioned, this work is related to the work [77] shown in Chapter 3. In this work, we
additionally introduce timing parameters, secrecy and injective authentication properties,
and enhance the computation capability of the timing constraint with PPL. Furthermore,
we provide the algorithm to compute the least constrained secure configuration of param-
eters in this work. We successfully analyze several protocols including Kerberos V and
find an attack in the Kerberos V specification [95] that is unreported before. The analyz-
ing framework closest to ours was proposed by Delzanno and Ganty [54] which applies
MSR(L) to specify unbounded crypto protocols by combining first order multiset rewrit-
ing rules and linear constraints. According to [54], the protocol specification is modified
by explicitly encoding an additional timestamp, representing the initialization time, into
some messages. Thus the attack can be found by comparing the original timestamps with
the new one in the messages. However, it is unclear how to verify timed protocol in gen-
eral using their approach. On the other hand, our approach can be applied to protocols
without any protocol modification. Many tools for verifying protocols [29, 48, 89] are
related. However, they are not designed for timed protocols.
Kerberos has been scrutinized over years using formal methods. In [27], Bella et al. an-
alyzed Kerberos IV using the Isabelle theorem prover. They checked various secrecy and
authentication properties and took time into consideration. However, Kerberos is largely
simplified in their analysis and the specification method in their work is not as intuitive as
ours. Later, Kerberos V has been analyzed by Mitchell et al. [91] using state exploration
tool Murϕ. They claimed that an attack is found in [70] when two servers exists. How-
ever, this attack is actually prevented in Kerberos’s official specification document RFC
1510 [69], which is later superseded by RFC 4120 [95] analyzed in this work. The biggest
advantages of our method is that the verification is given for an unbounded number of
sessions, which is not achievable previously with the state exploration approach. For the
above literatures, they did not consider alternative options supported in the protocol that
may accidentally introduce attacks as we do in this work. Similar to our work, Kerberos V
has been analyzed in a theorem proving context by Butler et al. [36]. They took many fea-
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tures into consideration, i.e., the error messages, the encryption types and the cross-realm
support. These features are not cover in this work since we focus on the timestamps and
timing constraint checking. Meanwhile, our framework can provide intuitive modeling
and automatic verifying, while Kerberos V is analyzed manually in [36].
4.9 Discussions
In this work, we developed an automatic verification framework for timed parameterized
security protocols. It can verify authentication properties as well as secrecy properties for
an unbounded number of protocol sessions. We have implemented our approach into a
tool named PTAuth and used it to analyze a wide range of protocols shown in Section 4.7.
In the experiments, we have found a timed attack in Kerberos V document that has never
been reported before.
Since the problem of verifying security protocols is undecidable in general, we cannot
guarantee the termination of our verification algorithm. When we use PTAuth to analyze
the corrected version of Kerberos, PTAuth cannot terminate because of the infinite depen-
dency chain of tickets. Hence, we have to bound the number of tickets generated in the
protocol. However, in Kerberos, generating more tickets may not be helpful to break its
security. Based on this observation, we want to detect and prune the non-terminable veri-
fication branches heuristically without affecting the final results in our future work. This
could help us to verify large-sized and complex protocols that we cannot verify currently,
as our verification algorithm only considers the general approach at present.
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Chapter 5
Analyzing Software-based Attestation in Practice
An increasing number of “smart” embedded devices are employed in our living environ-
ment. Unlike traditional computer systems, these devices are often physically accessi-
ble to the attackers. It is therefore almost impossible to guarantee that they are un-
compromised, i.e., that indeed the devices are executing the intended software. In such
a context, software-based attestation [108, 110, 106] is deemed as a promising solution to
validate their software integrity. It guarantees that the softwares running on the embedded
devices are un-compromised without any hardware support. However, designing software-
based attestation protocols has been shown as error-prone [111, 39]. In this chapter, we
develop a framework to design and analyze the software-based attestation protocols. We
first propose a generic attestation scheme that captures most existing software-based attes-
tation protocols. After formalizing the security criteria for the generic scheme, we apply
our analysis framework to several well-known software-based attestation protocols and re-
port various potential vulnerabilities. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first practical
analysis framework for software-based attestation protocols.
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5.1 Introduction
“Smart” sensory embedded devices are getting more and more popular. They are fre-
quently used for temperature measurement, fire detection, water saving, etc. In the near
future, they are expected to be ubiquitous. However, their wide adoption poses threats to
our safety and privacy as well. Unlike traditional computer systems, these devices are of-
ten physically accessible to the attackers and it is almost impossible to guarantee that they
are un-compromised, i.e., that indeed the devices are executing the intended software. Ef-
fective techniques for verifying and validating the embedded devices against malicious
adversary becomes increasingly important and urgent. Traditional hardware-based attes-
tation [14, 58, 102, 67] is cost-ineffective in such a context. Thus, software-based attesta-
tion [108, 110, 106], which aims to function without any dedicated security hardware, is
deemed as a promising solution for verifying the integrity of these massive, inexpensive,
and resource constrained devices.
Software-based attestation is based on the challenge-response paradigm between the
trusted verifier and the potentially compromised prover (the embedded device). It typi-
cally works as follows. The verifier first sends a random challenge to the prover and asks
the prover to generate a checksum for its memory state based on the challenge. Since the
prover’s computing and memory resources are designed to be fully utilized in the attesta-
tion, if the memory is tampered by the adversary, the prover needs to take extra time to
compute the correct checksum. We further assume that the verifier knows the expected
memory state of the prover. He thus can compute the same checksum and compare it with
the one received from the prover. By exploiting the fact that the prover is resource con-
strained, software-based attestation ensures that the prover can return the correct response
in time only if it is genuine. On the other hand, whenever the prover fails to reply in time
or returns an incorrect checksum, it is highly likely compromised.
The software-based attestation protocol design is challenging and error-prone [111,
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39]. Hence, in this work, we propose an analysis framework for software-based attesta-
tion that can be easily adopted in practice. First, our framework provides a parameterized
generic software-based attestation scheme that captures most existing software-based at-
testation protocols. The adversary modeled in this work can not only compromise the
prover before the attestation, but also communicate with the compromised prover during
the attestation. We then formalize the security criteria for the generic scheme based on the
knowledge of network latency (which is important as timing is essential here) and adver-
sary model. Since the real software-based attestation protocols are instances of the generic
scheme, these criteria thus naturally should be hold in the real protocols as well. Hence,
we apply our analysis framework to three well-known software-based attestation schemes,
i.e., SWATT [108], SCUBA [106] and VIPER [79], and find four potential vulnerabilities
that have not been reported before. As far as we know, this is the first framework that can
give practical analysis to real software-based attestation protocols.
5.2 Generic Specification for Software-based Attestation
We start with defining a generic software-based attestation scheme which captures most
existing software-based attestation protocols. The idea is that analysis results based on
the generic schema can be extended to concrete protocols readily as we show in later
sections. The generic software-based attestation scheme involves three parties, i.e., the
trusted verifier V , the prover (the embedded device) P and the adversaryA. We denote the
genuine prover and the compromised prover as Pg and Pc respectively. In this section, we
first present the system model, including the system architecture, the security property and
the threat model. Then we propose a generic software-based attestation scheme between
the trusted verifier V and the genuine prover Pg based on our system.
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5.2.1 System Overview
Software-based attestation is proposed to verify the resource constrained embedded de-
vices without using any security hardware (e.g., TPMs [3]). Before presenting the details
of the generic attestation scheme, we first describe the system model employed in this
work. The attestation procedure is conducted between a trusted verifier V and a prover P
over the network. We explicitly consider the network round-trip time (RTT).
The architecture of the verifier V and the prover P considered in this work are depicted
as follows. P consists of a computing processor, several registers and a memory M . The
data memoryMd and the program memoryMp are two different memory space that should
be attested in M . Specifically, Md stores the runtime data (e.g., stack information, data
collected from the environment) that are unpredictable to V , hence its content cannot be
attested directly in the attestation procedure. Mp stores the program code which is known
to V . The attestation routine verif on the prover side is pre-installed in Mp before the
attestation starts. In general, the size of Md could be 0 when the attestation for the data
memory is not required. Notice that some memory can be excluded from the attestation
in some specific attestation protocols [107, 106, 79], and thus Md + Mp may not equal to
M . Meanwhile, V is a powerful base station who can simulate the execution of P . When
V has the image of both Md and Mp in P , V can compute the memory checksum based on
the image.
During the attestation, P’s data memory Md will be first overwritten into a state that
is known to V . The attestation then aims at verifying whether P has a genuine state
for both Md and Mp as V expected. Let State(P) be the memory state of Md + Mp
in the prover P . When State(P) is known to V , the attestation can be modeled by a
game between the verifier V and the prover P . In the game, V first sends a random chal-
lenge to P , and then P picks a checksum reply based on the challenge. The prover P
wins if the used time is less than some threshold and the checksum is correct, other-
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wise P loses the game. We denote the percentage of differences between two memory
states S and S ′ as λ(S, S ′) and the winning probability of P as Pw(L,P), where L de-
notes the system and its configurations. We define an attestation protocol as correct if
Pw(L,Pg) = 1, which means that the genuine prover Pg can always win. On the other
hand, when µ is the least memory proportion that should be modified in the compromised
proverPc to perform a meaningful attack, we define an attestation protocol as 〈ε, µ〉-secure
if ∀Pc, λ(State(Pc), State(Pg)) ≥ µ > 0⇒ Pw(L,Pc) ≤ ε, which means that any prover
who needs to overwrite at least µ percentage of the attested memory has the winning prob-
ability of no more than ε. In the attestation, the adversary wins if and only if he can keep
the malicious code in the attested memory after the attestation. However, software-based
attestation does not guarantee that the device is unmodified before the attestation.
The adversary A’s capability is specified with two phases. Before the attestation be-
gins, A can use unlimited resources to reprogram the memory in Pc. However, A cannot
change the physical hardware and the network infrastructure, so Pc’s memory storage,
computing power and network latency are fixed. Once the attestation starts, A cannot
modify Pc’s memory content anymore. Nevertheless, A can communicate with Pc over
the network and compute with unlimited resources.
Notations. The notations used in this chapter are listed as follows. We write X, Y, Z to
denote sets and x, y, z to denote elements in the sets. f(x : X, y : Y ) → z : Z represents
a function f that maps the tuple of two elements x, y to the element z. Let n be a natural
number. Xn stands for the concatenation of n elements in X . X × Y is the Cartesian
product of X and Y . Let D be a probabilistic distribution over set X . x←[ D ]− X means
assigning an element of X to x according to D. [n . . .m] represents the integers from n
to m. [n,m] stands for the real numbers from n to m. max x,y{f(x, y)} stands for the
maximum value of f(x, y) for any x and y. Pr [x] denotes the probability of x.
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Checksum Computation comp(Sa, g0, r0)
Sa is the memory state of P under attestation.
g0 is the address generator seed.
r0 is the checksum response seed.
for i in [1 . . . n] do
gi = Gen(gi−1);
ai = Addr(gi);
ci = Read(Sa, ai);























FIGURE 5.1: Checksum Computation
5.2.2 Generic Attestation Scheme
In this section, we propose a generic specification for software-based attestation scheme
that captures most existing software-based attestation protocols. The specification is de-
scribed in two parts. First, given a memory state Sa = State(P) of both Md and Mp, we
introduce the checksum computation routine that compute the memory checksum as shown
in Figure 5.1. Then, we illustrate the generic software-based attestation scheme which first
securely erases the data memory Md and then attests the whole memory Md + Mp with
the checksum computation routine.
The checksum computation routine comp(Sa, g0, r0) aims at computing the unforgeable
checksum for memory state Sa based on the initial address generator g0 and initial memory
checksum r0. It iteratively computes the address generator gi, the memory address ai, the
memory content ci and the checksum response ri for i ∈ [1 . . . n] as shown in Figure 5.1.
The four functions used in the generic scheme are illustrated as follows. In the following
chapter, lg, la, lc and lr represent lengths of gi, ai, ci and ri respectively.
• Gen(gi−1 : {0, 1}lg) → gi : {0, 1}lg computes the generator gi of the memory
addresses in a random manner incrementally.














P : Gen0(o, g0)
P : Chk0(o, r0)
P : comp(Sa, g0, r0)
(2.5)
V : bound(t1, t2)
V : equal(comp(Sa, g0, r0), rn)









V ! P : S0d
(1.4) 
P ! V : FIN
(2.4)
P ! V : rn
 V : record(t2)
 M 0d(0)  M 0d(S0d)
 Md(Sd)  Md(S0d)
 Mp(Sp)




 Sa = S0d + Sp
 M 0p(Sp)
FIGURE 5.2: Generic Software-based Attestation Scheme
• Read(Sa : {0, 1}la×{0, 1}lc , ai : {0, 1}la)→ ci : {0, 1}lc reads the memory content
ci located at the address ai in Sa.
• Chk(ri−1 : {0, 1}lr , ci : {0, 1}lc) → ri{0, 1}lr updates the last checksum response
ri−1 with the memory content ci to the new checksum ri.
The generic software-based attestation scheme is shown in Figure 5.2. The functions
used in the figure are illustrated as follows. rand(x) generates a random bit-string and
stores it into x. fill(M,S) fills the memory M with state S. Gen0(o, g0) and Chk 0(o, r0)
derive the initial values for the generator and the checksum from the challenge o and
store them into g0 and r0 respectively. comp(Sa, g0, r0) illustrated previously computes
the checksum for memory state Sa with the generator seed g0 and the response seed r0.
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record(t) records the current time into t. bound(t1, t2) checks whether t2 − t1 is smaller
than a time bound. equal(x, y) checks if x and y are equivalent. I : op means that I
conducts the operation op. I1 → I2 : m means that I1 sends the message m to I2. The
generic software-based attestation scheme proposed in this work is divided into two phases
as shown in Figure 5.2.
Phase 1. Secure Erasure overwrites the data memory Md with random noise. Initially,
P’s data memory image M ′d in V are filled with 0, while Md in P has the memory
state Sd consisting of information generated at runtime. At the end of this phase, P
and P’s image in V have the same memory state S ′d filled with random noise.
1. When V wants to start the attestation, it first overwritesP’s data memory image
M ′d in V to a random state S ′d, which is generated by the rand(S ′d) function.
2. V sends S ′d to P and asks P to overwrite its Md with S ′d.
3. P accepts V’s requests and updates his Md with S ′d. In fact, the last step (1.2)
and this step (1.3) can be streamlined. Whenever P receives a value from V ,
he writes it into the corresponding data memory location.
4. When Md is filled with S ′d, P sends a FIN signal to start the second phase.
Phase 2. Checksum Computation aims at attesting both Md and Mp in P and discov-
ering memory modification with overwhelming probability. When the first phase
is finished, V can run the second phase for multiple times consecutively. Upon the
beginning of the second phase, V knows the memory state Sa = State(P).
1. V first picks a random challenge o.
2. V sends o to P and asks P to compute the checksum for his memory state
Sa = Sp + S
′
d. V also records the time t1 when the request is sent.
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3. After P derives the initial address generator g0 and the initial checksum re-
sponse r0 from the challenge o, he computes the checksum over the memory
state Sa with comp(Sa, g0, r0) illustrated in Figure 5.1.
4. As soon as the checksum computation routine is finished, P sends the check-
sum rn back to V . V again records the time t2 when rn is received.
5. Once V receives rn from P , he checks two conditions: (1) whether the check-
sum is received within the timing threshold {bound(t1, t2) = true} and (2)
whether the checksum is correct {equal(comp(Sa, g0, r0), rn) = true}. If both
of the conditions are satisfied, P is trusted as genuine and V will update P’s
unattested memory. Otherwise, P is deemed as compromised.
Adversary Model. The attacker has full control over the memory of the device. However,
the attacker cannot modify the hardware of the device and increase the computation power
of the device. For instance, the attacker cannot increase the size of the memory with new
memory cards; the attacker cannot increase the clock speed of the processor with the BIOS
settings.
Assumptions. In order to guarantee the correctness of the protocol, we make the fol-
lowing assumptions. First, P either has the attestation procedure verif pre-deployed in
its program memory Mp or can download it into a pre-allocated memory space in Mp at
runtime before the attestation starts. Second, V knows the exact memory image of Mp
in P . Md and Mp share the same address space. Third, the attestation procedure verif
implemented in P is optimal in terms of execution speed. Fourth, S ′d and o are unpre-
dictable to the prover. Fifth, the cryptographic primitives used in the attestation procedure
are perfect. This assumption does not reduce the security offered by our framework to the
real applications. We can update the attestation procedure with the state-of-the-art crypto-
graphic implementations that are unbreakable at the moment. For instance, when a hash
function is needed in the attestation, we use SHA-2 or SHA-3 that are safe for the time
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being. Sixth, the adversary cannot personate the prover and communicate with the verifier
directly, which means that the verifier is connected to the prover via a controllable chan-
nel during the attestation, e.g., a bus used in [79]. When the adversary can personate the
prover, the software-based attestation protocol is trivially broken because the adversary
can answer the challenge for the prover.
5.3 Security Criteria Formalization
In this section, we introduce several attack scenarios. Based on the attacks, we formalize
the security criteria for the generic attestation scheme. When the compromised prover
Pc computes the checksum by itself, we need to discuss two cases: (1) the checksum is
computed with the checksum computation routine at runtime, or (2) the checksum is pre-
computed. In the first case, when the memory and the registers are fully utilized as shown
in Section 5.3.1, we measure the winning probability of Pc who trades computation power
for memory space (memory recovering attack) in Section 5.3.2. In the second case, we
discuss the scenario where Pc stores the pre-computed challenge-response pairs in the its
memory (challenge buffering attack) in Section 5.3.3. On the other hand, whenPc does not
compute the checksum by itself, it can ask A to compute the checksum (proxy attack) as
introduced in Section 5.3.4. When the memory and the registers are fully attested, since the
above three attack methods are orthogonal, the winning probability of the compromised
prover Pw(L,Pc) then can be calculated by the most effective attack among them. Some
used notations are summarized in Table 5.1.
5.3.1 Full Utilization of Memory and Registers
In the checksum computation routine, the memory are accessed in a random manner which
is unpredictable for the prover before the attestation. Whenever the attested memory is
tampered, the malicious prover thus need to take extra time to recover the original memory.
In order to prevent the malicious prover from cheating, every memory address should
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Name Explanation Size
Md(Sd) Data memory Md filled with memory image state Sd md unit
Mp(Sp) Program memory Mp filled with memory image state Sp mp unit
M(S) Overall memory M filled with memory image state S m unit
o The challenge sent from V to P lo bit
gi Address generators for i ∈ [0 . . . n] lg bit
ai Memory addresses for i ∈ [0 . . . n] la bit
ci Memory contents for i ∈ [0 . . . n] lc bit
ri Checksum responses for i ∈ [0 . . . n] lr bit
TminV , T
max
V Network RTT between V and Pg varies from dming to dmaxg -
TminA , T
max
A Network RTT between A and Pc varies from dminc to dmaxc -
dGen , dAddr , dRead , dChk Computation time for Gen, Addr , Read and Chk resp. -
dg The time needed by Pg to compute the memory checksum -
dth The timing threshold on the verifier side -
n The number of iterations in a single checksum computation -
k The number of consecutive checksum computation (Phase 2) -
u The number of registers used to store the checksum -
Table 5.1: Notation Summary
be accessible in the checksum computation. Additionally, the registers should be fully
occupied as well. In this section, we formalize several design principles to ensure fully
utilization of the memory and registers in the checksum computation routine.
Choosing Random Function. During the checksum computation, Gen is a random func-
tion from lg bits to lg bits, and Addr converts the lg bit generators to the la bit addresses.
Thus, we can take the concatenation of Gen and Addr as a random function from lg bits to
la bits. Since all possible addresses should be accessible when the generators are traversed,
proper configuration of the random function in the attestation scheme becomes non-trivial.
We discuss two kinds of randomization functions in this work, i.e., the hash oracle and the
encryption oracle.
The hash oracle receives a bit-string as input and returns a corresponding random
bit-string as output. Since every hash output is computed independently, according to
the coupon collector’s problem, the expected number of independent runs to cover all
possible output values grows as Θ(t · log(t)) where t is the number of possible out-
put values. In other words, if the addresses (ai) and the generators (gi) have the same
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length, it is very likely that some memory addresses are uncovered. For instance, when
the hash function SHA-2 is used and both of the generator and the memory address have
the same length of 32bit, only 64% of the addresses can be covered on average when
the generators are traversed in our experiments. By enumerating all possible genera-
tors in the preparation phase, the adversary may find sufficient uncovered addresses and
use them to store the malicious code. As a consequence, when hash oracle is used in
the attestation protocols, the number of generators should be much larger than the num-
ber of addresses. By applying the tail estimate to the coupon collector’s problem, we
can calculate the probability lower-bound of covering all addresses under attestation as
1− (md +mp)1−2lg/((md+mp)·log(md+mp)).
On the other hand, the encryption oracle can be used to generate random numbers as
well by revealing the encryption key to the public. Since the encryption oracle is bijec-
tive, all of the memory addresses should be covered in the generator traversal when the
generator length is not less than the address length. As a result, the encryption oracle
becomes very suitable for the random number generation in software-based attestation.
Two heavily used implementations of the encryption oracle in the software-based attesta-
tion protocols are the stream cipher RC4 and the T-function [68]. RC4 is chosen as the
PRNG in SWATT [108] because of its extreme efficiency and compact implementation in
the embedded devices. Meanwhile, T-function can produce a single cycle, which ensures
the traversal of generators. Thus, it is employed in ICE scheme proposed in ICUBA [106].
A widely used T-function is x← x+ (x2 ∨ 5) where ∨ is the bitwise or operator.
Full Address Coverage at Runtime. Even though the addresses can be fully covered
in the generator traversal, the actual address coverage is also related to the number of
addresses generated at the runtime, which is decided by the number n in the checksum
computation routine (Figure 5.2) and the repeat time k of the consecutive checksum com-
putation (Phase 2). According to the coupon collector’s problem, in order to fully traverse
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the whole memory space in the attestation procedure, the minimal number of memory
access n · k should satisfy
Pr [n · k > c · (md +mp) · log(md +mp)] ≤ (md +mp)1−c. (5.1)
Full Register Occupation. According to several existing works [108, 106, 79], the regis-
ters in P are frequently used to store the checksum results. During every iteration in the
checksum computation, one of them gets updated to a new value. When any register is
unused in the attestation, the malicious prover can exploit it to conduct attacks. Thus, all
the registers should be occupied. Moreover, the registers should be chosen in a random or-
der so the malicious prover cannot predict which one is used next. Let the total number of
registers used for storing the checksum be u. According to the coupon collector’s problem,
the probability of covering all registers in the checksum computation is lower-bounded by
1− u1−n/(u·log(u)).
5.3.2 Pc Compute Checksum at Runtime: Memory Recovering Attack
Given a genuine prover Pg with the memory state Sg and a compromised prover Pc with
the memory state Sc, the probability of distinguishing their states with a single memory
access depends on two factors. The first factor is the percentage of the differences between
Sg and Sc, which could be defined as λ(Sg, Sc) = Pr [Read(Sg, a) 6= Read(Sc, a)|a ∈
{0, 1}la ]. When λ(Sg, Sc) is sufficiently large, we can easily detect the modifications in the
memory. The second factor is related to the memory content bias in Pg. For instance, the
program in Pg usually contains a large amount of duplicated assembly code such as mov,
jmp, call, cmp, nop, etc. These assembly code can be approximated with high probability.
As a consequence, the compromised prover can overwrite the biased memory content into
malicious code and recover the original content using a recovering algorithm C with high
probability. Assume the overwriting algorithm isW , the minimal overwriting potion is µ,
and memory recovering time dC is no more than δ · dRead as required, we could calculate
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the optimal success probability of the memory recovery as
Pm(S, µ, δ) = max C,W{Pr [Read(S, a) = C(W(S), a)
| a ∈ {0, 1}la ]| δ · dRead ≥ dC ∧ λ(S,W(S)) ≥ µ}
for any recovering algorithm C and overwriting algorithm W . δ is the allowed timing
overhead for the recovering algorithm comparing with the Read operation. We will discuss
more about δ in Section 5.3.4. When δ ≥ 1, we can always implement the recovering
algorithm C for any S as C(S, a) = Read(S, a), so Pm(S, µ, δ) ≥ 1− µ.
Since Pc needs to recover the memory content for n times in the checksum compu-
tation routine, he can compute the correct checksum if either the memory is recovered
successfully for every iteration or the computed checksum collides with the correct one.
So overall success probability for Pc is Pnm(S, µ, δ) + (1 − Pnm(S, µ, δ)) · 2−lr . As can be
seen from the formula, the success probability is lower-bounded by 2−lr . So increasing
n becomes less significant when n becomes larger. As a consequence, we can define a
threshold η for the potential probability increase and then give a lower-bound to the n
used in the checksum computation.




In this work, we suggest to set η = 2−lr which is the success probability’s lower-bound.
Additionally, we recommend the attestation protocols to set n as the lower-bound given
in formula (5.2) for efficiency and conduct the checksum computation phase (Phase 2) for
multiple times to give better security guarantee.
Full Randomization of Data Memory. In the first phase of the generic attestation scheme,
V asksP to overwrite its data memory with S ′d filled with noise. The unpredictability of S ′d
enforces P to erase its data memory completely. A similar design is taken in [44], but its
S ′d is generated by P using a PRNG seeded by a challenge sent from V . As we discussed
above, the recovering algorithm can use the PRNG to generate the memory state with the
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received challenge at runtime, so Pc can trade the computation time for memory space. As
a result, Pc can keep the malicious code in its memory, but still produce a valid checksum.
In Section 5.3.4, we show that the checksum computation can have overhead to a degree,
so this attack is practical. We thus emphasize that S ′d should be fully randomized by V .
5.3.3 Pc Pre-compute Checksum: Challenge Buffering Attack
The attestation scheme is trivially vulnerable to challenge buffering attack that stores the
challenge-response pairs directly in the memory. Upon receiving a particular challenge
from V , Pc looks for the corresponding checksum from its memory without computation.
Since S ′d and o are received in the attestation procedure, the challenge-response stored in
the memory is the tuple 〈o, rn〉 which has the length of lo + lr. Thus, the memory can
hold m · lc/(lo + lr) records at most. Additionally, we have 2lo different receivable values.
When Pc cannot find the record, he can choose a random response from {0, 1}lr . As a
consequence, the probability of computing the correct response with challenge buffering
attack method for Pc can be expressed as follows.





(lo + lr) · 2lo (5.3)
As can be seen, Pb(lo, lc, lr,md,m) is also lower-bounded by 2−lr . So we make the similar
suggestion for formula (5.3) as in Section 5.3.2 that b · (1− 2−lr) ≤ 2−lr .
5.3.4 Pc Forward Checksum Computation to A: Proxy Attack
As reported in [79], the software-based attestation is particular vulnerable to the proxy
attack, in which the compromised prover Pc forwards the challenge to the adversary A (a
base station) and asks A to compute the checksum for it. In order to prevent the proxy
attack, the expected checksum computation time should be no larger than a time bound,
so that Pc does not have time to wait for the response from A. However, one assumption
should be made that A cannot personate Pc and communicate with V directly. Otherwise,
116
the software-based attestation is trivially broken. The assumption can be hold when V is
connected to Pc using special channels (e.g., bus, usb) that A has no direct access to.
Assume the network RTT between V and Pg varies from TminV to TmaxV and the honest
prover Pg can finish the checksum computation with time dg = n · (dGen +dAddr +dRead +
dChk), the timing threshold dth on the verifier side thus should be configured as
dth ≥ dg + TmaxV (5.4)
to ensure the correctness of the attestation protocol defined in Section 5.2. Hence, the
maximum usable time for Pc can be defined as dc(T ) = dth − T , where T ∈ [TminV , TmaxV ]
is the real network latency between Pc and V .
On one hand, Pc could use dc(T ) to conduct the proxy attack. If the network RTT
between A and Pc varies from TminA and TmaxA , in order to prevent the proxy attack com-
pletely, we need to make sure that dc(TminV ) < T
min
A , which means the proxy attack cannot
be conducted even under the optimal RTT forPc. Thus, the attestation time for the genuine






On the other hand, Pc could use dc(T ) to conduct the memory recovering attack. So
we calculate the δ specified in the memory recovery attack as follows.
dGen + dAddr + δ · dRead + dChk








Since, δ ∝ d−1g ∝ n−1, in order to keep the δ small, the checksum computation routine
should use the largest n as possible, when formula (5.4) and (5.5) are still satisfied.
5.4 Case Studies
In this section, we analyze three well-known software-based attestation protocols, i.e.,
SWATT [108], SCUBA [106] and VIPER [79]. Since the generic software-based attes-
tation scheme is configured with the parameters listed in Table 5.1, we first extract them
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Parameters SWATT SCUBA VIPER
lo, lg, lr (bit) 2048, 16, 64 128, 16, 160 -, 32, 832
lc, la (bit) 8, 14 8, 7 8, 13
md,mp,m (unit) 1K, 16K, 17K 0K, 512, 58K 0K, 8K, 4120K
TminA , T
max
A - ≤ 22ms, 51ms 1152ns(43.34ms), 44.10ms
TminV , T
max
V - ≤ 22ms, 51ms 1375ns, 1375ns
dth , dg -, 1.8s 2.915s, 2.864s 2300ns, 827ns
n, k, u 3.2E+05, 1, 8 4.0E+04, 1, 10 3, 300, 26
Table 5.2: Settings of Software-based Attestation Protocols Studied in Section 5.4
from the real protocols as shown in Table 5.2. As can be seen, our generic attestation
scheme can capture existing software-based attestation protocols readily. Then, we apply
the security criteria described in Section 5.3 manually to the extracted parameters to find
security flaws. In the following subsections, we briefly introduce the protocols first, and
then give detailed vulnerabilities and justifications grouped by the topics in bold font. We
mark the topics with “?” if they are reported for the first time in the literature.
5.4.1 SWATT
SWATT [108] randomly traverses the memory to compute the checksum. Its security is
guaranteed by the side channel on time consumed in the checksum computation. SWATT
does not consider network RTT, so we do not discuss time related properties for SWATT.
In addition, SWATT uses RC4 as the PRNG and takes the challenge as the seed of the
RC4. As the length of the challenge chosen in the SWATT is not mentioned in [108], we
assume that the challenge is long enough to fully randomize the initial state of RC4, which
means lo = 256 · 8 bits.
Unattested Data Memory. The micro-controller in SWATT has 16KB program memory
and 1KB data memory. Based on the analysis of the generic attestation scheme, SWATT
is insecure because it neither has Secure Erasure Phase to overwrite the data memory
nor uses any additional complement to secure the data memory. In fact, the authors of
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SWATT assumed in [108] that non-executable data memory can do no harm to the security
of software-based attestation by mistake. In [39], Castelluccia et al. point out that the
data memory should be verified in SWATT, otherwise the protocol is vulnerable to the
ROP [109, 34] attack. In this work, we suggest to securely erase the data memory in
SWATT by following our generic attestation scheme.
?Too Large Iteration Number for Computing One Checksum. The main loop of
SWATT has only 16 assembly instructions, which takes 23 machine cycles. Inserting one
if statement in the loop will cause additional 13% overhead. As a result, we assume that
the recovering algorithm C only has time to read the memory content as Read does without
doing any extra computation. Hence, the success probability of the memory recovering of
SWATT becomes Pm(S, µ, δ) = 1−µ, where µ is the percentage of the modified memory.
According to the formula (5.2), after setting η as suggested, we have n ≥ −64/log(1−µ).
When µ = 0.001 which left only 16 byte memory for the adversary, we should set n
as 44340, which is much smaller than the iteration number 320000 used in SWATT. In
order to increase the difficulty of attacking the attestation protocol and traverse the mem-
ory address in the platform, more rounds of checksum computation could be conducted.
According to formula (5.1), when µ = 0.001, n = 44340 and c = 2 (the same setting
in SWATT), we have k ≥ 11. So we should conduct the checksum computation for 11
times. By using this new configuration, the overall memory access time is approximately
the same as SWATT while security guarantee becomes dramatically better.
5.4.2 SCUBA
SCUBA [106] is a software-based attestation protocol that based on Indisputable Code
Execution (ICE). Rather than attesting the whole memory, the ICE offers security guar-
antee by only verifying a small portion of the code. The Read and Chk implemented in
the ICE scheme are different from those given in Section 5.2.2. However, they can be
generalized into our framework. In SCUBA, Read not only reads the memory content, but
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also returns the Program Pointer (PC ), the current address, the current generator, the loop
counter and other registers. The Chk function then computes the checksum based on all
of them. In order to compute the correct checksum for the modified attestation routine, the
malicious prover has to simulate the execution for all of them, which thus lead to large and
detectable overhead on the computation time. If the malicious prover do not change the
attested code, the attested code can update the prover’s whole memory to a genuine state
so the malicious code shall be removed from the prover.
?Proxy Attack is Indefensible. In SCUBA, network RTT is explicitly evaluated in the
experiment as summarized in Table 5.2. The prover in SCUBA communicates with the
verifier over wireless network. Even though the adversary is assumed to be physically
absent during the attestation in SCUBA, this assumption seems to be too strong to be hold
when a wireless network presents. Thus, we give a detailed analysis for the proxy attack
to SCUBA as follows.
According to [106], the maximum network RTT is 51ms in SCUBA. By observing
the experiment results, the minimum network RTT should be no larger than 22ms. As the
adversary and the verifier share the same wireless network, the network latency for their
communication with the prover should be indifferent. So we have TminA = T
min
V ≤ 22ms
and TmaxA = T
max
V = 51ms. According to formula (5.4), we have dth ≥ dg + TmaxV ≥
51ms. On the other hand, according to formula (5.5), we have dth < TminA +T
min
V ≤ 44ms.
Hence, we cannot find a valid threshold dth from this network configuration. When the
adversary presents in the attestation, the proxy attack thus cannot be defended by SCUBA
without additional assumptions.
Moreover, if the verifier does not communicate with the prover with a secure channel
(e.g., the verifier uses the wireless network to the communicate with the prover in this
case), the adversary can personate the prover and send the checksum to the verifier directly.
Since the adversary can compromise the prover, he can obtain the secret key stored in
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the prover as well. So encrypting the wireless channel will not work. We suggest that
the verifier should communicate with the prover in an exclusive method, such as the usb
connection, which is also inexpensive. More importantly, the adversary cannot use this
communication method as it is highly controllable.
Security Claim Justification. Our framework can not only be used to find potential vul-
nerabilities, but also give justifications to the security claims made in existing works. In
SCUBA [106], the malicious prover may exploit the network latency to conduct memory
recovering attack without being detected. However, if the timing overhead of the attack is
even larger than the largest network latency, the attack then becomes detectable. Accord-
ing to this, the authors of SCUBA claim that the checksum computation time adopted in
SCUBA can always detect the memory copy attack, which is the most efficient memory
recovering attack method known to the authors, even if the malicious prover can commu-
nicate without network delay.
In this work, we can justify their security claim with our framework. When the proxy
attack is not considered in SCUBA, increasing the checksum computation time does not
introduce vulnerability. According to formula (5.6), we have dc(T )/dg = (dth − T )/dg.
The experiment results in [106] show that the memory copy attack is most efficient at-
tack which introduces 3% overhead to the checksum computation. In order to detect the
memory copy attack, we should ensure that ∀T ∈ [TminV , TmaxV ], dc(T )/dg < 1.03. As we
assume that the malicious prover can communicate without network delay, we set TminV
as 0. By applying formula (5.4), we have dg > 1700ms. Since dg chosen in SCUBA is
indeed larger than 1700ms, the security claim made by the authors is valid.
5.4.3 VIPER
VIPER [79] is a software-based attestation scheme designed to verify the integrity of pe-
ripherals’ firmware in a typical x86 computer system. They are proposed to defend all
known software-based attacks, including the proxy attack.
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?Absence of Random Function. VIPER uses a similar design as ICE scheme, while its
generators are not produced by a PRNG during the checksum computation, which does
not comply to our generic attestation scheme. The authors implement the checksum func-
tion into 32 code blocks. One register is updated in every code block with the memory
content and the program counter (PC). Both of the code block and the memory address
are chosen based on the current checksum. Thus, the randomness of the checksum is
purely introduced by the PC and the memory content. However, the PC is incremented in
a deterministic way inside each code block and the memory content usually is biased as
illustrated in Section 5.3.2. As the randomness could be biased, the adversary can traverse
all challenge values and he may find some memory addresses that are unreachable for
the checksum computation routine, as we discussed in Section 5.3.1. Hence, the security
provided by VIPER is unclear.
?Insufficient Iteration Number. In VIPER, the number of iterations used in the checksum
computation routine is only 3, which leads to at least 23 unused registers in the attestation.
Vulnerabilities may be introduced as discussed in Section 5.3.1. Even if the registers are
chosen in a fully randomized manner and the adversary cannot predict which register will
be used beforehand, the malicious prover still has a high probability to use some registers
without being detected. In fact, two or even one register could be enough for conducting
an attack in practice.
5.5 Related Works
A large amount of software-based attestation protocols have been designed and imple-
mented [66, 108, 63, 110, 107, 106, 120, 62, 7, 97, 79, 71]. Specifically, SWATT [108] is a
software-based attestation scheme that uses the response timing of the memory checksum
computation to identify the compromised embedded devices. In order to prevent replay at-
tack, the prover’s memory is traversed in SWATT in a random manner based on a challenge
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sent from the verifier. Rather than attesting the whole memory content, SCUBA [106] only
checks the protocol implemented in the embedded devices and securely updates the mem-
ory content of the embedded devices after the attestation is finished successfully. It is
based on the ICE (Indisputable Code Execution) checksum computation scheme, which
enables the verifier to obtain an indisputable guarantee that the SCUBA protocol will be
executed as untampered in the embedded devices. VIPER [79] is later proposed to de-
fense against the adversary who can communicate with the embedded devices during the
attestation. Network latency is consider in VIPER to prevent the proxy attack. Perito et
al. [97] develop a software-based secure code update protocol. It first overwrites the target
device’s whole memory with random noise and then asks the target device to generate a
checksum based on its memory state. The target device could generate the correct check-
sum only if it has erased all its memory content, so the malicious code should also be
removed. Besides the attestation protocol designed for resource constrained devices, Se-
shadri et al. [107] develop the software-based attestation protocol named Pioneer for the
Intel Pentium IV Xeon Processor with x86 architecture.
However, the software-based attestation protocol design is challenging and error-prone [111,
39]. Hence, it becomes necessary and urgent to develop an analysis framework for the at-
testation protocol design. Armknecht et al. [15] recently provide a security framework
for the analysis and design of software attestation. In their work, they assume the crypto-
graphic primitives such as Pseudo-Random Number Generators (PRNGs) and hash func-
tions might be insecure and give a upper-bound to the advantage of the malicious prover
in the attestation scheme. They mainly consider six factors: (1) the memory content could
be biased; (2) the memory addresses traversed in the checksum computation may not be
fully randomized; (3) the memory addresses could be computed without using the default
method; (4) the correct checksum could be computed without finishing the checksum com-
putation routine; (5) the checksum could be generated without using the default checksum
computation function; (6) the challenge-response pairs could be pre-computed and stored
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in the memory. In this work, we do not consider factor (2-5) based on two reasons. First,
the attestation routine used in the protocol can be updated at runtime, so we can always up-
date the cryptographic functions to meet the higher security standard and requirement. For
instance, since the hash function like MD5 could be insecure, we can replace it with SHA-
2 or SHA-3 to reclaim security. More importantly, the upper-bounds of the factor (2-5)
are very hard to measure in practice. For example, given a well-known weak hash func-
tion like MD5, it is hard to measure the time-bounded pseudo-randomness, corresponding
to factor (2), defined in [15]. Comparing with [15], we additionally consider observable
network latency, stronger threat model, unpredictable data memory, several security crite-
ria and various attack schemes. More importantly, our framework has been successfully
applied to several existing software-based attestation protocols to find vulnerabilities.
5.6 Discussions
In this work, we present a practical analysis framework for software-based attestation
scheme. We explicitly consider the network latency and the data memory in the system.
Furthermore, the adversary presented in this work can not only reprogram the compro-
mised provers before the attestation but also communicate with them during the attestation.
We successfully apply our framework to three well-known software-based attestation pro-
tocols manually. The results show that our framework can practically find security flaws
in their protocol design and give justifications to their security claims.
The deployment environment, including device architecture, network environment, ef-
ficiency requirement, etc. usually complicates the correctness of the software-based at-
testation protocols. Specifically, identifying the most effective overwriting and recovering
algorithms becomes very hard, which limits the application of our framework. For fu-
ture works, we believe that fine-grain measurement for the overwriting and recovering
algorithms in the practical application context is useful. Another future work is investi-
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gating the impact of timing requirement when the attestation efficiency is concerned. In
this work, we assume that software-based attestation can take as much time as it needs.
Nevertheless, in reality, we may require the attestation protocols to be finished within a
timing threshold. Hence, the probability of identifying the compromised prover will be





In the thesis, we first present an analysis to a vehicle charging protocol in Chapter 2 that
considers many security properties including secrecy, authentication and privacy. During
the analysis, we find several weaknesses of the existing tools as they either make strong
abstractions during the verification or cannot verify security protocols for an unbounded
number of sessions. Hence, we propose a verification framework that can verify protocols
of an unbounded number of sessions without abstraction, which is particularly useful for
verifying timed security protocols as shown in Chapter 3. We prove the partial correctness
of the verification algorithm and use it to check many security protocols efficiently. Con-
sidering the timing is fixed in Chapter 3 but it should be flexible in design, we extend our
framework with capabilities to verify parameterized timed protocols in Chapter 4. Further-
more, we develop the timed applied pi-calculus as a specification language so that timed
security protocols can be specified in a concise and natural way. However, the security
protocols may consider physical properties in their execution context so that they cannot
be specified and verified using symbolic verification method directly. In order to analyze
the protocols with physical properties, we propose an analysis approach to generalize the
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protocol design into a generic scheme and check the correctness based on the scheme in
Chapter 5. We use this approach to analyze a family of the software-based attestation
protocols and find several security weaknesses in them.
Based on the above works, I believe that our framework can be applied to verifying
real security protocol specifications and implementations efficiently and automatically.
Extensions required for specific domains can be extended to our framework readily. By
using my current works as a verification foundation, I would like to continue my research
in the following research topics.
Automatic verification for security protocol implementations. The protocol implemen-
tation usually does not completely comply with its formal specification. This can result
from the incomplete interface specifications, additional environment requirements, etc. In
order to ensure the correctness of protocol implementation, studying the approach that
extracts the security protocol directly from their implementations and verifies it in our
framework can be very interesting. The basic idea is as follows. First, we need to translate
the implementation into an intermediate representation consisting of branches guarded by
condition checking, API invoking and network communication using Control Flow Graph
(CFG) [8]. Then, the intermediate model can be transformed into our verification frame-
work based on the functional mapping between the APIs and their symbolic representa-
tions. Finally, if any security flaw is found during the verification, we need to validate it in
the original implementation and refine the protocol abstraction whenever false alarm oc-
curs. I believe the automatic verification of security protocol implementations is extremely
promising.
A heuristic method for pruning non-terminable verification branches. The security
protocol verification for an unbounded number of sessions has been proved as undecidable,
so the termination of verification cannot be guaranteed in general. In our framework, the
nontermination is introduced by two factors: the infinite knowledge deduction and the
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infinite timing expansion. We resolve the second one by introducing over-approximation
to the timing constraints. However, the first factor still persists in our framework. Even
though no general approach exists for deciding the termination of verification process,
detecting the non-terminable cases heuristically is still possible so that we can prune some
of the verification branches without affecting the final result. This work could help us
to verify large-sized and complex protocols that we cannot verify currently, because our
verification algorithm only considers the general approach at present.
A compositional approach for automatic security protocol generation. Designing se-
curity protocols is challenging and error-prone. Fortunately, automatic generation of se-
curity protocols is possible. Several methods [99, 98] have been previously proposed by
many researchers. However, existing methods are inefficient. Recently, a new compo-
sitional security paradigm is proposed, which is called universal composable (UC) secu-
rity [37]. It has a salient property that a secure protocol can be constructed with an arbi-
trary set of protocol components compositionally. Under this paradigm, we can specify
these security protocol components in our security protocol verification framework, and
efficiently search for security protocols with the required properties under our framework.
Extending PAT to verify security protocols. PAT [117] has been successfully applied to
verifying security protocols [88]. PAT is a compact tool which supports verification of real-
time systems [10, 116] with model checking [114, 81] as well as hybrid approach [115]. I
believe that extending PAT with security protocol verification could make it a comprehen-
sive verification tool for the end-users. The security protocol verification could also benefit
from its explicit model checking engine to handle protocol states and global variables.
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